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I. INTRODUCTION
Employment discrimination literature is filled with analysis of
the Supreme Court decisions constricting plaintiffs' rights under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1
 Both pro-plaintiffs and
pro-defendant commentators3
 agree that in the last few years the
' 42 U.S.C. §* 2000e-2000e-7 (1988).
t See Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court's 1988 Term: The Employment
Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1
(1989).
3 See Francis 1'. Coleman, New Rules for Civil Rights, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 78. The
pro-defendant bar characterizes the shift as the restoration of a "level playing field in
employment discrimination .... The Court has made it clear that the adjudication of the
civil-rights controversies in the workplace will now be governed by the same legal principles
that apply to every other kind of litigation." Id. at 80. We have characterized this shift as the
jurisprudence of nostalgia. See Judith Olans Brown & Phyllis Tropper Baumann, Nostalgia
as Constitutional Doctrine: Legalizing Norman Rockwell's America, 15 VT. L. REV. 49 (1990)
[hereinafter Brown & Baumann, Nostalgia].
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Court has dramatically reoriented title VII jurisprudence to favor
the employer. 4 Nevertheless, remarkably little scholarship explores
what these opinions teach about the complex and subtle interrela-
tionships between procedural and substantive law. 5 The dearth of
literature may be partially attributable to the tendency in our juris-
prudence to treat procedure and substance as discrete and distinct. 6
Moreover, academic proceduralists lack expertise in particular sub-
See, e.g., Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) (for-
bidding fee shifting against losing but non-frivolous intervenors); Lorance v. AT&T Tech-
nologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (commencing the running of the statute of limitations
prior to plaintiff's knowledge of the injury); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (permitting
non-parties unlimited time to reopen consent decrees); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (transforming an affirmative defense into an additional element of the
prima facie case). This pro-defendant trend in civil rights cases has not been limited to title
VII. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (limiting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 to the formation of an employment contract); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs). The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 appears to overturn several of the title VII cases discussed in this article. See
Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071. The primary change wrought by
the new act was to "codify," 3(2), the affirmative defenses established in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 901 U.S. 424 (1971), and to restore the protections against employment discrim-
ination "weakened," § 2(2), by Wards Cove. We will discuss the specific provisions of the Act
throughout this article. The enactment of this legislation strengthens our thesis that proce-
dure cannot be divorced from substance and, indeed, that the reality of legal practice belies
the sterility of separating substance from procedure.
5 Indeed, few scholars have studied these relationships in the context of a specific
substantive field. Notable exceptions are Edward Brunet & David J. Sweeney, Integrating
Antitrust Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale Stationers:- Evolving Antitrust Ap-
proaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof and Boycotts, 72 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1986); Robert M.
Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J.. 718 (1975);
Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the
Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842 (1974); George Rutherglen, Notice, Scope,
and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. REV. It (1983) [hereinafter Rutherglen,
Preclusion]; George Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. 688 (1980) [here-
inafter Rutherglen, Class Actions]. See also Stephen B. Burbank, Interjurisdictional Preclusion,
Full Faith and Credit and Federal Common Law: A General Approach, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 733
(1986) [hereinafter Burbank, Preclusion]; William C. Baskin, Note, Using Rule 9(h) to Reduce
Nuisance Securities Litigation, 99 YALE L.J. 1591 (1990). The lack of scholarship integrating
substance, procedure and practice in given fields is ironic because practitioners internalize
these relationships and understand their impact on critical questions such as which cases to
take and settlement value. See Judith Olans Brown et al., There are No Good Advocates in
Cubbyholes, Learning & L., Winter 1975, at 54 (published by the A.B.A. Section of Legal
Education and Admissions to the Bar).
6 For treatment of the separation of procedure and substance historically, see Stephen
N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical
Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 9Q9 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity); Stephen N. Subrin,
David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 LAW
& FI/ST. REV. 311 (1988) [hereinafter Subrin, Field]; Laurens Walker, Criteria For Adoption or
Retention of Federal Civil Rules (April 5, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the BOSTON
COLLEGE LAw Rxvtcw) (subsection titled "The 1938 Civil Rules").
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stantive fields; substantive specialists are uncomfortable with pro-
cedural niceties.
During the first fifty years of this century, several suppositions
developed about the ideal civil procedure and its appropriate rela-
tionship to substantive law. 7 This article questions those suppositions
with respect to cases arising under title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. 8
 Perhaps the primary supposition is that procedure and
substantive law should be separate categories, and that the former
must remain subservient to the latter, In the first half of the century,
many sophisticated scholars understood the difficulty of delineating
a firm boundary between substance and procedure; 9
 even so, they
preferred to treat procedure as separate from substantive law.'°
Recall the creed of Charles Clark, the drafter of much of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: procedure was to be the handmaid rather
than the mistress of justice."
A second supposition is that this subservient procedure should
be non-technical,' 2
 or "simple." In other words, procedural rules
should be flexible and accommodating, rather than rigid, defini-
tional and confining. Third, and corollary, is that procedural rules
should be uniform: that is, they should apply in all courts (federal
7
 Subrin, Equity, supra note 6, at 943-73; Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules,
and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV.
1999, 2001 (1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules]; Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in
American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. J. 1648 (1981) [hereinafter Subrin, New Era].
Although we primarily discuss race-based discrimination in this essay, our observations
apply with equal force to title VII sex discrimination cases. For a fuller discussion of the
gender issues, see Judith Olans Brown et al., The Failure of Gender Equality: An Essay in
Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 573 (1987) [hereinafter Brown, et al., Constitutional
Dissonance].
9
 See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, "Substance" and"Procedure" Revisited with Some Afterthoughts
on the Constitutional Problems of "Irrebuttable Presumptions," 30 UCLA L. REV. 189, 199-.202
(1982) (citing, inter alia, Walter W. Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws,
42 YALE L.J. 333, 336-37, 341, 345 (1933)); see also Robert G. Bone, Mapping the Boundaries
of a Dispute: Conceptions of Ideal Lawsuit Structure from the Field Code to the Federal Rules, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 88-89, 96, 98 (1989).
10
 See, e.g., Risinger, supra note 9, at 202. As Professor Risinger points out, the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934 granted the Supreme Court "the power to prescribe by general rules,
the ... procedure .. [which] shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .. ."
Id. at 202 n.51. For the historical background of the procedural/substantive distinction in the
Rules Enabling Act, see Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1015 (1982). See also Walker, supra note 6.
" Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WAsH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938) (quoting In
re Coles, [1907] 1 K.B. 4); Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA.
L. REv. 517, 542 (1925) (same).
12 See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1975 (1989); Subrin, Equity, supra note 6, at 939-73.
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and state) and to all cases, regardless of their substance." The latter
is the notion of transsubstantive procedure." There is one final
premise: procedural rules should be politically neutral, neither fa-
voring nor disfavoring certain categories of cases or litigants.' 5 The
twentieth century procedural reformers had convinced federal and
state legislators to cede procedural rule-making power to the judi-
ciary, arguing that "mere procedure" 16 was only adjective law. These
' 5 Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 7, at 2002-06.
14 Robert Cover used the term "transsubstantive" when discussing the benefits of and
problems with applying a single set of procedural rules to a myriad of substantive claims. See
Cover, supra note 5, at 718-40. We do not recall seeing the term previously used. For a
description of the current debate over the desirability of transsubstantive procedure, see
Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1939-40 (1989) [hereinafter Burbank, Transformation]; Stephen N.
Subrin, Fireworks on the 50th Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, JunicA•uttE,
June/July 1989 at 4 [hereinafter Subrin, Fireworks]. See the March 2, 1967 letter from
Benjamin Kaplan to Dean Acheson, in which Professor Kaplan, then Reporter to the Advisory
Committee, suggests a study to determine "whether the unitary court procedures now in
vogue could be deliberately altered to accommodate better to the several types." Burbank,
Transformation, supra, at 1966; see also Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 7, at 2025-26, 2038-
43, 2048-51; Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions;
An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
2067, 2067-69, 2113-15 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244-47 (1989); Maurice
Rosenberg, The Federal Civil Rules After Half a Century, 36 ME. L. REv. 2343 (1984). Professor
Rosenberg suggests that cases may be better served by differentiated procedural treatments,
but that the integration need not be along substantive lines. For instance, one might want
"simple" cases to have different procedural treatment from "complex" ones, without regard
to the substance of the case. Maurice Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action;
Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2211-12 (1989). A bill introduced by Senator
Joseph Biden and others encourages federal district courts to experiment with providing
different procedural tracks for different types of civil cases. S. 2648, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
473(a) (1990).
15 See Carrington, supra note 14, at 2074-79. When talking about law, the normative
"should be" is treated sometimes like a realistic description of what "is." Professor Carrington
treats the current Federal Rules as both aspiring to and achieving such political neutrality.
He acknowledges, however, that we are not any more likely to perfect neutrality in the
rulemaking process or in the procedure rules themselves than in other human institutions,
and that there should not be a pretense that we have. Id. at 2074. For critiques of Professor
Carrington's views, see Burbank, Transformation, supra note 14, at 1935-41; Benjamin Kaplan,
Comments on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. Rev. 2125, 2126-67 (1989). For evidence of the political
nature of procedural rule-making in the United States, see Peter G. Fish, William Howard
Taft and Charles Evans Hughes; Conservative Politicians as Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 Sur. Cr.
REv. 123 passim (twentieth century procedural reform); Subrin, Equity, supra note 6, at 943—
73 (twentieth century procedural reform); Subrin, Field, supra note 6, at 319-27.
16 Justice Sutherland, in testifying in favor of a rules enabling ad, answered a question
from Senator Albert B. Cummins on the "proper construction of the words 'practice and
procedure.'" Justice Sutherland stated: "Well, I don't know that I can give any precise
definition. They apply, of course, wholly to the adjective law, They could not involve the
making of any substantive law, because the Congress would be powerless to delegate such
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reformers viewed procedural law as non-political and less essential
than substantive law, which was understood to be the province of
the legislature.' 7
Of course, there is some truth behind all of these suppositions.
For example, no one denies the gross distinction between substan-
tive and procedural law. As a typical civil procedure casebook be-
gins:
Law can be conveniently divided into two categories, sub-
stance and procedure. Substantive law defines legal rights
and duties in everyday conduct . . . . Procedural law sets
out the rules for enforcing substantive rights in the courts
. . . . The line between substance and procedure is some-
times difficult to draw, but the basic distinction is central
to the theory of procedure. 18
But procedural separateness makes little sense in the real world.
Procedure is the language substance frequently must speak. Sub-
stance tends to be a museum piece—admired, but not used—unless
it is delivered by the procedure.
In practical terms, substantive law largely affects behavior
through procedure. It is true that the mere existence of substantive
law will alter some behavior. Equally important, however, are the
procedural incidents. A good example is the heated debate over the
proposed Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991) 9 Although the drafts
dealt largely with technical aspects of the burdens of proof, Presi-
dent Bush claimed that the bill would materially change employer
behavior, leading to quotas. 2° The proponents of the bills insisted
power to the courts." Burbank, Enabling Act, supra note 10, at 1078 (citing Procedure in Federal
Courts, Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the House judiciary Comm., 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1924)).
" For instance, Thomas Shelton, who spearheaded the American Bar Association move-
ment for uniform federal procedural rules, wrote of "jurisdictional and fundamental matters
and general procedure," which were the province of the legislature, and the "rules of practice
directing the manner of bringing parties into court and the course of the court thereafter,"
which should be the province of the judiciary. THOMAS SHELTON, SPIRIT OF THE COURTS at
xxiv–xxv (1918). For a description of Shelton's part in the movement, see Subrin, Equity,
supra note 6, at 948-61. For a comprehensive study of the history and background of the
distinction between the terms "substantive" and "procedural" within the meaning of the
Enabling Act of 1934, see Burbank, Enabling Act, supra note 10.
" RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1 (1989).
19
 For a good discussion of both positions, see Elizabeth Drew, Letter From Washington,
THE NEW YORKER, June 17, 1991, at 102.
20 See infra text accompanying notes 415-17. Note the length of time—nearly two years—
that President Bush effectively blocked passage of the civil rights acts by relying on this
overlap of substance and procedure. It was not until a compromise was reached on the highly
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that the legislation was necessary to effectuate the substantive pro-
visions of title VII. 21 The point is this: both sides agreed that bur-
dens of proof will alter behavior outside the courtroom. And in-
deed, in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress has
recognized our point that the effectiveness of a law is largely deter-
mined by the intersection of substance and procedure.
The relationships between substance and process are not lim-
ited to the trial. As pleading requirements stiffen, 22 the threshold
need to establish the prima facie case increasingly dictates the con-
tents of complaints. Parsing substance into the elements of the
prima facie case and allocating burdens of proof directly affect the
amount of discovery needed. This is also true for the factual inves-
tigation required under Federal Rule 11; the more elements the
plaintiff must prove, the more topics the lawyer must investigate
before filing a complaint. Finally, the delineation of the proper
elements of the prima facie case is crucial to survive a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, if, as has become more common,
the judge requires a specific fact-based complaint. 23
Today we realize as well the fallacy behind the second assump-
tion, which posits that all procedural rules should be or can be kept
flexible. In response to the need to clarify and to draw lines, courts,
treatise writers and legislators soon made the original general rules
of the Field Code and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure signif-
icantly more definitional.24 Without such definition, procedure can-
not facilitate uniform results. To the extent that substantive law and
procedural rules remain open-textured, judicial decision-making
must be ad hoc. The result is that two similarly situated parties
suffering similar harms may be treated quite differently by different
judges. 25
technical burden-shifting language that the substantive effects of the the legislation were
realized with its passage in November, 1991. Telephone interviews with Barbara Arnwine,
Executive Director, Lawyer's Committees for Civil Rights Under Law, Washington, D.C. (Oct.
1991). Ms. Arnwine participated extensively in the negotiations with the White House.
2' See infra notes 415-17 and accompanying text; 'see also Drew, supra note 19.
" See infra text accompanying notes 137-80.
SS See infra text accompanying notes 156-80.
" See Subrin, Equity, supra note 6, at 939-42, 982-86; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note
7, at 2018-26, 2045-46.
" See, e.g., P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial
Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. Ray. 1249, 1271 (1980); Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of
Complexity, 85 MICR. L. REV. 1463, 1468-70, 1474 (1987) [hereinafter Burbank, Complexity]
(book review). See also SAUL M. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS (Fed,
Jud. Center 1985), reprinted in RULE 11 AND OTHER SANCTIONS—NEW ISSUES IN FEDERAL
LITIGATION (Practicing Law Institute, 1987), in which 292 federal district judges were given
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Moreover, we now question the supposedly transsubstantive
nature of procedural rules. Although the same rule may apply to
all categories of cases or all types of litigants, the impact on each
type of case or litigant will perforce be different. Unlimited discov-
ery helps some parties more than others; for example, it has a
palpably different impact on the affluent than on the less affluent
litigant. 26 So too, the threat of Rule 11 sanctions has a far greater
chilling effect on civil rights plaintiffs and their lawyers than on
economically secure defendants. 27
In addition, the very generality of transsubstantive procedural
rules has two opposite effects, each resulting in a lack of uniformity.
If the rules remain general, they are, as Professor Burbank has
taught, uniform in name only, for they mask discretionary decision-
making. 28 Moreover, some judges are justifiably nervous that gen-
eral rules not only are inefficient, but also do not serve all cases
equally well. 29 Thus, for example, the courts have developed dif-
ferent pleading requirements for different types of cases."
Transsubstantive procedure can become non-transsubstantive
in a variety of ways. The legislature can make specific procedural
rules for a class of cases. Alternatively, the rules can remain the
same, and be applied uniformly to all cases, but the results will
differ. Also, the general rules can be interpreted judicially in a
unique way for one class of cases. Regardless of the method used,
it becomes clear that procedure is not politically neutral in its effects.
Hence, the fourth supposition is also incorrect.
ten case summaries, adapted from published opinions that included Rule I I motions for
sanctions. The judges filled in questionnaires on how they would rule. The investigator
concluded:
Of specific concern are the findings that there is a good deal of interjudge
disagreement over what actions constitute a violation of the rule, only partial
compliance with the desired objective standard, inaccurate and systematically
biased normative assumptions about other judges' willingness to impose sanc-
tions, and a continued neglect of alternative, nonmonetary means of response.
Id. at 473,526.
26 See, e.g., Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 2 REV. Lm&.
71,74 (1981). For a graphic description on how discovery can burden the poor, see Philip
G. Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115,
124-28,132-33 (1969). Of course, virtually any procedural rule can have a disparate impact
on those who can least afford lawyers or who have less relevant information at their disposal.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 362-403.
" See Burbank, Complexity, supra note 25, at 1474.
" See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 7, at 2018-25.
" See id., at 2025-26, 2038-43, 2048-51; Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLum. L. Rev. 433,447-51 (1986).
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Substance and procedure are inseparable in the context of title
VII. Our study suggests that the interaction of substance and pro-
cedure ultimately decides which cases are brought and which are
won. If we are correct, and to the extent that our title VII analysis
is replicable in other fields of law, we must reexamine our approach
to legal thinking. Law schools typically divorce substantive law
courses from procedural issues, teaching procedure as a distinct
body of knowledge. While this undoubtedly serves pedagogical pur-
poses, it overlooks the interaction between substance and proce-
dure, the very interplay that determines the outcome of cases.
Therefore, legislators must look beyond abstract statutory language
to the actual implementation of the law. When a general procedural
rule does not serve the ends of a particular substantive law, legis-
lators must consider including substance-specific procedures to ef-
fectuate the statute. 3 '
For purposes of this article, it is unimportant whether a partic-
ular incident is classified as substantive or procedural. To illustrate,
the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, often use bur-
dens of proof, pleading requirements, rulings on class certification
and necessary party motions, and Rule 11 determinations in much
the same way. Although one might argue that defining the prima
facie case and allocating burdens of proof are substantive tasks, the
effect of these decisions is determined by such "procedural" factors
as the stringency of the pleading requirements and the availability
of discovery. Moreover, judges address prima facie case and burden
issues in (often procedural) technical language. Throughout this
article, we explore the interrelations among elements of the prima
facie case, burdens of proof, pleading, discovery, joinder and sanc-
tions. Our point is that substantive law, procedural law and the legal
culture in which they exist combine to vindicate or defeat rights,
and, in so doing, to interpret and define the rights themselves. It is
the reciprocity of substance and procedure, regardless of labels,
that we will examine.
In addition to our interest in the field, we chose title VII for
two reasons. First, the statute on its face lacked most of the typical
procedural incidents, thus leaving the procedure-substance integra-
tion to the discretion of the judiciary." Second, the courts have used
31
 Professor Stephen Burbank has suggested on several occasions the need for Congress
to consider specialized procedure to accompany substantive acts. See, e.g., Burbank, Preclusion,
supra note 5, at 831, 832. And see the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
32
 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 added some procedural incidents to title VII in order
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procedure to change the substance of the statute. As Justice Mar-
shall recently observed, the Supreme Court has "imposed new and
stringent procedural requirements that make it more and more
difficult for civil rights plaintiffs to gain vindication." 33 The judiciary
has redefined basic civil rights and has resolved major social issues
by manipulating process. Procedure now defines unlawful discrim-
ination and determines the outcome of title VII cases. 34 Thus, with-
out grappling with the nature of discrimination, theories of equality,
or the historical and sociological complexity of employment dispar-
ities between African-Americans and whites, the courts have re-
written the law and changed workplace behavior using the language
of procedure. In the antithesis of Dean Clark's phrase, procedure
is now the master, not the handmaid, of substance.
Whether one agrees with our reading of legislative intent, the
critical point is that in title VII cases courts often decide outcomes
using procedural devices, without struggling with the complexity of
congressional purpose or of substantive issues. Nor do the courts
acknowledge that their procedural decisions define substantive
rights. One's perception of discrimination may lead to widely di-
vergent conclusions about the appropriate stringency of procedural
requirements. But this is all the more reason for Congress and the
courts to develop fully the interplay among the statute's goals, sub-
stantive language and applicable procedures. Whether the courts
apply general rules transsubstantively, in a way that adversely im-
pacts legislative goals, or whether the courts invent non-transsub-
stantive procedures to interfere with those goals, the points remain
the same: substance and procedure are intimately intertwined, the
results are frequently non-transsubstantive and highly political, and
procedural rules and their intersection with substance are far from
simple.
We begin Section II with a brief overview of the purpose and
legislative history of title VII. Sections III and IV examine the
structure of title VII and the claims brought under it, and discuss
the prima facie case, burdens of proof, pleadings and discovery. 35
to restore some of the substantive rights eroded by the "procedural" decisions of the Supreme
Court. See infra notes 105-11,279-330,337-47 and accompanying text.
35 Proceedings of the Judicial Conference—Second Circuit, 130 F.R.D. 161,166 (1989).
5' This we believe, remains the case despite passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. At
any rate, the substantive effect of that statute upon title VII plaintiffs will not be certain,
despite congressional intent, until the courts interpret its somewhat unclear language.
35 Title VII plaintiffs are required to exhaust their administrative remedies by filing
first with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 42 U.S.C. f 2000e-5
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Section V addresses the Supreme Court's redefinition of the parties
to title VII litigation and the Court's analysis of class actions, indis-
pensable parties and preclusion. Thereafter, we scrutinize the effect
of the cases on legal practice, discussing attorney's fees and Rule 11
sanctions." We conclude with an epilogue that questions the com-
partmentalization of twentieth century legal thinking, and chal-
lenges Congress to recognize the significance of the interplay of
procedure and substance in creating new rights.
II. THE STATUTORY MANDATE
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first broad-based congres-
sional attempt to address race discrimination in almost one hundred
years." Its language reflected an emerging national awareness of
race discrimination and a consensus, at least among its proponents,s 8
that African-Americans could no longer be denied access to the
benefits of full participation in society." Indeed, the rhetoric of
equality permeates the legislative history. 4°
(1988). This article will not explore EEOC procedure. For an exhaustive treatment of this
topic, see BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW . 933-
83 (2d ed. 1983).
36 In this article we do not attempt to review how every federal rule or procedural
doctrine intersects with title VII. One could write a treatise on the bizarre statute of limitations
rules, See CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 423-537 (2d ed. 1988),
or the impact of emerging Supreme Court summary judgment law, see Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Mat-
sushita Elect. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
57 Earlier civil rights acts were less ambitious. Compare the Civil Rights Act of 1957,
Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in various sections of titles 5, 28, and 43 U.S.C.)
and the Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No, 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (1960) (codified in various
sections of titles 18, 20 and 42 U.S.C.). See David L. Rose, Twenty-five Years Later: Where Do
We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1124
(1989).
" There are, of course, some. hazards in ascribing uniform purpose to a group. See
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 1972.
59 "All vestiges of inequality . . . must be removed in order to preserve our democratic
society, to maintain our country's leadership and to enhance mankind." H.R. REP. No. 914,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2517 (1964) (additional
views on H.R. 7152 of the Honorable William M. McCulloch et al.). The Supreme Court
echoed these sentiments in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 400 U.S, 424, 429-30 (1971): "The
objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute.
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees, over other employees."
90
National legislation is required to meet a national need which becomes ever
more obvious. That need is evidenced, on the one hand, by a growing impa-
tience by victims of discrimination with its continuance and, on the other hand,
by a growing recognition on the part of all of our people of the incompatibility
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The new law addressed many segments of American life,'"
recognizing, in Senator Case's words, that discrimination in em-
ployment was "the culmination of a whole set of discriminatory
forces—forces 'which start even before birth . . . . A whole complex
of social institutions has effectively isolated the Negro community
from the mainstream of American life . . . . "42 By 1964, it had
become clear that society could no longer tolerate the lack of equal
employment opportunity suffered by racial minorities." The work
force was segregated both by job categories and by rates of com-
pensation. Unemployment was rampant in the African-American
community; those minorities who did work were concentrated in
unskilled and low paying occupations that had no job security and
no chance for advancement." Title VII is a straightforward attempt
of such discrimination with our ideals and the principles to which this country
is dedicated.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
Among other things, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited segregated public
accommodations, title II, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1988), and forbade recipients of federal funds
from discriminating on the basis of race, tide . VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
42 110 CONG. REC. 7241 (1964). The House Judiciary Committee Report states with
reference to title VII :
In other titles of this bill we have endeavored to protect the Negro's right to
first-class citizenship. Through voting, education, equal protection of the laws,
and free access to places of public accommodations, means have been fashioned
to eliminate racial discrimination.
The right to vote, however, does not have much meaning on an empty
stomach. The impetus to achieve excellence in education is lacking if gainful
employment is closed to the graduate. The opportunity to enter a restaurant
or hotel is a shallow victory where one's pockets are empty. The principle of
equal treatment under law can have little meaning if in practice its benefits are
denied the citizen.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2513
(additional views on H.R. 7152 of the Honorable William M. McCulloch et al.).
43
Job discrimination because of one's race is an evil which affects not only the
individual, but also the future of a constantly expanding America . . . The
Committee concluded that if the Negro labor force at its present level of
educational attainment were fairly and fully utilized, then the gain in our gross
national product would reach $13 billion.
110 CONG. REC. 6562 (1964) (statement of Senator Kuchel).
44 In 1963, the median income of African- Americans was barely 60% that of whites.
110 CONG. REC. 7204 (1964). The unemployment rate among blacks was more than twice
that of whites. Id. Only 17% of non-white workers had white collar jobs, compared to 47%
of white workers. CONG.. REC. 13091 (1964) (citing U.S. Department of Labor statistics). A
black college graduate could expect to earn less in his lifetime than a white man who quit
school after the eighth grade. 110 CoNc. Rec. 7204. While only 2% of white female high
school graduates were domestic workers, 20% of black female high school graduates could
find only domestic work. Id. at 7205. By 1989, the median income of African-Americans had
risen to only 70% that of whites and the unemployment rate among African-Americans was
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to correct the racially biased labor marker* by a comprehensive
prohibition of employment discrimination on the basis of race. 46
The'primary injustices Congress sought to enjoin were the payment
of lower wages and the denial to minorities of access to the work-
place "because of race."'" Title VII suggests that adverse consider-
ation of one's race in an employment decision is inherently unfair.
After title VII, the race of an applicant can no longer be the cause
of an adverse employment decision.48
 The theory was that once race
was no longer a factor, African-Americans would have the same job
opportunities as whites, and would thus begin to enjoy their full
rights as citizens."
more than twice as high as among whites. Although unemployment rates among African-
American college graduates are now equivalent to white college graduates, African-Americans
continue to be concentrated in laborer and service jobs and to be underrepresented in white
collar jobs. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 78, 138-40, 231 (1989).
45 See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1979) (noting
the congressional concern with the "plight of the Negro in our economy").
46 The statute reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988). Some supporters of title VII feared that the amendment
introduced by Rep. Smith adding "sex" to the statute was an effort to defeat the bill. Rep.
Green of Oregon argued on the floor of the House that:
[A's opponents of the legislation in a beguiling way make a good piece of
legislation carry all of the piggyback amendments, we may find that the whole
proposal will sink in midstream. Of course, it is to the advantage of the oppo-
nents of this legislation to add additional burdens—to water it down—to weaken
it—to divert attention from the primary objective of providing basic constitu-
tional rights.
110 CONG. REC. 2721 (1964) (statement of Rep. Green).
47
 We have elsewhere suggested an analysis for other anti-discrimination statutes. See
Judith Olans Brown, et al., Treating Blacks As If They Were White: Problems of Definition and
Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1975) [hereinafter Brown et al., Section 1982
Cases].
4° As Justice Brennan recently observed, "[lin passing Title VII, Congress made the
simple but momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national origin are not
relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees." Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S, 228, 239 (1989).
49
 "The rights of citizenship mean little if an individual is unable to gain the economic
wherewithal to enjoy them." H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2516 (additional views on H.R. 7152 of the Honorable William M.
McCulloch et al.).
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Title VII, of course, does not prohibit employment decisions
based on considerations of ability or qualification. Congress was well
aware of the legitimate needs of employers to hire qualified em-
ployees,5° and title VII reflects a legislative reconciliation of em-
ployer prerogatives with She anti-discrimination principle." It does
not prohibit arbitrary oil idiosyncratic employment decisions, so
long as those decisions are not made for a reason attributable to
race. For example, title VII allows a hospital to require that all its
doctors have surnames beginning with the letters "A," "R," and "V."
But it does not countenance a hospital policy that refuses to hire
physicians because they are African-American.
Hence, the statutory scheme: (1) delineates the specific com-
ponents of the employer/ 1 mployee relationship (hiring, promotion,
etc.); and (2) makes it illlgal to use the employee's race as a factor
in decisions that implement that relationship; while (3) recognizing
the employer's legitimatbusiness needs. Said another way, Con-
gress intended that title
el 
VII invalidate employment decisions in-
formed by race that were neither within specific statutory exceptions
nor otherwise impelled by the necessities of business. 52 But the
statute did not confront the difficult procedural issues the courts
would face in implementing the prohibition against discrimination.
5° This issue was discussed e haustively. Senators Clark (D—Pa.) and Case (R—N.J.), as
Senate floor managers of the Home-approved bill, submitted an interpretive memorandum
which stated that title VII as proposed "expressly protects the employer's right to insist that
any prospective applicant, Negro or white, must meet the applicable job qualifications." 110
CONG. REC. 7247 (1964). The Clark-Case memorandum states: "An employer may set his
qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these
qualifications and he may hire, as ign, and promote on the basis of test performance." Id.
The Supreme Court has frequentl deferred to the authoritativeness of this memorandum.
See, e.g., Firefighters v. Stotts, 4 7 U.S. 561, 581 (1984). The Supreme Court has also
repeatedly recognized that title VD does not interfere with nondiscriminatory job qualifica-
tions. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 239; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
51 For example, section 703(h lists certain employment practices that are made specif-
ically lawful, such as the use of ra e-neutral job related ability tests. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1988). That section also makes otherwise prohibited employment practices lawful in specific
circumscribed situations, such as Iona fide seniority systems, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h), and
bona fide occupational qualifications, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988).
52 In 1964, it seemed that t.14 congressional command to eliminate race as a factor in
employment decisions would rectify past discrimination and achieve racial equality in the
workplace. Arguing for a "more robust" strategy, Professor Fiss noted in 1971 that "a law
that does no more than prohibit discrimination on the basis of race will leave that desire, in
large part, unfulfilled." Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REV.
235, 314 (1971). Today, we recognize the naivete of the notion that statutory language,
without more, can resolve the intractable issues of institutionalized racism.
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III. PROTECTING DEFENDANTS: REDEFINING ELEMENTS,
REALLOCATING BURDENS OF PROOF AND INCREASING DISCOVERY
COSTS
In evaluating and litigating claims, American lawyers break
down general statutory language into specific variables or elements.
The choices made in the delineation of the elements of the prima
facie case and in the assignment of the burden of proof have a
profound impact not only on the nature of a plaintiff's claim but
also on the contours of the entire litigation, from the pleadings to
discovery, the possibility of Rule 11 sanctions, the outcome and the
finality of the decision. This observation is particularly compelling
in the civil rights context. Discrimination is an elusive concept, and,
unless one adheres to objective criteria, it is difficult to prove. Thus,
the definition of the elements of discrimination and the allocation
of burdens of proof are often outcome-determinative. 53
Although Congress had never amended the relevant language
of title VII or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," the courts
dramatically diluted the statutory rights that Congress created and
that early judicial opinions had recognized. 55
 By imposing a greater
burden on title VII plaintiffs and by virtually eliminating defen-
dant's burden of persuasion, 56 the courts made it much more dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to prevail. For the most part, the authors of these
opinions do not discuss the nature of discrimination, but limit them-
selves to the technical language of allocating burdens of proof."
The cases reflect an ideological shift from the notion of discrimi-
nation as an historically entrenched, pervasive social evil (and the
55 Moreover, the parties to a civil rights case typically have vastly disparate bargaining
power and resources. See Brown et al., Section 1982 Cases, supra note 47, at 21-24.
54 Rule 11 was amended in 1983, Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
461 U.S. 1097 (1983), but the amendment was not for the purpose of altering the results in
title VII cases. Congress has recently responded to this dilution of statutory rights in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66,1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
55 See infra text accompanying notes 60-70.
56 See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158,181-82 (1989) (noting
that the several cases construing section 703(h) of title VII had made the bona fide seniority
system defense into an element of plaintiff's case); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490
U.S. 462,659-60 (1989) (transforming the affirmative defense of business necessity into an
element of the prima facie case). Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ostensibly
returned the business necessity claim to its position as an affirmative defense. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(k)( I )(A).
57 Only recently has the Supreme Court recognized the substantive content of its pro-
cedural decisions. In Wards Cove, the Court acknowledged that it was redefining the prima
fade case and reallocating burdens of proof to protect business operations from judicial
interference. 109 S. Ct. at 2127.
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corresponding belief that the prima facie case and defenses should
reflect this), to the idea that discrimination is an aberrant, transient
and isolated phenomenon58 (and that title VII cases should there-
fore be difficult to prove and easy to defend). 59
A. Disparate Impact
We begin our review of the transformation of discrimination
law with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.6° The original model of the prima
facie case formulated in Griggs closely followed the language of title
VII and reflected the congressional goal of eradicating the perni-
cious effects of historically entrenched racism. In Griggs, plaintiffs
argued that the facially race-neutral requirement of a high school
diploma or a general intelligence test as a condition of employment
violated title VII because it impacted more severely on African-
Americans than whites. 51 Defendants maintained that there could
be no discrimination because they had no specific invidious racial
purpose; they suggested that the diploma requirement would raise
the level of the work force. 62 The Court disagreed, holding that
"Congress directed the thrust of . . . [title VII] to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation." 85 More
broadly, "good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate
as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups."" Griggs stands for a
clear judicial understanding that Congress meant title VII to pro-
vide plaintiffs with a straightforward way to attack those "artificial,
56
 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505 (1989); see also
Brown & Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note 3, at 51-54.
59
 Race prejudice and discrimination remain an enduring national tragedy. A recent
report prepared by the Urban Institute demonstrates that "unequal treatment of black
jobseekers is entrenched and widespread." TURNER ET AL., OPPORTUNITIES DENIED, OPPOR-
TUNITIES DIMINISHED: DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 31 (1991). The Urban Institute's study of
Washington, D.C. and Chicago found that "if equally qualified black and white candidates
are in competition for a job when differential treatment occurs it is three times more likely
to favor the white applicant than to favor the black." Id. at 32. The study also found that
blacks received unfavorable differential treatment twenty percent of the time they compete
against comparable whites for entry level positions. Id. at 31. Whites receive unfavorable
differential treatment seven percent of the time they compete with comparably qualified
blacks. Id. at 31; see alsoj.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 530-35 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6' Id. at 427-28.
62 Id. at 431.
63 Id. at 432 (emphasis in original). Title VII forbids those facially neutral employment
practices that are not job-related and that operate "to exclude Negroes." Id. at 431.
64 Id. at 432.
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arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment" that were the
legacy of slavery. 65
The Court implemented this understanding through its defi-
nition of the prima facie case, and by making the explanation of
what has been called "disparate impact" an affirmative defense, with
the burden of proof totally on the defendant. Griggs explicitly ac-
knowledged that employers can establish legitimate qualifications
for jobs. But an employer must legitimize its use of a selection
procedure that excludes more minorities than whites. As stated by
the Griggs Court, "Congress has placed on the employer the burden
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest rela-
tionship to the employment in question." 66
 Thus, pursuant to Griggs,
once the plaintiff shows that an employment practice has a racially
disparate impact, defendant has the obligation to justify that impact
by persuading the factfinder that the practice is required for its
business. What is critical is that defendant's explanation is an affir-
mative defense; the burdens of production and persuasion are on
the defendant at all times. 67
Hence, a hospital requirement that all staff physician's must
possess a medical degree does not violate title VII even if the facts
showed that only two out of every three hundred doctors in the
relevant labor pool were African-American. On the other hand, a
hospital rule that allows the hiring of only those physicians whose
fathers are physicians may well be a violation.68
 A defendant hospital
" Id. at 43031. In the Court's words:
In short, the Act does not command that any person be hired simply because
he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member of a
minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority,
is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed. What is required by Con-
gress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employ-
ment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial
or other impermissible classification.
Id.
66 Id. at 432. Congressional debate had focused on claims that title VII would require
the hiring of unqualified employees. The proponents of the statute insisted that title VII
"expressly protects the employer's rights to insist that any prospective applicant, Negro or /
white, must meet the applicable job qualifications." Id. at 434 (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7247
(1964)) (emphasis in original).
67
 For a description of the different concepts of "production burden" and "persuasion
burden" that are both embraced by the term "burden of proof," see FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 313-21 (3d ed. 1985). James and Hazard state that
"Whe party that carries the burden of pleading usually also carries the burden of proof." Id.
at 196-97.
" See infra text accompanying notes 90-94. Cf. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438
U.S. 567 (1978).
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may not be able to persuade the factfinder that such a facially race-
neutral nepotism policy is related to patient care or other legitimate
hospital concerns. 69
Griggs adopted the commonly perceived notion of Congress's
reconciliation of plaintiff's rights and defendant's needs; plaintiff
must show only that he or she was a member of a protected class,
and that the employment practice in question disparately burdened
the members of that class. Defendants must justify the discrimina-
tory impact of their policies by persuading the factfinder of the
business necessity of its policies. This allocation of proof, which has
become known as the disparate impact theory, recognizes both the
statutory mandate to eliminate the consequences of discriminatory
employment practices, as well as the legitimacy of the employer's
need for qualified employees. It also recognizes the unequal posture
of the litigants in a discrimination case. Disparate impact makes
sense because the defendant is in a better position than the plaintiff
to justify the validity of its business practices." The Griggs model
thus defines unlawful discrimination through allocations of burdens
of proof.
B. Disparate Treatment
The Court, however, soon departed from the interpretation of
title VII adopted in Griggs. In a line of cases beginning with Mc-
Donnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 7 ' the Court created another model
of the prima facie case, now known as the disparate treatment
theory, which requires plaintiff to prove defendant's subjective dis-
criminatory intent. 72 Green, an African-American civil rights activ-
" Such a rule has a greater adverse impact on blacks than whites because of the historic
denial to African-Americans of the opportunity to become physicians. The crux of this
hypothetical, however, is not this unfortunate fact but rather title VII's recognition of an
employer's need for qualified employees.
7° The holding of Griggs follows from those Fourteenth Amendment cases that looked
to the consequences or impact of discriminatory behavior and ignored the motivation behind
that behavior. The classic case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), where the Court
held unconstitutional the administration of a facially neutral laundry licensing law that
resulted in the denial of licenses to Chinese applicants and the granting of licenses to nearly
all Caucasian applicants. Id. At least until Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which
required plaintiff to prove defendant's racist animus, the Court understood that racism often
masquerades behind neutral language. See Brown et al., Constitutional Dissonance, supra note
8, at 593-601.
71 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72 This involves subjective motivation and not objective intent. See infra notes 77-83 and
accompanying text.
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ist, had argued that defendant refused to rehire him because of his
race and because of his participation in illegal civil rights demon-
strations that had blocked access to defendant's plant." At the same
time that these civil rights activities were going on, the company
was also the target of union demonstrations." The crux of plain-
tiff's complaint was that although the white pro-union demonstra-
tors were not discharged," he, an African-American, was.
If one were to read only the Supreme Court opinion, it would
be difficult to identify any facts that demonstrate that plaintiff was
treated differently because of his race. The opinion is technical and
formal, and omits most of the critical facts set forth above. It is
devoted to the design of a new prima facie case, with the following
elements: (1) plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (2) he applies
and was qualified for a job for which applicants were sought; (3)
despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and (4) after his rejection,
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek
applicants with plaintiff's qualifications.76
But the McDonnell Douglas Court also held that once plaintiff
introduces credible evidence of the four factors, all defendant need
do is "articulate" 77 a legitimate race-neutral reason for its rejection
of the applicant. Thereafter, plaintiff can prevail only if he or she
shows that the reason offered by the defendant was false or pretex-
tual: that is, that the defendant was subjectively motivated by racial
animus, not by a race-neutral reason. 78 The effect of not requiring
defendant to bear the burden of persuading the factfinder that the
reasons for its behavior were race-neutral, and of requiring the
plaintiff to prove that defendant's explanation was pretextual (or
racially motivated), was the addition of a new element to plaintiff's
75 411 U.S. at 796.
74 Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 528 F.2d 1102, 1104-05 (8th Cir. 1976).
" Id. The whites were rehired pursuant to an amnesty agreement with the union. Id.
46 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. At first, it seems that the Court was simply
adapting Griggs to the case of an individual plaintiff. On their face, the four elements of the
prima facie case in McDonnell Douglas do not necessarily seem inconsistent with Griggs. Griggs
involved the legitimacy of a facially race-neutral job qualification that applied to an entire
job category throughout defendant's plant, and that impacted a large number of African-
Americans. See 401 U.S. 424, 427-28, 432 (1971). McDonnell Douglas, on the other hand,
involved the claim of one individual who argued that the treatment given him violated title
VII because, although facially neutral (demonstrations), it was based upon race (he was
treated differently from white labor organizers). 411 U.S. at 796. Unlike Griggs, there was
no evidence in McDonnell Douglas that the treatment of plaintiff impacted other African-
American employees.
77 911 U.S. at 802.
" Id. at 809-05.
230	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 33:211
prima facie case: proof of defendant's invidious, subjective discrim-
inatory intent.
The cases that have followed McDonnell Douglas squarely allo-
cate to plaintiff the burden of proving defendant's state of mind.
As the Court explained in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States, proof of discriminatory motive is critical in disparate
treatment cases but not required under the disparate impact the-
ory. 79 And in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the
Court held that the defendant has the burden of production to
show through admissible evidence a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for plaintiff's rejection. 8° Although the defendant must sug-
gest a legitimate reason, it need not persuade the factfinder of
anything. Most importantly, it has no burden either to produce
evidence or to "persuade the court that it was actually motivated"
by that reason. 8 ' If the employer merely testifies that it found the
employee disagreeable, it does not matter whether the Court be-
lieves the employer, or whether that reason motivated the decision
not to hire. Under disparate treatment, therefore, once the assertion
of a legitimate reason is given under oath, it is plaintiff's ultimate
responsibility to persuade the factfinder of defendant's impermis-
sible state of mind. Moreover, the critical mental element is subjec-
tive motivation—that the defendant was impelled by racial hatred.
79 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). McDonnell Douglas required defendant to "articu-
late" some legitimate reason for its employment practice. 411 U.S. at 802. It took several
opinions before the Court explained what it meant by "articulate." In Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), the Court referred to the employer's burden of "proving
that he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate
one such as race." Id. at 577. In the very same paragraph, however, the Court cited the
McDonnell Douglas language that all the defendant need do is "articulate" some legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 578. Thus, not surprisingly, the lower courts read Furnco as
teaching that "articulate" and "prove" mean the same thing. For example, in Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 579 F.2d 169 (1st Cir. 1978), the First Circuit
interpreted the critical paragraph in Furnco as requiring defendant to persuade the factfinder
of its absence of discriminatory motive because defendant had greater access to the relevant
evidence. Id. at 177. In a rare opinion handed down in connection with the grant of certiorari,
the Supreme Court chastised the First Circuit for allocating the burden of persuasion to
defendant: "We think that there is a significant distinction between merely 'articulat[ing]
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' and 'prov[ing] absence of discriminatory motive."
439 U.S. 24, 25 (1978). Over a vigorous dissent, the Court held that the proper verb was
"articulate" and not "prove," and that defendant has no burden of proving the legitimate
reasons for its behavior. Id.
8° 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
al Id. In order to survive a Rule 41(b) motion under the disparate treatment formulation,
plaintiff has the total burden (both production and persuasion) of proving that the defendant
was motivated by racial animus. Title VII cases typically are tried before a judge. Thus, we
refer to Rule 41(b) motions instead of directed verdicts.
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It is not sufficient for plaintiff to introduce evidence of objective
intent, that is, that the factual and foreseeable consequences of
defendant's behavior would result in less favorable treatment of
minorities." To return to our hospital, under disparate treatment,
a refusal to hire an African-American physician because her father
was not a physician would not violate title VII unless plaintiff could
persuade the factfinder that the hospital's refusal was specifically
motivated by hatred of African-American doctors."
Furthermore, even dramatic evidence of racism may not be
sufficient to support an inference of racist intent. In Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, plaintiff was told that the bank teller position
she sought was "a big responsibility with a lot of money . . . for
blacks to have to count."84 The Supreme Court did not find these
blatantly racist remarks sufficient to permit a finding of discrimi-
natory intent." Judicial denial that this conduct evidences discrim-
ination permits the very behavior title VII was enacted to prevent.
62 Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), is illustrative. In Feeney, plaintiff
failed to persuade the factfinder that the purpose of the Massachusetts statute that created
an absolute lifetime civil service preference for veterans was to discriminate against women.
Id. at 281. The district court had found that this preference impacted so inevitably and
severely on women that its discriminatory effect could not be unintended. Id. at 260. Although
conceding that the foreseeability of the consequences has some "bearing" upon the existence
of discriminatory intent, Id. at 279 n.25, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs failed to
prove the requisite state of mind of the Massachusetts legislature. See id. at 280. In so holding,
the Court refused to infer the legislature's sexist motivation from the district court's finding
that the absolute preference had a "devastating impact" on women's employment opportu-
nities. Id. at 260.
es The motivation-driven notion of discrimination originated in Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), where the Supreme Court rewrote the plaintiff's prima facie case for
equal protection claims by requiring plaintiffs to persuade the factfinder that defendant's
conduct was motivated by racial hatred. See id. at 240-41. The disparate treatment cases
breach the Court's promise in Davis that the motivation requirement would be limited to
constitutional claims. In addition to title VII, the Court has extended the intent requirement
to other civil rights statutes. See, e.g., General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, 458
U.S. 375, 388-89 (1982) (42 U.S.C. 11 1981 requires proof of defendant's state of mind
because that statute is the "legislative cousin" of the Fourteenth Amendment). And the Court
has acknowledged that the state of mind required in title VII disparate treatment cases is
identical to that required for constitutional claims. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). Notice that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does
not address the disparate treatment model; that judicial reconstruction of title VII remains
good law. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.)
1071.
84 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
63 The Court did not discuss inferences in Watson. It seems clear from that silence,
however, that the Court was unwilling to allow plaintiff to use those words to support an
inference of discriminatory intent. It is possible to read Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228 (1989), in which the plurality opinion condemned stereotypes, as relevant to proving
discriminatory intent. In our view, Hopkins does not significantly help plaintiffs. Hopkins
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Requiring plaintiffs to prove defendant's subjective racist intent
rewrites the statute 86
 and makes it virtually impossible for plaintiffs
to prevail. 87
 Obviously, plaintiffs do not have access to evidence of
defendant's state of mind. 88
 Indeed, sophisticated, yet discrimina-
tory, defendants will make sure that this evidence does not exist.
Liberal discovery rules notwithstanding, requiring plaintiffs to ob-
tain evidence of defendant's mental state imposes an enormous
burden on plaintiffs. Broad discovery rules are merely a formal
response to the issue of access to evidence. They do not balance the
financial and practical inequities between defendant employers and
plaintiff employees, who typically are less able to bear the economic
burden of discovery. Often, plaintiff's primary source of income is
the job that is the subject of the litigation.
Despite its drastic consequences for plaintiffs, disparate treat-
ment has been a seductive construct." The Court has applied it to
requires an unrealistic and unworkably tight causal link. Plaintiff must prove that gender
was a motivating force in the employer's decision; defendant may prevail if it can prove it
would have made the same decision in the absence of gender bias. See id. at 250, 258. In
other words, plaintiff must reconstruct defendant's decision-making process. If that were not
difficult enough, plaintiff at all times bears the burden of persuasion that the same result
would not have occurred but for gender. See id. at 240. The impact of section 107 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 on Hopkins is uncertain. See sec. 107, § 703 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105
Stat.) 1071, 1075-76 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)) ("[Amn unlawful employment
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex ... was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice.").
U6
 The disparate treatment construct redrafts title VII as if it read as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice to discriminate in any incident
of employment because of race. "Because of race" means that the employer was
subjectively motivated to create or continue the practice because of racial hatred.
It does not constitute an unlawful employment practice if the consequence of
the practice is to deny minorities and women the benefits of participating in
the employer's paid work force so long as the employer suggests a plausible
reason for the practice, even though the employer was not actually motivated
by that reason.
B7
	 difficulty has been extensively delineated both by the commentators and by the
Court. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71-73 (1986); Mark S. Brodin, The
Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 292, 321-23 (1982); Brown ,Sc Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note 3, at 593-94.
88
 Without discovery, plaintiffs can never obtain the facts about defendants' state of
mind critical to their disparate treatment cases. And this data, of course, is within the
defendants' control. For further discussion of the discovery implications of requiring plain-
tiffs to provide such evidence, see infra text accompanying notes 123-31.
89
 The need for two separate constructs of discrimination remains obscure. Disparate
impact applies equally well to individual plaintiffs and class actions and to work forces that
are racially balanced or Unbalanced. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 456 (1982) (even
if the work force is racially balanced, specific acts of discrimination remain actionable). The
critical issue is whether a given employment practice deprives or tends to deprive plaintiff
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an ever expanding group of cases, many of which clearly warranted
application of disparate impact. In Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters," for example, the employer refused to hire at the job site
and hired only those applicants known to the supervisor or rec-
ommended to him. 9 ' The defendant conceded that, under this sys-
tem, well-qualified African-American applicants were rejected. 92
Thus, Furnco involved the discriminatory impact of a facially neutral
rule, the paradigm Griggs case." But the Court insisted—albeit with-
out explanation—that the appropriate model was disparate treat-
ment, thereby changing the focus from defendant's discriminatory
conduct to plaintiff's failure to prove that the exclusion of qualified
minority workers was motivated by racial animus. 94
The two-construct system belies the concept that procedural
rules are simple and readily accessible. Furnco teaches the impossi-
bility of predicting which prima facie case model the courts will use
and that the choice of model is often outcome-determinative. Had
the Court applied the Griggs model in Furnco, all plaintiff would
have had to introduce was the statistical impact of Furnco's hiring
practice. Defendant would then have had to persuade the court
that its practice was justified by business necessity.
C. Impact Redux
In the past few terms, the Court intensified its pro-defendant
orientation.95 The Court added to the original disparate impact
of equal employment opportunities and whether the employer offers a legitimate justification
for that practice, See id. at 448.
g° 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
9L Id. at 570.
92 See id. at 576.
95 Although the Furnco Court stated that a racially balanced workplace does not affect
an employer's obligation not to discriminate against individual job applicants, the Court held
that evidence of the racial mix of the work force was relevant to motivation. Id. at 580-81.
In other words, the presence of some minority employee might negate an employer's dis-
criminatory intent. The Furnco Court seems to confuse the discriminatory effect of a partic-
ular hiring practice with minority representation in the work force. See id.
94 See id. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), is
another example of disparate impact facts forced into the disparate treatment model. That
case was brought by the United States against an employer's system-wide discriminatory
hiring, assignment, seniority and promotion policies. Id. at 328-29. The comparable worth
cases also exemplify the misapplication of the disparate treatment model to classic disparate
impact cases. See Judith Olans Brown et al. Equal Pay for Jobs of Comparable Worth: An Analysis
of the Rhetoric, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1'27 (1986) [hereinafter Brown et al., Comparable
Worth].
95 This slant has not been limited to title VII cases. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to affirmative action programs);
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model of Griggs the requirement that plaintiff prove the absence of
any justifications for defendant's conduct. 96 This new disparate im-
pact theory bears almost no resemblance to the understanding of
discrimination embodied in Griggs; indeed, it is precisely the op-
posite . 97
For example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust,g8 the de-
fendant bank four times refused to promote Clara Watson, an
African-American woman. 99 The bank had relied on the subjective
judgment of supervisors, and each promotion was given to a white
person.'m Although the plurality'°' used the disparate impact
model, they drastically modified the prima facie case, reduced the
defendant's burden of proof from affirmative defense to rebuttal,
and lowered the standard of proof from necessity to convenience. 102
Under Watson, defendant only needed to "produc[eJ" evidence of
"legitimate business reasons."°' Production is less than persuasion,
and legitimacy is far short of necessity. After Watson, once defendant
came forward with evidence of business legitimacy, plaintiff had the
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (drastically limiting the coverage of
42 U.S.C. § 1981); Brown & Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note 3.
96 See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text. The seniority system cases have evolved
similarly. Originally an affirmative defense, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1988), it is now clear
that plaintiff must prove the negative, that is, that the seniority system was not bona fide. As
Justice Kennedy observed in Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989),
the bona fide seniority system proviso itself delineates which practices are illegal and which
are not. See id. at 181. In other words, the Court has fully transformed an affirmative defense
into an element of plaintiff's case.
97 See infra notes 105-11 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, in what appears to be a
return to Griggs, section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides: "disparate impact is
established under this title only if (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent
uses a particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact ... and the respondent
fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in question
and consistent with business necessity." Sec. 105, § 703,1992 U.S.C.C.A.N (105 Stat.) 1071,
1074-75 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)). Section 104 of the Act defines
"demonstrates" to include both the burden of production and persuasion. Sec. 104 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(m)). The Supreme Court will ultimately decipher the param-
eters of an employee's burden in disparate impact cases.
90 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
99
 Id. at 982.
100 Id,
101 The division in Watson was four to four, as Justice Kennedy had not yet taken his
seat.
10Y
	 id. at 997-99.
103
 487 U.S. 998 (emphasis added). Recall that under Griggs, once plaintiff established
the racially disparate impact of a practice, the burden shifted to defendant to persuade the
factfinder of its business necessity. Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, although
specifically addressed to Wards Cove, see §§ 2(2), 105, also applies, of course, to Watson, see
supra note 97.
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ultimate risk of nonpersuasion that this evidence was pretextual.
Plaintiff had to prove the nonexistence of the asserted legitimate
reason. In the words of Justice Blackmun, this reallocation of the
burdens of proof was "flatly contradicted" by the Court's own case
law and forced every title VII case into the proof allocations of the
disparate treatment construct.'"
In Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 1 °5
 a majority of the Court
abandoned Griggs and embraced Watson.l06
 Wards Cove clearly allo-
cated the burden of proving the employer's lack of business justi-
fication to the employee; the plaintiff was forced to prove that the
defendant's employment practices did not serve any legitimate busi-
ness goal.'°7 The Wards Cove defendants operated a segregated
workplace that Justice Blackmun described as "a kind of overt and
institutionalized discrimination we have not dealt with in years: a
total residential and work environment organized on principles of
racial stratification and segregation, which . . . resembles a planta-
tion economy." 108 Yet the Court refused to find a title VII violation
because, among other things, plaintiffs had failed to meet their
newly assigned burden of proving that there was no better or more
cost-effective way for defendant to run its operation.wg This failure
shielded the blatantly discriminatory workplace from judicial scru-
tiny.
It is the rare plaintiff who would be able to perform the her-
culean tasks of disproving the employer's assertion that it runs its
business according to legitimate business considerationsu° and of
1 " Watson, 487 U.S. 1000-01 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part).
1D5
 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Professor Brodin sees Wards Cove as a "dear break" even from
Watson, Brodin, supra note 2, at 10.
I" 490 U.S. at 659.
107 Id. at 659-60.
we
	 U.S. at 662 (1989) (citations omitted).
109 Sections 2 and 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 make it clear that Congress intended
to overrule Wards Cove's allocation of this burden to plaintiff. §§ 2, 3, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(105 Stat.) 1071, 1071. Wards Cove also required plaintiff to show the discrete discriminatory
impact of each employment practice. Id. at 2124-25. This echoes Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977), which requires that plaintiff prove the "incremental segre-
gative effect" of each school board policy. Id. at 419-21. Section 105 of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act attempts to soften, but not overrule, this requirement. The new Act exempts the plaintiff
from having to show that a particular practice has a particular impact only if the plaintiff
can demonstrate "that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable
of separation for analysis." Sec. 105 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i)).
Moreover, even after the 1991 Act, the plaintiff may still have to prove that there are less
discriminatory alternatives to the challenged practice. See sec. 105 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(1)(c)).
"0 See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
WARDS COVE V. ATONIO, 15-31 (1990) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT].
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fashioning a less discriminatory but equally cost-effective operation.
The message of Wards Cove was clear: the issue is not discrimination
but the financial or other burdens defendant will incur if it stops
its discriminatory practice."
D. The Paths Not Taken
It is useful to think about the other reasonable choices available
to the Court that would have been consonant with the language
and policy of tide VII. Recall that prior to Watson and Wards Cove
there were two clear lines of cases. Under disparate impact, as
initially defined in Griggs, plaintiff won if a neutral policy caused
discriminatory impact, unless the defendant prevailed on the affir-
mative defense of persuading the factfinder of business necessity." 2
The disparate treatment construct, beginning with McDonnell Doug-
las and clarified by Burdine, removed the affirmative defense. If a
qualified minority was denied a job which then remained open,
there was a presumption of racial animus, which the employer could
dissipate by producing evidence of a legitimate race-neutral reason.
Then plaintiff would have to prove racial animus, both through
production and persuasion."' The disparate treatment cases re-
quire plaintiffs to prove racial animus because an employer meets
its burden merely by testifying to a legitimate reason for its action,
and need not produce evidence that the proferred reason actually
motivated that action. This effectively eliminates the affirmative
defense for defendants, turning all cases into presumption cases.
The Court could have held that defendant had an affirmative
defense of persuading the factfinder of non-discriminatory motive,
or persuading the factfinder of legitimate business purpose. In-
stead, the Court, pursuing its pro-defendant vision of title VII,
placed only a minimum production burden on the defendant. In
other words, using the language of presumptions, the 'Court re-
lieved the defendant of any burden of persuasion. This is both
regrettable and aberrant, given the fact that virtually all of the
I Together, Watson and Wards Cove redrafted title VII as if it read as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to engage in
a practice that disparately impacts women or racial minorities only if plaintiff
can prove (1) that such employment practice serves no legitimate business goal
and (2) that no other practice exists that less adversely affects women and
minorities and that is equally cost effective or no more burdensome to the
employer.
112 See supra text accompanying notes 60-70.
' 13 See supra text accompanying notes 71-85.
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evidence of business purpose and racial animus is in the files and
minds of the defendant. 14 Moreover, if there is a strong policy to
hire qualified minorities and to eliminate practices that result in a
racially disparate impact, it makes more sense to require the em-
ployer to persuade the factfinder of the non-discriminatory reason
for its action. 15
But even using presumptions rather than affirmative defenses,
the Court could have rationally taken a more neutral, less pro-
defendant position. In presumptions, there are usually triggering
facts (A) and the presumed fact (B). 16 In title VII cases, the trig-
gering facts could have been failure to hire a qualified minority and
leaving the job open, or hiring a non-minority employee, or having
some other practice that resulted in a disparate impact. Any of these
facts could have led to the presumption of racial animus, unless the
employer convinced the factfinder of non-B, a lack of racial animus.
There is a good deal of scholarly literature (and case law) suggesting
that when the evidence of non-B resides with the side against whom
the presumption should operate and/or when there is a strong
policy, then the side against whom the presumption operates should
have the burden of production and persuasion on non-B." 7 Notice
how oddly the Supreme Court has treated this issue. First, it ignored
that non-B is a lack of racial animus, and instead referred to legit-
imate business purpose. Second, it required only the meeting of the
production burden, and frequently suggested the smallest amount
of production—"articulation"—is satisfactory. Instead, the Court
could have required, as some courts do with certain presumptions,
clear and convincing evidence. 118 This would still have been less
than a total burden-shift to defendant.
It is true that Federal Rule of Evidence 301, the normal pre-
sumption rule in federal court, shifts only the burden of production,
" 4 For a discussion of reasons for presumptions including, inter alia, which party has
"peculiar access" to evidence, and "to make a result deemed socially desirable," see 21
CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5122,
at 569,570 (1977); see also Brown et al., Section 1982 Cases, supra note 47, at 36.
1 " The strength of the policy, however, was diluted by Texas Dept of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1980), where the Court held that title VII does not obligate
an employer to select a woman or minority from among equally well-qualified candidates.
Id. at 259; see also Brown at al., Constitutional Dissonance, supra note 8, at 615-18.
" 5 CHARLES T. McCoRmIca, McCoRmtcx ON EVIDENCE § 342, at 965 (Edward W. Cleary
ed., 3d student ed. 1984); Brown et al., Section 1982 Cases, supra note 47, at 36.
" 7 See WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 114, $ 5122, at 564, 566; McCottsficR, supra note
116, § 344, at 975-76.
>>a See McCoummai, supra note 116, § 344, at 976 & nn.22-23.
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but that shift applies to non-B, not to a different fact altogether." 9
Again, note that the employer's burden is not to produce a suffi-
ciency of evidence to permit a finding of no racial animus, but only
to produce evidence of some legitimate business purpose that may
not have even activated the employer's failure to hire. Moreover,
the Court could have said that the strong policy of title VII, backed
by the decision in Griggs, requires the defendant to establish an
affirmative defense. This would have rendered Rule 301 either
irrelevant or subservient to the title VII policy already announced
in Griggs.' 2°
If the Supreme Court insisted on using presumption language,
and wanted to give the defendant a production burden only, it still
could have held that there is sufficient evidence to permit (not
require) a finding of racial animus whenever a qualified minority is
not hired or there is disparate impact.'" In other words, the fact-
finder could use the triggering facts plus other evidence, such as
the racist statement made to the plaintiff in Watson or the segregated
workplace in Wards Cove, to make the inference of racial animus, if
the defendant's evidence was not compelling. In some states this is
referred to as giving the plaintiff's triggering facts, if believed, the
power of always making a prima facie case.' 22
It is not important for our purposes whether you agree with
us that, given the purpose of title VII, employees should have a
lesser burden and employers a greater one. It is important to notice
the range of omitted, logical procedural choices and to recognize
that the choices made were pro-defendant.
112
 FED. R. Evm, 301. As the conference report suggests, the issue is whether the adverse
party offers evidence "contradicting the presumed fact." H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1974).
120
 Rule 301 specifically begins, "In all civil actions and proceedings not otherwise
provided for by Act of Congress or by these rules . . ." FED. R. EVID. 301. But see Brown et
al., Section 1982 Cases, supra note 47, at 41-42.
14'
	 example, the Conference Report on Federal Rule of Evidence 301 states that
even after a presumption disappears, "[t]he court may, however, instruct the jury that it may
infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof of the basic facts." H.R. REP. No. 1597,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
122 See W. BARTON LEACH & PAUL. J. LIACOS. HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE
56-57 (4th ed. 1967); see also, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 114, at 608-11. There are
several additional alternatives. The Court could have kept the more stringent definition of
business "necessity" from Griggs, instead of adopting the new terms "legitimate business
reason" or "convenience." Also, it could have assigned plaintiff less than the virtually impos-
sible burden of persuading that another business practice was less expensive or as practical.
Indeed, this is the import of Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which purports to
restore Griggs. Sec. 105,4 703,1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071,1074-75 (to be codified
at 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e—(k)(1)(A)); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 3(2).
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E. Discovery Implications
The judicial redraft of title VII enormously increased plaintiff's
discovery burden. After the past three Supreme Court Terms,
plaintiffs had to discover much more information, almost all of it
solely within defendant's control. 123 In Wards Cove, the Court down-
played this concern by pointing to the liberal discovery rules that
give plaintiff broad access to defendant's records.' 24 This, however,
ignored the reality of the litigation process. Each new element of
the prima facie case imposes additional discovery burdens on plain-
tiff. Discovery is expensive, particularly where the evidence is within
defendant's control. Thus, the Court's cavalier reference to liberal
discovery rules ignored the significant economic disparity between
the plaintiffs—who are typically litigating about their major source
of income, their jobs—and corporate defendants. 125
In addition, the federal courts have responded to the sheer
volume of potentially relevant, and thus discoverable, information
by curbing discovery in title VII cases.' 26 For example, courts have
often been sympathetic to defendants' claim that certain discovery
is irrelevant or unduly burdensome. 127 Defendants have been suc-
123 Most of this evidence pertains to defendant's business practices.
124 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989). The Court also referred to the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedure, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 el seq. (1988), which require some em-
ployers to maintain records on the impact of certain procedures. 490 U.S at 658 (quoting 29
C.F.R. 1607.4). But of course, as the Court also recognized, employers' obligations under
these guidelines are limited. See id. at 658 n.10. For a' practical critique of this issue, see
ACLU REPORT, supra note 110, at 7-10, 16-17. Wards Cove created additional discovery
problems by requiring the disparate impact plaintiff to show an extremely close causal link
between a specific employment practice and racial imbalance in the work force. 490 U.S. at
658. Under Wards Cove, plaintiffs who allege several violations, such as nepotism, separate
hiring channels and subjective decisionmaking, had to "demonstrate that the disparity .. is
the result of one or more of the employment practices . . . specifically showing that each
challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact . ." Id. at 657-58.
123 Ironically, the Court has heralded the accessibility of the title VII process to "laymen."
Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).
ISO At least theoretically, plaintiff may benefit from the broad subpoena powers of the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1988). Once plaintiff
files a complaint with the EEOC, that agency has broad access to the defendant's records.
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69, 72 (1984). The Supreme Court has held that
once the EEOC makes a valid charge, the EEOC can use its subpoena power to obtain any
information relevant and material to the filed charge. Id. The EEOC need not have reasonable
cause to believe that the charge is true, and a valid charge, although a jurisdictional prereq-
uisite, need only be a clear and concise statement of facts, including pertinent dates. Id. at
67, 72-73. During the Reagan administration, however, the EEOC did not facilitate the
enforcement of plaintiff's' rights. Bill McAllister, EEOC Chief Faces Scrutiny as Court Nominee,
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 5, 1990, at Al.
127 See, e.g., Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
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cessful in limiting discovery to the particular department and/or
facility within the defendant's business in which plaintiff worked.' 28
Courts also have been willing to restrict the time period for which
discovery may be obtained.' 29
 Further, local rules in many jurisdic-
tions limit the number of interrogatories available to plaintiffs.' 3°
Finally, courts have created privileges unique to title VII cases to
protect employment records from disclosure.' 81
(to avoid burdening the defendant, the court limited title VII plaintiff's discovery pertaining
to defendant's affiliated stores to "relevant documents for inspection at the respective branch
locations"). See generally Mark J. Jacoby, Motion Practice and Discovery in Age Discrimination
Cases, reprinted in Advanced Strategies EMPLOYMENT LAW 1988, at 403, 417-26 (Practicing Law
Institute, 1988).
12" See, e.g., Grigsby v. North Miss. Medical Ctr., 586 F.2d 457, 460 (5th Cir. 1978)
(discovery restricted to limits of medical center where plaintiff worked); Hinton v. Entex
Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (discovery restricted to one facility because plaintiff
made no allegations pertaining to any other facility of defendant and local facility was
responsible for most employment decisions); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 62
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (where defendant's plants functioned independently of each other with
respect to hiring decisions defendant was justified in limiting its interrogtory answers to
facility at which plaintiff worked); cf. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 406 (5th Cir.
1983) (trial judge exceeded discretion in issuing protective order that restricted discovery to
one plant in light of plaintiff's allegations of a pattern of discrimination in a consolidated
enterprise's promotion and transfer system).
129 See, e.g., James v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1979) (trial
court that limited discovery to four-year period had not unreasonably restricted plaintiff in
her pretrial discovery); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (appropriate
cut-off date for discovery was two years prior to the earliest date of filing of an EEOC charge
by a plaintiff because back pay awards may be retroactive for two years), aff 'd, 729 F.2d 85
(1984); Williams v. United Parcel Service, 34 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1655 (N.D. Ohio
1982) (discovery limited to three years prior to last allegedly discriminatory act because
permitting discovery beyond that period would be unduly burdensome and probably irrel-
evant); GI: Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (back pay liability
provision of title VII could not be used by employer to restrict plaintiff's discovery to events
that occurred two years prior to date of filing complaints).
ISO See ACLU REPORT, supra note 110, at 10; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 7, at 2024
- 25. Interrogatories may be a less expensive form of discovery for poorer litigants. In 1979,
Judge Walter R. Mansfield, then Chairman of the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, explained one reason why the
Advisory Committee withdrew a proposal that would have specifically authorized federal
district courts to adopt local rules limiting the number of interrogatories: "[m]any commen-
tators stated that interrogatories are the only form of discovery available to ordinary litigants
and to the poor." 85 F.R.D. 521, 543-44 (1980) (letter from Mansfield to Judge Roszel C.
Thomsen, dated June 14, 1979).
15 ' Several federal courts have deemed affirmative action reports and other self-evalu-
ative documents prepared by title VII defendants to be privileged and thus not discoverable.
In Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia, 53 F.R.D. 283, 285 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court held that
disclosure of an affirmative action report prepared pursuant to mandatory government order
would be against public policy because disclosure would stifle frank subjective analysis and
would discourage companies from making investigations that are calculated to have a positive
effect on equalizing employment opportunities. Id. at 285. Many courts have adopted this
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Consider the hypothetical hospital that hires only those physi-
cians who have received a personal recommendation from staff
physicians. There currently are no African-American physicians on
staff, and none of the white doctors have recommended a black
colleague. The hospital has asserted that requiring personal rec-
ommendations from physicians whose qualifications are familiar to
the hospital assures good patient care, a collegial atmosphere and
trust among its medical staff. While these reasons may not have
amounted to business necessity under Griggs, they were "legitimate"
under Watson and Wards Cove. Assume that an African-American
doctor applies for a staff position and is rejected. In addition to the
discriminatory impact of the recommendation rule, plaintiff had to
prove the availability of alternate, non-discriminatory staffing meth-
ods that imposed no additional burden on the hospital. This created
nightmarish discovery problems.
There are at least two obvious alternate selection methods: the
establishment of a qualifications committee to review medical school
and residency records, and the use of written evaluations and rec-
ommendations from non-staff physicians. As each alternative clearly
imposes additional administrative and financial costs on the hospital,
and neither may be as effective in assuring staff collegiality, trust
and confidence, plaintiff loses. Thus, Wards Cove reified the historic
patterns of exclusion that were precisely the type of artificial bar-
riers to employment Congress sought to eliminate through title VII.
reasoning, thereby denying tide Vii plaintiffs information otherwise clearly discoverable
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26. See, e.g., Jamison v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 511
F. Supp. 1286, 1296-97 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (broadcasting company not required to disclose
affirmative action plans and subjective data compiled in compliance with affirmative action
requirements); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D. 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (news-
paper entitled to assert qualified privilege of "self examination" for material pertaining to
affirmative action taken to eliminate employment discrimination). Some courts recognize a
limited privilege laid out in Webb v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 434-35 (E.D.
Pa. 1978); others review the material in chambers to determine which parts should be deleted
or summarized for the plaintiff. See O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D.
Mass. 1980). Still other courts have modified and confined the application of the privilege.
See Siskonen v. Stanadyne, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 610, 610-12 (W.D. Mich. 1989); Hardy v. New
York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 100
F.R.D. 446, 452-54 (D. Md. 1984) (evaluating privilege under Wigmore's four-prong test,
the court refused to bar discovery of affirmative action reports), aff'd, 785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir.
1986); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27, 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (production ordered
subject to a protective order preventing disclosure), aff'd, 729 F.2d 85 (1984). Although the
federal courts are "in disarray" on the self-analysis privilege, the trend does not favor
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 552 (7th Cir. 1985) (although
district court abused discretion in denying plaintiffs' request for discovery of defendant's
affirmative action plans, plaintiffs were not "substantially prejudiced" and not entitled to the
plans).
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The Wards Cove majority was untroubled by its perpetuation of
the status quo. Indeed, Justice White reiterated the proposition that
it is neither the concern of the judiciary nor within its competence
to "restructure business practices." 132 It is hard to fathom how the
purpose of title VII can be effectuated if business practices are not
changed. Yet without any direction from Congress, the Court
changed plaintiff's title VII case to include a requirement that
balanced the employer's convenience against the alleged discrimi-
nation. In making this substantive change, the Court did not openly
analyze the nature of racism in the workplace;'" instead, the Court
insisted in Wards Cove that its only concern was the appropriate
allocations of proof. Yet, until the Court reallocated the burdens of
proof in Watson and Wards Cove, the facts in Wards Cove would have
established a classic title VII violation.'" Surely Congress intended
in 1964 that title VII apply to racially segregated workplaces. The
Court's stylized preoccupation with the burden of proof is little
more than a subterfuge for promoting its laissez-faire approach to
business, albeit at the expense of the continued existence of discrim-
inatory practices.
Less harshly, the Court decided that discrimination was no
longer a serious problem and that any requirement that business
justify its practices was too onerous. In so doing, the Court effec-
tively rejected the congressional mandate to eliminate unjustifiable
workplace discrimination,'" thus permitting discriminatory prac-
132 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989). "[C]onsequently the
judiciary should proceed with care before mandating that an employer must adopt a plain-
tiff's alternate ... practice in response to a Title VII suit." Id. Wards Cove also perpetuated
the economic disparities between plaintiff and defendant; clearly, employers have vastly
greater resources than plaintiffs to explore alternative business practices.
1" What troubled the Court in both Watson and Wards Cove was its speculation that any
interpretation of title VII that gives too much weight to the discrimination established by
plaintiff may encourage an employer to hire minorities on a preferential basis, in violation
of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988). It has been well settled for some years that section 703(j)
means only that as between two equally well-qualified applicants, title VII does not require
or impose an affirmative duty upon the employer to hire the minority or female applicant.
See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981) (title VII
does not obligate an employer to select a woman or a minority from among'equally well-
qualified applicants). Ignoring its own jurisprudence, the Court used the narrow exception
of 703(j) to swallow the anti-discrimination rule of title VII.
134 See 490 U.S. at 646-48. It appears that even the Griggs plaintiffs would lose under
Wards Cove. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 110, at 26-31.
133 As we have observed elsewhere, disparate treatment and its emphasis on defendant's
subjective racist motivation redefines equality in terms of narrow conduct performed for the
specific purposes of violating precisely defined rights. Looking to the subjective race-specific
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tices that were cheaper than nondiscriminatory practices. The
Court's new disparate impact rules redefined equality in terms of
economic efficiency; if a plaintiff could not prove the equivalent
cost-effectiveness of a non-discriminatory practice, the plaintiff
could not prevail.'" Under the guise of clarifying evidentiary con-
cerns and allocating and ordering burdens of proof, the Court
undermined congressional intent and legitimated business as usual.
Decisions about burdens of proof that have little regard for the
underlying procedural issues about who has the evidence, who can
get it, and the cost of obtaining it, obviously belie the notion that
procedure is distinct from substance. Moreover, they make a mock-
ery of procedure's supposed political neutrality.
IV. How SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE INTERSECT AT THE
COMMENCEMENT OF A CASE: PUNISHING PLAINTIFFS WITH NEW
PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we examine the impact of the cases mandating
greater specificity in title VII complaints. The Federal RuleS of Civil
Procedure promised a liberal pleading regime, 1 S7 envisioning a sim-
ple narrative that would let plaintiffs use discovery to establish the
specific details of their cases.' 38 Thus, Federal Rule 8(a)(2) compels
only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief."'" But despite this promise, the courts
have imposed stricter pleading requirements in title VII cases. 148
motivation of individual defendants conceptualizes discrimination as aberrant acts of isolated
individuals, thereby absolving the community of any responsibility for this behavior. Brown
et al., Constitutional Dissonance, supra note 8, at 590-98.
1 " For a discussion of the Court's economic analysis of constitutional rights, see Brown
& Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note 3. Compare Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex
Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (1989) (title VII interferes with economically
efficient behavior) with John J. Donohue, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An
Economic Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1337 (1989) (discrimination not attributable to
efficiency but "misogyny").
157 The objectives of Rule 8(a)'s drafters were to get away from the exacting requirements
of the Field Code, "to avoid technicalities and to require that the pleading . . . [give] the
opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim." 5 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1215-1216 (1990).
I" These heightened pleading requirements have combined with the more onerous
prima facie case rules, discussed earlier, to increase plaintiffs' discovery burdens. Stricter
pleading and proof rules significantly impact discovery; moreover, plaintiff must be able to
discover enough information to avoid Rule 11 sanctions.
"9
 FED. R. Ctv. P. 8(a)(2).
''° Indeed, this trend is true of civil rights cases generally. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737
F.2d 1, 30 & n.87 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("[Elvery other circuit has articulated a requirement of
particularity in pleading for civil rights complaints."); Trader v. Fiat Distribs., Inc., 476 F.
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Federal courts in several circuits now routinely require title VII
plaintiffs to plead specific facts in their complaints."' Abandoning
the liberal "notice pleading" requirements championed by Charles
Clark 142
 and acknowledged with approval by the Supreme Court in
Conley v. Gibson,' 43 the federal courts have largely revived fact plead-
ing, requiring that title VII claimants not only state their claims,
but also support them with specific facts.'" The courts have used
Rule 8(a) as a sifting device to delay or dismiss meritorious claims
on the grounds of lack of factual specificity in complaints.' 45
Supp. 1194, 1197-1202 (D. Del. 1979) (claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as well as title VII);
Marcus, supra note 30, at 449-50.
141 See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text. Although some federal courts have
held that the pleader must set forth the prima facie elements of a claim in order to meet the
requirements of Rule 8, see, e.g., Local 1852 Waterfront Guard Ass'n v. Amstar Corp., 363
F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (D. Md. 1973), the cases taken as a whole indicate that each and every
element need not be stated specifically as long as it can be inferred that the evidence regarding
the missing element will be presented at trial.
115
 In his earlier writings, Clark was more willing to embrace the term "notice pleading."
Compare Charles E. Clark, Comments: Pleading Negligence, 32 YALE L.J. 483, 484 (1923) and
Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 IL'Atz L.J. 259, 264 (1926) with Charles
E. Clark, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958,58 CoLum. L. REV. 435, 450-51
(1958). Perhaps the confusion over the term "notice pleading" has in part been caused by
the two ways in which Clark used it. Sometimes he distinguished between two types of notice
functions. On occasion, he wrote about "notice of each material fact of the pleader's cause,
rather than merely general notice of the case, as in the so-called 'notice pleading.'" Charles
E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 YALE L.J. 260, 265 n.30 (1926) (citing Charles E.
Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, II VA. L. REV. 517, 542-44 (1915)). But this
distinction is also confusing because Clark and the other drafters of the Federal Rules
assiduously avoided the words "facts" and "causes of action" in the pleading requirements.
JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 67, at 151. For discussion of the "ambiguity" of the Federal
Rules' purposes with respect to the degree of specificity required in complaints, see JAMES &
HAZARD, supra note 67, at 152-54.
"3 Set 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[Al complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
' 44
 For a discussion of the revival of fact pleading in the federal courts generally, see
Marcus, supra note 30, at 447-51. See also David M. Roberts, Fact Pleading, Notice Pleading,
and Standing, 65 CORNELL L. Rev. 390, 408-21 (1980); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading
Rule for Civil Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677, 678-88
(1984).
' 43
 Professor Marcus suggests several motives for applying a specificity requirement: a
desire to protect defendants from discovery that becomes the principal objective of a lawsuit
(rather than a device to aid in its resolution), general disapproval of civil rights claims, and
fear of groundless suits being brought by indigents under the liberal federal rules. Marcus,
supra note 30, at 441, 471, 477. The fear of frivolous complaints is misplaced. In our view,
if a qualified African-American applicant is denied a job that is given to a white, that should
be enough to shift the burden to the defendant to explain its behavior. Similarly, racially
disparate impact should shift the burden because by definition defendant's conduct has hurt
minorities more than whites.
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More stringent pleading requirements may well be part of a
broader trend that affects a larger group of cases." 6 Nevertheless,
imposing different pleading rules on title VII cases undercuts the
myth that pleading standards are transsubstantive. Stricter pleading
requirements have a particularly harsh effect on title VII plaintiffs
and ignore the very nature of discrimination claims. Title VII plain-
tiffs are less able to obtain specific facts at the pleading stage. First,
the resources of title VII plaintiffs are limited. Second, much of the
information necessary to establish plaintiff's case is in defendant's
hands. Certainly, evidence of the critical issue of defendant's state
of mind is not easily available to plaintiff. Even with respect to
statistical evidence of racial disparities, plaintiff will need to obtain
evidence from defendant on the racial composition of the work
force, and will require the assistance of expert statisticians. Evidence
of the employer's justification for its allegedly discriminatory prac-
tices, as well as the alternative ways of doing business required by
Wards Cove, were similarly inaccessible. In other words, the extensive
and costly discovery plaintiff needs to establish her case is not
available unless she survives the pleading stage.
Heightened specificity requirements further disadvantage a ti-
tle VII plaintiff by limiting the permissible scope of her complaint.
As a general proposition, the scope of a title VII complaint must
relate to the charge filed with the EEOC. Although there are various
formulations of the rule, the generally accepted standard appears
to be that "the 'scope' of the judicial complaint is limited to the
`scope' of the EEOC investigation that can reasonably be expected
to grow out of the charge of discrimination"" 7 initially filed with
that agency. This standard has been applied with varying degrees
of strictness, making it difficult for a plaintiff to discern when a
court will broadly construe the potential EEOC investigation 48
 and
148 Marcus, supra note 30, at 435-36, 491-92. Professor Marcus identifies securities
fraud, civil rights and conspiracy as types of cases in which the courts have required more
specificity in complaints. Id. at 447-50.
L" Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970).
L48
 For broader applications of the standard, see, e.g., EEOC v. Reichhold Chemicals,
Inc., 700 F. Supp. 524, 526-27 (N.D. Fla. 1988) (granting leave to amend to add charge of
retaliation for exercise of title VII rights in sex discrimination case where discovery grew out
of investigation and conciliation efforts had failed); Emrick v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 539 F.
Supp. 653, 655 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (charges of sex discrimination with respect to hiring, seniority,
compensation, promotion, transfer, and terms and conditions of employment could "reason-
ably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination" with respect to termination
filed with the EEOC). The Reichhold Chemicals court applied a somewhat more restrictive
standard, defining the permissible scope of the complaint by the scope of the EEOC inves-
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when it will not. 149 It seems particularly unfair to punish a plaintiff
for drafting a less than comprehensive EEOC charge, which is often
done without the advice of counsel, because she did not consider
or anticipate certain discriminatory practices, perhaps relying on
the EEOC's discovery efforts to unearth facts to support her claim.
Furthermore, such a limitation violates the transactional approach
of the Federal Rules and contravenes its liberal amendment pol-
icy.' 5° Notice that there is no language in title VII that supports the
imposition of this limitation.
Another rule that may adversely affect plaintiffs requires the
pleading with specificity of jurisdictional prerequisites or conditions
precedent to suit.'" This requirement is not universally applied;
indeed, some courts allow general statements that plaintiff has met
the conditions. But there is such wide judicial variation that a plain-
tiff cannot be sure what to anticipate. Thus, while a federal district
court in Pennsylvania found plaintiff's allegation that administrative
remedies had been sufficiently exhausted to withstand a Rule
12(b)(6) motion,' 52 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a
tigation "as long as the investigation reasonably grew out of the discrimination charge." 700
F. Supp. at 526 (emphasis added).
19 See, e.g., Torriero v. Olin Corp., 684 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (granting
summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's sexual harassment claim where EEOC charge
alleged that, because of her sex, plaintiff's calls and times of arrival were monitored, she was
denied transfer or promotion, and was placed on probation and terminated; sexual harass-
ment could not reasonably have been expected to be revealed by investigation of EEOC
charge); Jackson v. Ohio Bell Tel, Co., 555 F. Supp, 80, 83 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (granting
defendant's motion to dismiss daims alleging racial discrimination in maintenance of "sepa-
rate" lines of seniority and standards of conduct, harassment, and assignment of "menial
work" where EEOC charge only referred to "termination" and "disciplinary action").
15° Several of the Federal Rules look at whether the claims or events that are sought to
be joined arise out of the "same transaction or occurrence," e.g., FED. R. Ow. P. 13(a), or the
"same transaction, occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences," e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.
20(a). See also Feu. R. Ctv. P. 13(g), 14(a), 15(c), 15(d). Although the courts do not offer a
precise test for what constitutes sufficient transactional unity to permit joinder, such unity is
aided by a "common scheme, or design, or conspiracy to defraud or to violate the law," the
"fact that all the acts or the conduct are more or less consciously directed toward or connected
with some common core such as a common purpose or a common event or a single claim or
item of property," or "the fact that completely independent acts converge to cause an injury
for all or for some part of which the actors have a common liability under substantive law."
JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 67, at 478-79. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 18(a) even
permits unrelated claims to be joined against an opposing party and Rule 15(a) states that
leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires." For an explanation of the
transactional approach, see Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure
11: Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1298-1301, 1319 (1935).
151 FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c).
152 See Spidle v. Pennsylvania Office of Budget, 660 F. Supp. 941, 943-45 (M.D. Pa.
1987).
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district court opinion requiring plaintiff specifically to plead receipt
of an EEOC right-to-sue letter in order to satisfy title VII's exhaus-
tion requirement.'" In the Seventh Circuit, it appears that a plain-
tiff's title VII claim was dismissed for pleading conditions precedent
too specifically.'" But another panel within the same circuit, refer-
ring to the "relative quagmire of Title VII procedure," applied a
more liberal standard to the pleading of conditions precedent in
upholding plaintiff's title VII claim. 155
Courts have also required that title VII plaintiffs plead specific
facts to support their claims. 156 Several courts have used a specificity
requirement to dismiss title VII complaints under Rule 8(a)(2),' 57
1 " See Pinson v. Hendrix, 493 F. Supp. 772, 776 n. f (N.D. Miss. 1980), aff'd without
published opinion, 660 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1981).
' 5' See Sanders v. A.J. Canfield Co., 635 F. Supp. 85, 87 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Despite the
Fact that time limitation is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, the court dismissed a title VII
claim where plaintiff alleged only that the complaint was timely filed, holding that pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(c), plaintiff must at least allege that "all conditions
precedent to the institution of the lawsuit have been fulfilled." Id, This misreads Rule 9(c),
which states only that "it is sufficient" to make a general averment regarding conditions
precedent but does not in any way prohibit a more specific statement. FED. R. Cry, P. 9(c).
'" See Brown v. Reliable Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 852 F.2d 932, 933 (7th Cir. 1988)
(plaintiff's complaint indicating only that EEOC charge had been made and that complaint
was filed within 90 days of receiving EEOC right-to-sue letter was adequate to give employers
notice that plaintiff was pursuing title VII action; complaint dismissed on other grounds).
Echoing the writ system and the Field Code, the federal courts have also developed specific
elements for different types of title Vii claims. Sexual harassment and sex discrimination
are pleaded differently. Compare Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872, 877-78
(S.D. Ga. 1983) with Haag v. Board of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1267, 1272 (N.D. 111. 1987). Sex
discrimination is defined in title VII; the specific elements of sexual harassment are listed
only in section 1604.11 of the EEOC Guidelines. Religious discrimination has its own prima
fade case. See McCrory v. Rapides Regional Medical Ctr., 635 F. Supp. 975, 978-79 (W.D.
La. 1986), aff'd, 801 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1986).
15° The Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed whether title VII plaintiffs should
be subjected to a specificity requirement pursuant to Rule 8(a)(2). In Baldwin County Wel-
come Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S.. 147, 149, 150 (1984), however, the majority refused to construe
a pro se plaintiff's right-to-sue letter as a properly pleaded complaint under Rule 8(a)(2) and
stated that it could "find no satisfactory basis for giving Title VII actions a special status
under the Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. at 150; cf. Nielsen v. Flower Hosp., 639 F. Supp.
738, 744-45, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (in pro se title VII action, court refused to extend Baldwin
beyond its facts, holding that the form complaint filed by plaintiff, though general, was
sufficient to commence an action).
1 " See, e.g., Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 666 (1st Cir. 1979) (dismissing complaint
without leave to amend for failure to state a title VII claim where fetnale employee, who
alleged sex discrimination in termination of her employment at college, did not allege facts
showing that department chairman who made sexual advances to her played role in the
termination decision); Martin v. New York State Dept of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372
(2d Cir. 1978) (court dismissed with leave to amend complaint of black employee who alleged
that employer denied him authority, salary and privileges commensurate with his position
on the basis of his race, stating that complaint consisted of "naked assertions" and did not
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while other panels have found similar title VII pleadings sufficiently
specific to withstand a motion to dismiss.'" The point is this: while
the courts speak in similar language, their actual expectations about
exactly what facts and what degree of specificity is necessary are
often unclear and seem to vary from case to case. For example,
Rule 9(b) specifically permits intent to be "averred generally."'"
Although some courts accept a general averment of discriminatory
motivation, others require the allegation of specific facts about de-
fendant's improper state of mind. 16° Thus, a complaint that one
court views as containing all the requisite facts might be dismissed
by another for mere conclusory allegations.' 6 ' At least with respect
to these cases, the pleading rules are neither simple nor predictable.
The First Circuit requires some of the most exacting pleading
standards. In Johnson v. General Electric, 162 an African-American
set forth facts to make out a claim under title VII); Johnson v. New York City Transit Auth.,
639 F. Supp. 887, 893 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (district court dismissed plaintiff's title VII claim
under Rule 12(b)(6) as "conclusory" where plaintiff did not allege with particularity that he
was qualified for position denied him or that he was discharged from a position due to
discrimination, and where plaintiff failed to demonstrate with any specificity that similarly
situated individuals were treated differently), aff'd, 823 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1987). For a case
applying a specificity standard to other than a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see Nash v. City of
Oakwood, 90 F.R.D. 633, 635-36 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (court denied plaintiff's motion to compel
production of documents on title VII racial discrimination claim where complaint contained
only conclusory allegations of broad-based discrimination; court claimed to apply liberal
"notice pleading" standard).
158 See, e.g., Emrick v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 539 F. Supp. 653, 656-57 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
(allegations that plaintiffs entered defendant's apprenticeship program and that they were
subject to several long-term layoffs on the basis of sex, read in conjunction with rest of
complaint, were sufficiently specific to survive motion to dismiss; court granted motion for
more specific statement); Ratcliffe v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 482 F. Supp. 759, 765 (E.D.
Pa. 1980) (amended sex discrimination complaint, much of which was cast in conclusory
language, "barely" satisfied rule of factual specificity in civil rights cases); see also Irizarry v.
Palm Springs Gen. Hosp., 657 F. Supp. 739, 740-41 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (claim of unlawful
discharge under title VII, though "somewhat unartfully drafted," contained sufficient alle-
gation of intentionally discriminatory animus to survive motion to dismiss).
"a FED. R. Clv. P. 9(b). Professor Marcus objects to the insistence on detailed pleading
regarding the defendant's state of mind, as it contradicts the express language of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). See Marcus, supra note 30, at 469.
360 See, e.g., Brown v. City of Miami Beach, 684 F. Supp. 1081, 1083 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(upholding disparate treatment complaint alleging rejection from various positions applied
for, because complaint identified several particular requests that were denied); Afro-Amer-
ican Police League v. Fraternal Order of Police, 553 F. Supp. 664, 668 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(dismissing minority police officers organization's title VII claim alleging discriminatory
implementation of seniority system where no facts of intentional discrimination were alleged).
16 ' The complex prima facie case required by Wards Cove would no doubt exacerbate
the specificity problem.
' 62 840 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1988).
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employee alleged that, because of his race, he was not promoted)"
Counts I and III of plaintiff's complaint were time-barred.' 64 The
court held that count II, in which plaintiff alleged that General
Electric had adopted a racially discriminatory review process in
response to plaintiff's grievance for failure to promote, should be
dismissed without leave to amend because it was not pleaded with
requisite specificity.'" In essence, a title VII plaintiff in the First
Circuit must plead particular facts establishing racial discrimination,
either by alleging in the complaint that non-minority employees
similarly situated or qualified were granted favorable treatment or
benefits or by introducing unspecified "other evidence of racial
bias." 166
District courts in the Third Circuit also demand that title VII
plaintiffs plead specific facts. For example, in Trader v. Fiat Distrib-
utors, where minority plaintiffs alleged that both their employer and
their union were engaging in discriminatory employment practices,
the court dismissed under Rules 12(b)(6) and 8(a) various counts of
the complaint as too vague to support a cause of action under title
VII: "a civil rights complaint must specify, with a sufficient degree
of particularity, the unlawful conduct allegedly committed by each
defendant and the time and place of that conduct." 67 The court
admonished the plaintiffs, when preparing their amended com-
plaint, to include "facts as to when, how, to whom, and with what
results such discrimination has been applied."'"
166 Id. at 133.
164 Id. at 134, 139.
166 The court stated:
Appellant has alleged facts which, if proven, might sustain a claim of an unfair
review process. But that alone does not establish a title VII violation. The
element of racial discrimination must also be alleged with sufficient particularity.
Plaintiff does not contend that any white employees were promoted without
the qualifications for which the review process tested. Nor does he allege any
other evidence of racial bias in the nature of the review. Appellant has not
asserted facts sufficient to create inferences that would support a finding that
he would have been treated differently had he not been black.
Id. at 138 (emphasis in original). The court acknowledged, however, that count I, in which
the plaintiff alleged that he had qualifications equal to or better than the white employees
promoted ahead of him, would have been sufficiently pleaded had it been timely filed. Id.
155 Dismissal of a complaint without leave to amend conflicts with the liberal amendment
policy of the Federal Rules. See, e.g., 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 (1990) (a[lif the requisite allegations are not in the complaint
and a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is
made, the pleader should be given the opportunity to amend his complaint, if he can, to
show the existence of the missing elements.").
157 476 F. Supp. 1194, 1198 (D. Del. 1979).
165 Id. at 1199 (quoting Ogletree v. McNamara, 449 F.2d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1971)). Ogletree
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In particular, the Trader court deemed the following allegations
"broad and conclusory," and thus improper under Rule 8(a)(2):
The Plaintiff was retaliated against for opposing Defen-
dant's employment practices by written warnings, repri-
mands and other forms of harassment. Further, Plaintiff
was discriminated against, and Blacks as a class have been
discriminated against, in the hiring and promotion policies
of the Defendant in that the Defendant maintained pref-
erential job assignments for whites over Blacks and seg-
regated job classifications.' 69
The court found that plaintiff's complaint contained "no specific
factual allegations supporting his claim of retaliation" and was "de-
void of facts supporting [the] broad allegations of employment
discrimination" in hiring and promotion.' 7° Although plaintiff had
stated a claim and informed both the court and defendants of the
nature of his grievance, the court wanted more. Because the plain-
tiff did not recite specific facts about when the discriminatory acts
occurred, who performed them, and what the results of the acts
were, the court dismissed the complaint.'"
Courts are not unanimous in advocating the revival of fact
pleading in title VII cases. Some courts have criticized the specificity
requirement and remained faithful to the Federal Rules.'" For
is a frequently cited decision in which a dass of African-American employees alleged that
their employer, an Air Force base, had engaged in racially motivated employment discrimi-
nation. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants based in part on
the complaint's "notable" lack of specificity. Ogletree, 449 F.2d at 95. Under the Ogletree
standard, a title VII plaintiff must provide "evidentiary" facts demonstrating the veracity of
the claim. Id. at 98.
189 Trader, 476 F. Supp. at 1199-1200.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 1199. Plaintiff was given 20 days to remedy the "defective" pleadings. The
Trader court upheld several other counts. The court emphasized the requirement of specific
pleading in civil rights cases when drafted by "experienced counsel," suggesting more leniency
for the pro se plaintiff. Id. at 1197. In support of this proposition, see McClelland v. Herlitz,
Inc., 704 F. Supp. 749, 750-51 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (handwritten pro se complaint reciting
grounds for title VII race discrimination claims sufficient to comply with Rule 8(a)(2)'s
requirement of "a short and plain statement").
' 72 See, e.g., Amarnare v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 611 F. Supp. 344, 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (African-American employee, who was discharged by brokerage firm while
employed as administrative assistant, alleged facts sufficient to support claim even though
she alleged no facts regarding fourth element of prima facie case; plaintiff's statement in
complaint made clear the nature of her charge was sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2)). It is
indicative of the general confusion in this area that, even within circuits that have adopted
a specificity requirement, some courts have refused to apply it or have denied its applicability
to title VII cases. Two separate decisions of district courts in the Eleventh Circuit refused to
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example, in Talley v. Leo J. Shapiro & Associates, Inc., several employ-
ees brought a title VII action against their former employer, alleging
it had denied qualified minorities equal opportunity in all positions
and had maintained a promotion system that locked African-Amer-
icans into discriminatory assignments.'" The court easily rejected
the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) argument that the complaint did not
contain a sufficient factual foundation for the title VII claims. Stat-
ing that the allegations were "sufficient to put defendants on notice
of the basis for plaintiff's claims and to permit defendants to submit
adequate responsive pleadings," the court found that the complaint
met the liberal "notice pleading" standards of the Federal Rules.' 74
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals restated the importance
of notice pleading in American Nurses' Ass'n v. Illinois,'" a class action
alleging sex discrimination in wages in violation of title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The dis-
trict court dismissed the plaintiffs' lengthy and detailed complaint
under Rule 12(b)(6) on the ground that it pleaded a comparable
worth case, a theory that was not actionable under title VII.' 76 The
Seventh Circuit, in reversing the lower court, extolled the virtues
of using notice pleading and discovery, instead of fact pleading, to
uncover the facts underlying plaintiffs' claim.' 77 Thus, the com-
plaint should not have been dismissed because, even though the
apply a heightened specificity requirement to title VII cases, In Hawkins v. Fulton County,
95 F.R.D. 88 (N.D. Ga. 1982), the court granted plaintiffs' motion to add parties-plaintiff
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21, finding that plaintiffs' complaint was suffi-
cient to put defendants on notice of a possible claim regarding their hiring practice even
though the complaint only specifically listed allegations of discrimination in transfer and
promotion. M. at 90-91. Rejecting the greater specificity standard, the court asserted that
complaints in civil rights and employment discrimination actions must be read in a "broad
and expansive manner." Id. at 91. A more recent decision, EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards,
Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1438 (M.D. Fla. 1988), holding that defendant bore the burden of failing
to seek clarification of a phrase—"unequal terms and conditions of employment"—in plain-
tiff's complaint at an earlier stage of the proceedings, expressly found that the requirement
of greater specificity in civil rights pleadings did not apply to title VII suits. Id. at 1443.
'" 713 F. Supp. 254, 257 (N.D. III. 1989).
174 Id.
176 783 F.2d 716, 723-25 (7th Cir. 1986). But cf. Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Companies,
Inc., 727 F.2d 648, 654 (7th Cir. 1984) (in a case brought under RICO and the Sherman
Antitrust Act, Judge Posner said that Conley v. Gibson "has never been taken literally" and
interpreted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) to require greater factual specificity).
176 American Nurses' Assn, 783 F.2d at 719, 724. For the problems of comparable worth
cases, see Brown et al., Comparable Worth, supra note 94.
177 American Nurses' Ass'n, 783 F.2d at 723-24. The court warned of the risks of overly
specific pleading, stating that la] plaintiff who files a long and detailed complaint may plead
himself out of court by including factual allegations which if true show that his legal rights
were not invaded." Id. at 724 (citations omitted).
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comparable worth claims were not actionable, it alleged other kinds
of intentional sex discrimination that were.'" The court suggested
that a complaint that does not allege facts may still satisfy Rule
8(a)(2).'"
But the Seventh Circuit's approach is not typical. The majority
of courts now impose stringent pleading requirements. Of course,
a plaintiff cannot use the discovery process before she files her
complaint to learn the facts she must specifically plead. As one judge
has observed: "no information until litigation: no litigation without
information."'" The revival of fact pleading thus frustrates action-
able claims and, ultimately, the opportunity to be heard.
V. REDEFINING THE PARTIES: EITHER Too MANY oR Too FEW
From 1938 until 1980, the earmarks of American procedure
were permissive pleading, ease of joinder of claims and parties, and
liberal discovery."' In previous sections, we saw how the interplay
of an expanded prima facie case, reallocated burdens of proof,
stricter pleading requirements, and enlarged discovery dramatically
increased the burdens of title VII plaintiffs. In this section, we
review the injury to plaintiffs caused by the federal judiciary's re-
writing of joinder of party doctrine. During the 1980s, the Supreme
Court used two cases, General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon i 82
and Martin v. Walls,'" as vehicles to change title VII joinder rules.
These cases made title VII procedure vastly more technical and
complex. In so doing, they redefined the concept of discrimination.
Falcon and Wilks demonstrate again the political nature of pro-
cedural choices. Falcon made it much harder for plaintiffs with a
'7' Id. at 728-29.
' 79 Id. at 727. The court stated:
[A] complaint is not required to allege all, or any, of the facts logically entailed
by the claim .... A plaintiff does not have to plead evidence .... [Al complaint
does not fail to state a claim merely because it does not set forth a complete
and convincing picture of the alleged wrongdoing.
Id.
188 Johnson ex rd Johnson v. United States, 788 F.2d 845, 856 (2d Cir.) (Pratt, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 914 (1986).
'8' See, e.g., JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 67, at 21. Another characteristic was the merger
of law and equity. For the procedural viewpoints and debate evolving after 1980, see Subrin,
Fireworks, supra note 14; Subrin, New Era, supra note 7; Jack 13. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. Rev.
1901, 1902-03, 1907, 1913-17 (1989).
1" 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
I" 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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common injury—discrimination—to join together to achieve relief.
At the same time, under Wilks, plaintiffs had to join many more
defendants. Thus, plaintiffs' rights were constricted while the rights
of nonplaintiffs—other (white) employees—were enlarged. The ex-
pansion of the number of parties who must be joined as defendants
also extends the vulnerability of any judgment won by plaintiffs.'"
A. Restricting Class Actions: Atomizing Plaintiffs
1. Before Falcon: Title VII and Class Action Congeniality
Early Supreme Court civil rights cases recognized the financial
and political powerlessness of individual victims of discrimination. 185
Class actions provide a more level litigation playing field by per-
mitting the sharing of legal resources and expenses. Indeed, one of
the purposes of Federal Rule 23 was to empower the weak or
vulnerable members of society.' 86 Special rules in class actions for
statutes of limitations, mootness and settlement can strengthen in-
dividual plaintiffs.' 87 For example, people who believe they have
been discriminated against can gain enormous settlement leverage
by bringing a class action. Class actions also magnify defendants'
184 Section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 changes the holding of Martin v. Wilks.
Sec. 108, § 703, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1076-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(n)(1)(A)). For a full discussion, see infra notes 264, 291. Notice, however, that the
new Act does not address Falcon.
' 85 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) is perhaps the most famous early
judicial recognition of institutionalized discrimination.
lee FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For the importance of the class action to such litigants, see Jack
B. Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions, 58 F.R.D. 299, 300, 304
(1973); Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2184-90 (1989). The advisory committee's notes to the 1966 amend-
ments to the class action rule state: lilllustrative are various actions in the civil rights field
where a party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose
members are incapable of specific enumeration." FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's
notes; see also Kaplan, supra note 15, at 2126-27. A class action can also protect anonymous
class members from reprisals.
187 See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v, Parker, 462 U.S, 345 (1983) (filing of class action
tolls applicable statute of limitations); United States Parole Comm'r v. Geraghty, 445 U.S.
388 (1980) ("mootness" of plaintiff's personal claims does not prevent appeal of denial of
certification); Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (satisfaction of named
class members' private substantive claims does not prevent their appealing denial of class
certification); RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE 469-98 (1985) (on judicial control of settlement
in class actions); Stephen N. Subrin & John Sutton, Welfare Class Actions in Federal Court: A
Procedural Analysis, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Ray, 21, 54 (1973) (on using class actions to prevent
defendants from making cases moot); see also FED. R. Cm P. 23(e).
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exposure; 188 consequently, the realistic threat of certifying a class
adds to the settlement value of a case. 189
The compatibility of title VII and class actions is not limited to
redressing power imbalances. The very nature of discrimination is
its commonality to a group, whether racial, religious or gender-
based. The essence of discrimination is often the hatred of the
group to which an individual belongs. Thus, it is particularly sen-
sible to read Rule 23 in a pro-plaintiff way when an alleged title
VII violation is involved.
Before Falcon, many courts determined that title VII cases were
inherently class actions' 9° because racial discrimination is, by defi-
nition, class discrimination.'" Some courts spoke of "across-the-
board" discrimination to denote the inherent class nature of dis-
crimination; they presumed that a victim of discrimination could
represent other victims of the same group as to a variety of discrim-
inatory practices.' 92 Discrimination was the common denomina-
tor. 193
These cases reflect both a commitment to judicial implemen-
tation of the policy of title VII and an understanding of workplace
discrimination. For example, in Senter v. General Motors Corp. the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "It is manifest that every
decision to hire, fire or discharge an employee may involve individ-
ual considerations. Yet when that decision is made as part of class-
wide discriminatory practices, courts bear a special responsibility to
vindicate the policies of the Act regardless of the position of the
' 88
 Class actions are also more likely than individual suits to effectuate systemic reform.
189 Settlement is particularly relevant in this context, as the length and complexity of
civil rights litigation especially disadvantages plaintiffs.
L90
 In this section, we refer to private class actions initiated under Rule 23. Pattern or
practice cases brought by the UGC or the Department of Justice under section 707(a) of
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(a)(1982), provide another
vehicle for classwide relief, but those cases are not governed by Rule 23 and are thus not
germane to this article.
19' See Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1968); see also Bowe
v. Colgate7Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 719 (7th Cir. 1969) ("A suit for violation of title VII
is necessarily a class action as the evil sought to be ended is discrimination on the basis of a
class characteristic, i.e., race, sex, religion or national origin.").
in Set, e.g., Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976), and cases
cited in SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 1217 n.10.
191 See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 1217. Indeed, many courts found it an
abuse of the district court's discretion not to permit a plaintiff to represent a broad class of
individuals who had been subjected to discrimination, even if the injuries of other class
members arose out of distinct practices or issues. Id. at 1217 and cases cited therein. For a
contrary view, that racial discrimination is not inherently class-wide, see Rutherglen, Class
Actions, supra note 5, at 707-08.
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individual plaintiff."'" Employment discrimination ordinarily af-
fects all or most members of identifiable oppressed groups. "The
operative fact in an action under Title VII," stressed the Senter
court, "is that an individual has been discriminated against because
he was a member of a class." 195 In other words, discrimination is
"peculiarly class discrimination." 98
This understanding enabled plaintiffs more readily to satisfy
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a)(2) (common questions of fact and
law), (a)(3) (typicality), and (a)(4) (representativeness), as well as
Rule 23(b)(2), which states that grounds generally applicable to the
class make appropriate final injunctive relief for the class as a
whole.' 97 Moreover, making it easier to show commonality and typ-
icality automatically made it easier to achieve sufficient "numerosity"
under 23(a)(1), since the affected group was itself inherently
larger.' 98
194 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th Cir. 1976); see also Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543,
547-48 (4th Cir. 1975) ("[A]n 'across the board' attack on all discriminatory actions by
defendants on the ground of race.., is . . . consonant with the broad remedial purpose of
Title VII.").
105 532 F.2d at 524 (emphasis added). The "across the board" theory was also consistent
with the paradigm of group injunctive or declaratory relief under Rule 23(b)(2). The drafters
of that Rule noted that it was "intended to reach situations where a party has taken action
. with respect to a class, and [injunctive or declaratory relief] with respect to the class as a
whole, is appropriate." FED. R. Ow. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee's notes to 1966 amend-
ments, As the advisory committee pointed out, Congress particularly intended this rule to
serve discrimination cases: lilllustrative are various actions in the civil rights field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one whose members
are incapable of specific enumeration." Id.
198 Seater, 532 F.2d at 524.
197 See FED. R. Civ. P. 28(a)(2), 23(a)(4), 23(6)(2). These values ostensibly inspired
Congress to create the Rule 23(b)(2) class action in the first place. See FED. R. CR,. P. 23(b)(2)
advisory committee's notes to 1966 amendments. The only other questions were whether the
plaintiff had demonstrated numerosity and adequacy of representation. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN,
Supra note 35, at 1218.
199 These courts were neither skewing title VII nor ignoring the requisites of Rule 23.
Discrimination based on race or' sex is still widespread in America, making it unlikely that
any act of discrimination is isolated. In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court has
recognized that discrimination is more like a spreading cancer than an isolated wound. This
is the theory behind the so-called "germ theory" presumption in school desegregation cases.
See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 201 n.12 (1979) ("'Infection at one school
infects all schools.'" (quoting Judge Wisdom in United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467
F.2d 848, 888 (5th Cir. 1972))). An employer that discriminates against an employee is apt
to discriminate against other employees of the same group; this attitudinal malignancy tends
to spread throughout the organization. Less metaphorically, discrimination by high level
supervisors often represents at least the appearance of corporate acquiescence, thereby
condoning similar behavior by lower level employees. Thus allegations of discrimination
almost always raise workplace-wide issues of law and fact.
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Class actions also foster the judiciary's efficiency interest in not
repeatedly litigating the same facts. For example, plaintiffs who
must prove racial animus often will call upon evidence of repeated
discrimination against a number of employees in order to show
intent. Class actions also reduce the problem of inconsistent results
in the same or similar cases.'"
It is not important whether you agree with us that title VII
cases are peculiarly appropriate for class actions. What is not con-
troversial is that both the pre- and post-Falcon cases demonstrate
the entanglement of process and substance, the impact of process
on the value of cases, and the political nature of the judicial inter-
pretation and application of a given procedure. Before Falcon, the
courts tried to mesh their understanding of employment discrimi-
nation and the plight of powerless title VII plaintiffs with the mean-
ing of typicality and commonality and the efficiencies of the class
action. They purposely made it easier to bring a title VII case as a
class action, because that is what they thought an accurate reading
of the goals of title VII and Rule 23 required. 2" When the Supreme
Court altered this view in Falcon, it forged a new substantive-pro-
cedural accommodation.
2. Falcon and Its Aftermath: A Defendant-Oriented Integration
of Substance and Procedure
In General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that title VII cases were uniquely suitable
for class treatment and held that the discrete requirements of Rule
23(a) must be subjected to "rigorous analysis." 2°' In so doing, the
199 "The class action is a powerful procedural device, offering enormous savings in time
and judicial resources over individual trial of each class member's case while opening up
opportunities for both new forms of litigation and potential abuse by litigants." MARCUS Sc
SuitumAN, supra note 187, at 233.
2'9° Perhaps they acted in a non-transubstantive manner, molding the procedure for a
particular field of law. But title VII was by no means the only substantive field that received
such sympathetic class action treatment. For example, fraud cases received similar treatment.
See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
201 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). This holding strengthened the rule first announced in
East Texas Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977). Reversing a
broad class certification, the Rodriguez Court stated:
We are not unaware that suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination are often
by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs. Common questions
of law or fact are typically present. But careful attention to the requirements
of [Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable. The mere fact that a complaint
alleges racial or ethnic discrimination does not in itself ensure that the party
who has brought the lawsuit will be an adequate representative of those who
may have been the real victims of that discrimination.
Id. at 405-06.
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Court eliminated Rule 23 as an accessible vehicle for title VII plain-
tiffs, and detracted from the policy of collective relief that impelled
the enactment of Rule 23.
The named plaintiff in Falcon claimed his employer had not
promoted him because he was Mexican-American. 2°2
 He also set
forth class claims on behalf of all unpromoted Mexican-American
employees of the company and all Mexican-American applicants
who had not been hired.2" The district court certified a class that
included employees and applicants at one of the company's facili-
ties,204 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 2°5
The Supreme Court reversed. 2" Although the Court acknowl-
edged that "racial discrimination is by definition class discrimina-
tion," it insisted that the mere allegation of racial discrimination
does not necessarily respond to Rule 23(a)'s requirements, or define
a class suitable for certification:
Conceptually, there is a wide gap between (a) an individ-
ual's claim that he has been denied a promotion on dis-
criminatory grounds, and his otherwise unsupported al-
legation that the company has a policy of discrimination,
and (b) the existence of a class of persons who have suf-
fered the same injury as that individual, such that the
individual's claim and the class claims will share common
questions of law or fact and that the individual's claim will
be typical of the class claims. 207
Rather, "actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) [is]
indispensable." 208 Thus, a private title VII class action may be cer-
tified only if the trial court is satisfied "after a rigorous analysis" 209
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been met. 21 °
202 457 U.S. at 149.
207
	 at 150-51.
2" After trial, the Court found discrimination against the class representative in pro-
motions only, not in hiring. With respect to the class claims, the Court found no discrimination
in promotions but found discriminatory hiring practices. Falcon, 457 U.S. at 153.
299 The Fifth Circuit applied the "across-the-board" rule, which "permits an employee
complaining of one employment practice to represent another complaining of another prac-
tice, if the plaintiff and the members of the class suffer from essentially the same injury. In
this case, all of the claims are based on discrimination because of national origin." Falcon v.
General Tel, Co., 626 F.2d 369,375 (5th Cir. 1980).
2°6 Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161.
2" Id. at 157 (footnote omitted).
208 Id. at 160.
209 Id. at 161.
210 In footnote 13, the Court stated that "[t]he commonality and typicality requirements
of Rule 23(a) tend to merge" and that these two requirements "also tend to merge with the
adequacy of representation requirement, although the latter requirement also raises concerns
about the competency of class counsel and conflicts of interest." Id. at 157 n.13.
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The named plaintiff's complaint in Falcon failed to demonstrate
a close nexus between his individual claims and the class claims
because the complaint did not provide a sufficient basis to conclude
that his claim of discrimination in promotion "would require the
decision of any common question [about defendant's] failure to hire
more Mexican-Americans." 2 " The Falcon Court also suggested that
district courts should carefully scrutinize the merits of the named
plaintiff's individual claim at the class certification stage, 212
 notwith-
standing the absence of any statutory rule requiring or permitting
this inquiry.
In sum, Falcon triggered three major shifts in the application
of Rule 23 to title VII class actions: first, title VII plaintiffs now
must satisfy Rule 23(a)'s requirements under a standard of "rigor-
ous analysis;" second, the nexus213
 between the named plaintiff's
claims and those of the class the plaintiff seeks to represent must
be "close;" and last, the title VII plaintiff may be required to plead
specific facts and argue the merits of her claim before certification
will be approved. 214
Just as the more permissive view of the symbiosis between Rule
23 and title VII reflects a particular understanding of discrimina-
tion,215
 the shift accomplished by Falcon makes sense only in the
context of the Supreme Court's current understanding of the na-
ture of discrimination. Falcon embodies a belief that discriminatory
employment practices are no longer prevalent in America 216
 and
2" Id. at 158 (emphasis added). In footnote 15, however, the Supreme Court set forth
some infrequently applied exceptions. Id. at 159 n. 15. First, an employee who asserts that
she was a victim of specific discriminatory employment practices may properly represent an
applicant when the employer used a biased testing procedure to assess both applicants and
incumbent employees. Id. Second, a general policy of discrimination could justify a class
including both applicants and employees "if the discrimination manifested itself in hiring
and promotion practices in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective
decision-making processes." Id.
212 See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160.
415
	 use the term "nexus" broadly, as do the courts, to include both the "typicality"
and "commonality" requirements of Rule 23(a). After Falcon, the federal courts tend to
merge the two. See, e.g., Meiresonne v. Marriott Corp., 124 F.R.D. 619, 622 n.7 (N.D. Ill.
1989) ("Typicality most often subsumes commonality, for a plaintiff's claim must necessarily
share at least some characteristics of the other class members' claims to be 'typical' of them.").
Accordingly, in the cases we cite in this section, we do not specify whether it was a lack of
"typicality" or of "commonality" that led the courts to find an insufficient nexus between the
named plaintiffs and their classes.
2" See Falcon, 457 U.S. at 158.
515 See Bryant G. Garth, Conflict and Dissent in Class Actions: A Suggested Perspective, 77
Nw. U. L. REV. 492 (1982).
418
 The evidence is clearly to the contrary. See, e.g., TURNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 4,
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that discrimination is simply an isolated transgression by individual
supervisors against individual employees. 217 Thus, to the Falcon
Court, plaintiffs with limited facts and losing cases are likely to use
class actions to harass employers and clog up the courts."' The
Falcon Court's view of discrimination has made it increasingly dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to use Rule 23 to consolidate claims and obtain
collective relief. 219 Ironically, this restrictive trend has also preju-
diced plaintiffs' ability to bring and win individual title VII suits.
9, 12. Moreover, people of color constitute a disproportionate percentage of the American
poor. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, P-60, No. 161, MONEY, INCOME AND
POVERTY STATUS IN THE UNrrEn STATES: 1987, at 8 (Aug. 1988); Walter L. Updegrave, Race
and Money, MONEY, Dec. 1989, at 152; see also Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARNT. L. REV.
1331, 1332 n.3 (1988). The racial disparity is continuing. See Michael K. Frisby, The Economics
of Disparity; Gap Among Blacks Widening, Study Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 9, 1991, at 1.
217 We have written elsewhere about the impact of this new definition upon women. See
Brown et al., Constitutional Dissonance, supra note 8; Brown & Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note
3.
RIB Twenty-three years ago, Judge Godbold of the Fifth Circuit predicted the respective
risks to plaintiffs, defendants and the courts of too lenient or too strict a view of the efficacy
of class actions in title VII cases:
Over-technical limitation of classes by the district courts will drain the life out
of Title VII, as will unduly narrow scope of relief once discriminatory acts are
found. But without reasonable specificity the court cannot define the class,
cannot determine whether the representation is adequate, and the employer
does not know how to defend. And, what may be most significant, an over-
broad framing of the class may be so unfair to the absent members as to
approach, if not amount to, deprivation of due process. Envision the hypothet-
ical attorney with a single client, filing a class action to halt all racial discrimi-
nation in all the numerous plants and facilities of one of America's mammoth
corporations. One act, or a few acts, at one or a,few places, can be charged to
be part of a practice or policy quickening an injunction against all racial dis-
crimination by the employer at all places. It is tidy, convenient for the courts
fearing a flood of Title VII cases, and dandy for the employees if their cham-
pion wins. But what of the catastrophic consequences if the plaintiff loses and
carries the class down with him, or proves only such limited facts that no practice
or policy can be found, leaving him afloat but sinking the class?
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1126 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold,
C.J., specially concurring).
219 That the number of civil rights class actions filed in federal courts is progressively
decreasing is beyond dispute. Judge Robert L. Carter of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York has demonstrated this statistically. See Carter, supra note
186, at 2183. Carter shows that, in 1977, 8.67% of all federal court filings were civil rights
cases, whereas, by 1985, civil rights filings had plummeted to a mere 6.4%. Id. Nationally,
civil rights class action filings have dramatically decreased from 1,174 filed in the judicial
reporting year ending June 30, 1976, to 48 filed in the reporting year ending June 30, 1987.
See Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Submission to the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on the Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas as an Associate Justice of
the United States Supreme Court 33 (Sept. 11, 1991).
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a. "Rigorous Analysis" and "Close Nexus"
Rule 23 lists four prerequisites for any class action: typicality,
commonality, representativeness and numerosity. 22° The theory is
that before one or more people can, through their lawsuit, bind
others by preclusion law, due process requires that their circum-
stances be sufficiently similar so that the unnamed members will be
protected by the diligence and similarity of the named members. 221
Therefore, courts inquire whether the named parties are "typical,"
and whether their cases have common questions of law or fact with
the unnamed class members. Moreover, the named parties must
not have conflicts of interest with the unnamed members, and must
be able to represent them diligently. 222
 Post-Falcon, these inquiries
are first to be analyzed "rigorously" (that is, formally) and, in a
sense, abstractly (that is, acontextually). Discriminatory behavior,
the underlying subject of the lawsuit, is not relevant.
The next requirement, "close nexus," means that the circum-
stances of one named party must be almost identical to the circum-
stances of the unnamed members of the class. 22s Having defined
the class by virtue of these requirements, the court then must decide
whether the class as a whole is so numerous that a class action makes
sense.
2" Fen. R. Ur/. P. 23. Rule 23(a) lists them in a different order. In order to bring a class
action, the plaintiff must first satisfy all the requirements of Rule 23, that is, the plaintiff
must be a proper class representative pursuant to the four prerequisites of Rule 23(a). Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if ( I) the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the represen-
tative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Id.
" I See llansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940). Professor Rutherglen teaches that
"[als with other problems in class action practice, the fundamental issue is adequacy of
representation." Rutherglen, Preclusion, supra note 5, at 44.
444
	 e.g., Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 247 (3rd Cir. 1975).
22 ' After the prerequisites are met under Rule 23(a), the class action must also meet the
requirements of one of four specific types of class action, enumerated in Rule 23(b). The
four types of class action are described in: (b)( I)(A), relating to the risk of inconsistent or
varying adjudications; (b)(1)(B), relating to the risks of being dispositive of, or impairing the
interests of, absentees; (b)(2), when final injunctive relief or declaratory relief is appropriate
for the whole class because of the defendant's act or refusal to act; and (b)(3), when there
are common and predominate questions of law or fact, and the class action is superior to
other methods for fair and efficient adjudication. FED. R. Dv. P. 23.
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After Falcon, almost every court has made it difficult for plain-
tiffs to meet the "typicality" and "commonality" requirements. 224
For example, plaintiffs who assert that one employment practice is
discriminatory may not represent others who claim discrimination
by another practice. 225 Courts have held that present employees
may not represent unsuccessful applicants, 226 that terminated em-
ployees may not represent rejected applicants, 227 and that an em-
ployee who has never tried to obtain a promotion cannot represent
employees denied promotions. 229
Similarly, post-Falcon courts have refused to certify classes de-
scribing injuries resulting from several discriminatory policies. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to permit
an incumbent employee to represent a class that included appli-
cants.229 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in Roby v. St. Louis Southwestern
224 Most of the courts have directed their post-Falcon analysis to Rule 23(a) requirements,
which are therefore the primary focus of our discussion. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc.,
839 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1988) ("In the wake of Falcon, courts have generally been strict in
their application of the Rule 23(a) criteria."). Ironically, at least one circuit has refused to
give title VII plaintiffs access to the discovery they ostensibly required to demonstrate a
nexus between their claims and those of the class they sought to represent. See Ardrey v.
United Parcel Serv„ 798 F.2d 679, 682-85 (4th Cir. 1986).
425 See, e.g., Coon v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 829 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir. 1987) ("[O]ther
than the fact that all are women, plaintiff has not identified the required nexus between
herself and the class."); Merrill v. Southern Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 608 (5th Cir.
1986) (in university setting, one woman's sex discrimination claim "may be markedly different
from another's"); Walker v. Jim Dandy Co., 747 F.2d 1360, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 1984) (plaintiff
with sex discrimination hiring claim lacked sufficiently close nexus to represent applicants
and employees with claims arising out of recruitment, job assignment, transfer and promotion
practices); Gilchrist v. Bolger, 733 F.2d 1551, 1554-55 (11th Cir. 1984) (denial of certification
appropriate where there was an insufficient nexus between nonsupervisory employee and
class comprising supervisory employees and applicants).
226 See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (employee could not
represent unsuccessful applicants); Freeman v. Motor Convoy, Inc., 700 F.2d 1339, 1345-47
(11th Cir. 1983) (same).
227 See, e.g., O'Neal v. Riceland Foods, 684 F.2d 577, 581 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982).
226 See, e.g., Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 333-34 (4th Cir. 1983)
(named plaintiff deemed improper representative for persons discriminated against with
respect to promotions); cf. Rosario v. Cook County, 101 F.R.D. 659, 662-64 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(named plaintiff could not represent persons who had not applied for promotions).
229 Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1486-87 (11th Cir. 1987). The Eleventh Circuit
stated:
No longer will one allegation of specific discriminatory treatment be sufficient
to sustain a company-wide class action. No longer will an employee complaining
of racial discrimination, for example, in one employment practice necessarily
be permitted to represent other employees complaining of racial discrimination
in other practices . . . In practical terms, this means that . . incumbent
employees cannot represent a class that includes applicants and that even a
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Railway Co.,23° held that African-American railroad employees who
had been discharged for failure to follow proper procedures to
protect their seniority after being furloughed did not share a suf-
ficiently close nexus with other minority employees discharged for
a violation of company rules. 231
Post-Falcon courts have also refused to allow plaintiffs em-
ployed in one organizational unit or geographical facility to repre-
sent a company-wide class. 232 These courts demand that plaintiffs
not only show that each of them suffered discrimination by the
same employer, but also show that each of them was injured in the
identical location. 2" This forces victims of discrimination who hap-
pen to work for a large employer with numerous or scattered offices
to bring their actions individually. 234
general policy of discrimination will not justify a class of both applicants and
employees.
Id.
"° 775 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1985).
2!I Id. at 961-63.
292 See, e.g., Nation v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 95 F.R.D. 82, 86 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (class
certification refused because named plaintiff only worked in a few among several of defen-
dant's "territories" where independent promotion decisions were made). But see Kilgo v.
Bowman Transp. Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 875-78 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting certification of
class containing all female plaintiffs from nationwide units whose applications at several
terminals would have been processed through a central terminal). Compare cases cited supra
note 128 (restricting discovery to individual facilities within defendant's organization).
2" As if the difficulties in certifying a class under Rule 23(a) were not enough, courts
also have invoked the notion of standing to restrict further the named plaintiff's capacity to
represent absent class members. See, e.g., Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 723 F.2d 1195,
1200 (5th Cir.) ("Because Johnson and Vuyanich can allege injuries only as a result of the
Bank's hiring and termination practices, respectively, they lack standing to assert class claims
arising from the bank's other employment practices—compensation, promotion, placement,
and maternity practices."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); see also Bernard v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 841 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1988) (black employees who had not signed releases did
not "possess the same interest and suffer the same injury" as those who had signed releases;
thus, the first group lacked standing to represent the second).
234 As noted above, Falcon left open—as an "exception"—the possibility that class treat-
ment might be available for some disparate treatment claims where there is significant proof
that the several forms of alleged disparate treatment resulted from a defendant's general
policy. A few courts have certified classes under this "loophole." See, e.g., Wynn v. Dixieland
Food Stores, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 696, 700-01 (M.D. Ala. 1989) (in view of defendant's entirely
subjective system for all selection decisions, named plaintiffs permitted to represent class
with promotion, termination and hiring claims); Johnson v. Montgomery County Sheriff's
Dep't, 99 F.R.D. 562, 566 (M.D. Ala. 1983) (employee allowed to represent applicants since
evidence showed "an overarching subjective decisionmaking process affecting both applicants
and employees"). But Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio seemed to foreclose this line of
analysis. See 490 U.S. 642 (1989). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the disparate
impact plaintiff had the burden of isolating a specific practice in order to prove that a
selection process had a disparate impact. The cumulative effects of an employer's practices
were no longer relevant. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
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The "rigorous analysis" standard has had a domino effect.
Sorting out discrimination plaintiffs according to their location, job
classification, failure to receive a specific benefit, or the exact time
period in which the discrimination took place, tends to make any
named plaintiff atypical of other employees. This in turn makes the
named plaintiff less likely to be representative of anybody else.
Moreover, the heightened pressure to be more typical leads to
smaller potential classes. Smaller classes decrease the chances of
meeting the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1). 235
Rule 23(a)(4) requires that "the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class." This rule has two
parts. First, the class representative must be competent; that is, the
representative party's counsel must prosecute the class claims "vig-
orously" and "competently." 256 Second, the interests of the class
representative must be co-extensive with the interests of the class;
that is, the representative and the class should not have any conflicts
of interest."' This inquiry is closely linked with the commonality/
255 By definition, the smaller the class, the fewer its members, and the less likely that
"the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable." See FED. R. Dv. P.
23(a)(1). "Several factors are relevant to the Court's determination that the joinder of all the
members is impracticable. The most obvious consideration is the size of the class itself."
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, 7A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1762, at 160 (2d ed.
1986).
236 See Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1227-30 (8th Cir. 1986) (antagonism
between named plaintiff and class, and inadequacy of representative's counsel, justified
decertification). Several courts have decertified classes on this ground alone. See, e.g., Key v.
Gillette Co., 782 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (decertification upheld where counsel displayed
inadequacy by using seriously inappropriate expert testimony and by intentionally omitting
to provide evidence explaining regression analysis used by plaintiff's expert); Lusted v. San
Antonio Indep, Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 817, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1984) (denial of certification
upheld where plaintiff moved for certification for first time after trial and decision, and
complaint contained no class allegations); Davis v. Buffalo Psychiatric Ctr., 613 F. Supp. 462,
464 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (certification motion denied where untimely under local rules); Dunn
v. Midwest Buslines, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 170, 172-73 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (representative's counsel's
inability to state proper class action complaint, errors in brief, and his conduct during
deposition led to denial of class certification). But see Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America,
Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[The class representative need not be the best
of all representatives.").
2" See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 595-96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (named plaintiff,
a supervisory employee, had interests clashing with those of nonsupervisory employees and
with those of his own supervisor, who was also a potential class member); Goodman v. Lukens
Steel Co., 777 F.2d 113, 124 (3rd Cir. 1985) (no named plaintiff had viable claim of racial
discrimination in initial assignment of newly hired employees and therefore there was no
adequate representative of class); Sheehan v. Purolator, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 641, 650-55
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (high level employee not adequate representative of low level employees
because of distinct interests; likewise, employee in charge of promotion decisions could not
represent employees seeking promotions). There is the additional question of what happens
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typicality nexus test. 238
 In effect, courts will not permit a class rep-
resentative to represent a class whose members have interests that
are not co-extensive with respect to the claims set forth or the jobs
involved. 239
The manageability requirement appears in Rule 23(b)(3).24° In
employment discrimination cases, however, the courts have read it
into Rule 23(b)(2)—the subsection of Rule 23(b) under which most
title VII classes have any chance of being certified. 241
 The more
divided a class, that is, the less obvious the nexus between named
representatives and class members, the more difficult the manage-
ability problems become. 242
 Both the numerosity requirement, 243
if a particular named plaintiff is held to be an inadequate representative. In cases where the
plaintiff's individual claims are dismissed and no class representatives with valid claims
remain, the court may decertify the class. See O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 670 F.2d 864, 869
(9th Cir. 1982). However, if the class prevails but the named representative does not, the
class is not decertified. See Scott v. City of Anniston, 682 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 1982).
Instead the court will appoint a new class representative. See Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin
State Univ., 706 F.2d 608, 617-18 (5th Cir. 1983).
238 In Falcon, the Court not only stated that the typicality and commonality requirements
are essentially the same inquiries, but also that they "tend to merge with the adequacy-of-
representation requirement." General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 n.13 (1982).
239 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 237.
24°
 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(6)(3).
241
 This is because a 23(b)(2) class by definition deals with action or inaction "on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate injunctive relief ... with respect
to the class as a whole." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The advisory committee notes to (b)(2)
specifically say that "various actions in the civil-rights field" are "illustrative." See also Son..Et
& GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 1259-60.
212 See SCH4EI & GROSSMAN, supra note 35, at 1244. Manageability issues often arise in
bifurcated trials, where stage 1 is devoted to proof of a violation of the rights of a group of
plaintiffs and stage 2 involves whether individual group members are entitled to relief. See
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
243
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1) requires that the class be "so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable." The case law of impracticability is open-ended. See,
e.g., Holsey v. Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 217 (4th Cir. 1984) (rejecting attempts to assess
numerosity solely by looking at number of available promotions and instead concluding that
it is the number of persons "possibly" affected that controls), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028
(1985); Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 123 F.R.D. 195, 196-97 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(numerosity satisfied by "factors such as the fear of retaliation against individual plaintiffs,"
but there is "no magic number" that will satisfy the numerosity requirement). In close cases,
the practicability rule has been used to block certification. See Emanuel v. Marsh, 828 F.2d
438, 444 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming district court opinion that refused to certify 200-member
class of black workers and instead certified only class of 78 black employees denied promo-
tions; after 29 complaints were withdrawn following negotiation and 20 settled without
admission of discrimination, 11 remaining employees failed to meet numerosity require-
ment); Martin v. City of Beaumont, 125 F.R.D. 435, 436-38 (F.D. Tex. 1989) (ignoring
significant evidence that past employees had been terminated or left job because of racial
discrimination, court only included 25 present employees in count; numerosity not found).
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which forbids certification where joinder is practicable, 244 and the
manageability requirement, which forbids certification where the
claims of a class and its representatives are too heterogeneous for
one suit, aim at the economy and feasibility of class actions. But the
two prerequisites, applied simultaneously, are a Catch-22: the
named plaintiff must show that there are too many claimants to
join for the court to require individual actions to be brought and
yet not too many distinct claims to raise any serious manageability
issues. 245
b. Pre-Certification Inquiries into the Merits
In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court held that
federal courts have no authority to scrutinize the merits of a class
action before certifying the class. 246 Despite this ruling, some courts
have explored, during the certification phase, the merits of a class
244 See, e.g., Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F,2d 124, 131-32 (1st Cir. 1985)
(joinder practicable and numerosity requirement not fulfilled where class of forty-nine black
employees resided in same geographic area).
245 At least one court has refused to certify a class where the court viewed the class,
defined in one manner, as being too small—violating Rule 23(a)(1)'s numerosity require-
ment—and yet, defined in another manner, as being too large—and thus "unmanageable").
See Hill v. American Airlines, Inc., 479 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1973).
246 The Court stated:
We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court
any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order
to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action .... 'In determining
the propriety of a class action, the question is not whether the plaintiff or
plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will prevail on the merits, but rather
whether the requirements of rule 23 are met.'
417 U.S. 150, 177-78 (1974) (quoting Miller v. Mackey Intl, 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir.
1971)) (plaintiff alleged defendants conspired to fix commissions in violation of antitrust and
securities laws). Indeed, for many courts the language of Rule 23(0(1) compels such a result.
That rule states:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An
order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended
before the decision on the merits.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1). This rule, according to some courts, represented Congress's intent
to see certification issues resolved quickly and economically. For instance, in Avagliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court noted that "it is
often proper ... for a district court to view a class action liberally in the early states of
litigation, since the class can always be modified or subdivided as issues are refined for trial."
Id. at 573 (citations omitted). The court also pointed to Rule 23(c)(4)(B) ("a class may be
divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class") and implied that the proper
time for a district court to focus on the merits and shape group relief is after certification.
Id. "[A] motion for class certification," the court concluded, "is not the occasion for a mini-
hearing on the merits." Id, (citations omitted).
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action.247
 There is language in Falcon that the lower courts have
used to justify pre-certification examination of the merits. 248 In
Falcon, the Supreme Court reiterated the well-established notion
that "the class determination generally involves considerations that
are 'enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plain-
tiff's cause of action.'" 249
 The Court then advised plaintiffs to pro-
vide a "specific presentation identifying the questions of law or fact
that [are] common to the claims of [plaintiffs] and of the members
of the class [they seek] to represent."25° Once the Falcon Court
ordered that there be a close nexus between the claim of the class
representative and every member of the class, it was inevitable that
the lower courts would take a closer look at the facts and the law,
that is, at the merits of the claim.
Moreover, with respect to those few across-the-board certifica-
tions exempted in footnote 15 of Falcon, the Court directed the
district courts to require significant proof that an employer acted
pursuant to a general policy of discrimination before certifying the
class. 25 ' Thus, after Falcon, it is logical to conclude that the proper
time for courts to look at the merits of title VII class suits is before
certifying a class. 252
 This teaches the title VII plaintiff seeking cer-
247 See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("While, of course, a
court does not possess any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits' ... it
is evident that some inspection of the circumstances of the case is essential to determine whether
the prerequisites of ... Rule 23 have been met." (emphasis added)). Pre-certification inquiries
implicate discovery because pre-certification discovery may be insufficient to furnish plaintiffs
with the information they require to prove the merits of their claims. Arguments in favor of
examining the merits before certification presume that by the time the court addresses
certification, plaintiffs will have had access to the same discovery they would have obtained
by the time of the trial. This is probably wrong. In fact, title VII plaintiffs may be powerless
to compel sufficient pre-certification discovery. Requests for discovery pertaining to class
certification issues are governed by Rule 23 rather than by the discovery rules; accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 23(d), the district courts have complete discretion to compel or relax
compliance with such pre-certification discovery requests. See JAMES W. MooRE & JOHN E.
KENNEDY, 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.85 (2d ed. 1991). A court that permits only
limited pre-certification discovery but that looks carefully into the merits during the certifi-
cation phase can, at its sole discretion, prevent a viable class action from moving forward.
For an early civil rights case arguing that courts must provide access to adequate discovery
before considering certification issues and concluding that under no circumstances should
courts decertify a civil rights class action based on "speculation as to the merits," see Yaffe v.
Powers, 454 F.2d 1362, 1365 (1st Cir. 1972).
448 See, e.g., Nelson v. United States Steel Corp., 709 F.2d 675, 679-80 (11th Cir. 1983)
("We reject [the] argument that evidence relating to discrimination allegedly suffered by
other class members is properly reserved for trial on the merits.").
249
 General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982).
25° Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
251 Id. at 159 n.15.
452
 In Martin v. City of Beaumont, 125 F.R.D. 435 (E.D. Tex. 1989), the court found,
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tification that if her case is riot a winning case from the start, the
court will not certify her class. 255
c. Isolating the Individual
Prior to Falcon, the federal courts had a clear sense that class
actions were an important instrument for eliminating systemic dis-
crimination in the labor market. While the liberal view of the title
VII class action visualizes an empowered plaintiff, the "Falconiza-
tion" of the process has demoralized and disempowered the plain-
tiff. Today, individual employees are left to challenge employers
alone, without the emotional and economic support gained by ag-
gregating their claims, thus making it far less likely that title VII
will achieve the national goal of eliminating workplace discrimina-
tion.
Falcon also announced that an individual plaintiff would have
to reveal the extent and strength of his or her individual case at the
certification stage. In order to show the nexus between the individ-
ual claim and the class claim, one must carefully scrutinize the
individual claim. This means that a lawyer has to undertake discov-
ery on the individual claim before knowing whether the case will
be certified as a class action, thereby economically justifying the
discovery. After convincing the court of the strength of the individ-
ual claim and defining its contours, the plaintiff's lawyer must begin
discovery on the class action aspects of the case. Then, the lawyer
must convince the court, through "rigorous analysis," of the "close
nexus" of the individual claim to that of all class members.
Post-Falcon, a certain stultifying and inflexible illogic has crept
into the case law. In order to protect defendants from excessive
among other things, that the commonality requirement had not been fulfilled. Id, at 437-
38. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' claims that they suffered race discrimination in promotions
because of the defendant's "pervasive attitude" and notwithstanding evidence showing many
black employees had resigned or been terminated in the relevant period, the court, looking
directly at the merits of the plaintiffs' case, stated that "complaints of racial epithets in a
police station locker room are not such as to purely constitute discriminatory hiring practices
or discriminatory promotion practices." Id. Moreover, the notion that Rule 23(c) enables
district courts to correct overly broad classes after certification, thus making preliminary
inquiries into the merits inappropriate, see Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. 103
F.R.D. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), has lost out to the theory in Falcon that "actual, not presumed
conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable." Nelson v. United States Steel Corp.,
709 F.2d 675, 680, (1 Ith Cir. 1983) (citing Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160).
2" See Kim v. Commandant, Defense Language Inst., 772 F.2d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1985)
(it was not improper For district court in title VII case to decide merits prior to ruling on
class certification where "early resolution of the motion for summary judgment seemed likely
to protect both the parties and the court from needless and costly further litigation").
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discovery, in the event that the case would not be certified as a class
action, judges have limited an initial round of discovery to the
alleged discrimination against the named plaintiff. 254 This is partic-
ularly harmful to plaintiffs seeking to prove racial animus. One way
to do that is to show repetitive negative treatment against a number
of employees in the minority group; another is to use statistics that
simultaneously show discrimination against the individual and the
group. Such evidence is expensive to accumulate and is therefore
itself a deterrent in the individual case. When some judges forbid
any evidence or discovery of class-wide discrimination during the
first look at the individual case, deterrence becomes prohibition. 255
Some courts have gone further, holding that failure to certify a class
showed a lick of "across-the-board" discrimination and therefore
evidence at trial of other acts of discrimination was irrelevant. 256
But absent the "smoking gun" of racist remarks directed at a plain-
tiff, how does one show racial animus absent a pattern of discrim-
inatory behavior?
By rejecting the theory that discrimination is either present or
absent, and substituting the notion that people experience discrim-
ination individually and must seek relief for their suffering inde-
pendently, the Falcon Court was not merely reinterpreting the pro-
cedural technicalities of Rule 23. Heightening the scrutiny applied
to class certification repudiated the notion that victims of sex and
race discrimination often share membership in disadvantaged or
powerless groups whose claims should be jointly vindicated, not-
withstanding some differences between the named plaintiff's claims
and those of class members. Falcon thus rejects the concept of
discrimination as an institutionalized historic and social problem.
Instead, it reinforces the Court's idea that discrimination is an iso-
lated aberrant action in a nondiscriminatory world.
B. Creating New Rights for Whites: Aggregating Defendants
At the same time that it has taken a microscopic view of plain-
tiffs' interests, the Supreme Court, contrary to the prior holdings
of all but one circuit, magnified the interests of white employees by
254 See, e.g., Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1986).
255 See id.
256 See Sheehan v. Purolater, Inc., 839 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1988). In dissent. judge
Kearse explained the relevance of a co-worker's excluded testimony that the company's senior
vice president had made a blatantly discriminatory statement to her that "no one would be
respectful of a woman in that position." Id. at 106 (Kearse, J., dissenting).
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turning them into necessary parties to a title VII suit. The creation
of a new group of necessary parties had several results. It became
virtually impossible to bring title VII cases in a manner that was
not subject to dismissal for failure to join Rule 19 parties. 257 This
in turn undermined the finality of title VII decrees. Employers had
a strong disincentive to settle, for they no longer had an "imper-
missible collateral attack" defense against any white who claimed
reverse discrimination resulting from the settlement agreement.
Once again, the Court bid these substantive changes under proce-
dural language.
In Martin v. Wilks, 258 a case involving the propriety of a collat-
eral attack on a consent decree, the Supreme Court ended the
finality of title VII judgments. The consent decree, which included
goals for hiring and promoting minorities, had been entered into
after protracted litigation between African-American firefighters
and the city of Birmingham, Alabama. 259 The defendants had been
found in violation of title VII for using a racially-biased test to
screen applicants.'" A fairness hearing was held prior to the entry
of the consent decree at which the all-white Birmingham Firefigh-
ters Association ("BFA") appeared and filed objections as amicus
curiae on behalf of non-minority firefighters. 26 ' After the failure of
their efforts to intervene and to seek injunctive relief, individual
BFA members sued, alleging race discrimination in promotions
pursuant to the consent decree. 262 The issue that ultimately reached
the Supreme Court was the right of non-parties affected by a con-
sent decree in title VII cases to attack the decree collaterally. The
Court held that the BFA members could attack the consent decree,
even though they had had notice and the opportunity to be heard
257 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
258 990 U.S. 755 (1989).
259 The initial complaint was filed on January 7, 1974. See LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN MARTIN V. WILES 2
(1990) [hereinafter LAWYERS' COMMITTEE].
268 Wilks, 490 U.S. at 759.
281 Id.
282 Id. The BFA and two of its individual members brought the motions to intervene
after the fairness hearing (and after seven years of litigation between the original parties).
See id. The district court denied the motions as untimely and was upheld by the Eleventh
Circuit on appeal. Id. Subsequently, seven white firefighters, all of whom were members of
the BFA at the time of the fairness hearing, sought injunctive relief against enforcement of
the decrees. Id. at 759-60. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of that relief,
holding that petitioners had not adequately shown irreparable harm. Id. at 760. The Court
of Appeals noted that the white firefighters could "institutlel an independent Title Vii suit,
asserting specific violations of their rights." Id.
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before the decree was entered. 265
 Wilks, therefore, taught title VII
plaintiffs that joinder of all third parties potentially affected by their
claims was mandatory. 264
The Supreme Court has long recognized the potential effect
of title VII remedies on the expectations of non-discriminatees,
holding in an early case that it was presumptively necessary for such
"innocent" parties to share the burden of past discrimination with
injured discriminatee plaintiffs. 265
 But the Court's initial concern
with eradicating the effects of past discrimination soon was sub-
merged in its solicitude for the non-minority "innocent victims" of
race and gender conscious remedies. 266
 Ironically, these white work-
ers have been the beneficiaries of the racist workplace title VII was
enacted to restructure.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States marked the
beginning of the Court's preference for white workers over suc-
cessful title VII plaintiffs. 267 In Teamsters, the Court held that a
seniority system does not violate title VII simply because it may
perpetuate past discrimination. 26H The Court stated that "Congress
766 Id. at 761-63.
28'
	 Wilks allowed collateral attack by non-parties whom the original parties
failed to join. See id. at 762-63. At section 108, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 appears to
overturn Martin v. Wilks by limiting permissible challenges to title VII consent degrees. Sec.
108, § 703, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1076-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(n)(1)(A)). Note, however, that parties to a decree carry the potentially significant burden
of showing that the challenger had I) actual notice of the proposed judgment and 2) an
opportunity to present objections to the proposed judgment. Id. The Supreme Court will
ultimately decide the weight of this burden.
266
 See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (identifiable victims of post-
Act hiring discrimination may be awarded seniority retroactive to the dates of their employ-
ment applications: lelmployee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement may
be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy interest").
266
 This shift in focus has appeared in civil rights cases generally, most noticeably in
connection with affirmative action issues. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to local ordinance setting aside thirty per
cent of city construction contracts for minority-owned businesses because any lesser standard
would not protect innocent white contractors); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 298 (1978) (non-minority medical school applicants are "innocent persons" who
should not be forced to bear the burdens of redressing grievances not of their making); see
also Brown et al., Constittaional Dissonance, supra note 8, at 607-12; Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Comment, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 78
passim (1986).
267
 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
26e
	 at 356. Section 703(h) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system .. provided that such differences
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did not intend to make it illegal for employees with vested seniority
rights to continue to exercise those rights, even at the expense of
pre-Act discriminatees." 26° Any other result, said the Court, would
make plaintiffs eligible for retroactive seniority, which might "water
down" the seniority rights of "innocent" employees and interfere
with the "delicate task" of balancing the "legitimate expectations"
of non-victim employees against the remedial rights of minority
victims. 270 Teamsters implies that these "innocent victims," whose
rights can trump plaintiffs' rights, might be necessary parties to the
initial litigation.
Another important decision in the movement toward manda-
tory joinder was Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts. 271 In that
case, the Court invalidated a preliminary injunction that prevented
the Memphis Fire Department from making layoffs under the es-
tablished seniority system because it would alter the percentage of
African-American employees who had been hired or promoted
pursuant to a consent decree. 272 The Court held that the injunction
was not necessary either to enforce or to modify the decree. 273 The
majority noted that neither the union nor the "innocent" non-
minority employees were parties to the suit when the consent decree
was entered, and thus, could not be said to have agreed to its
terms.274
Concurring, Justice O'Connor emphasized the need for a care-
ful balancing of the competing interests of discriminatees, "inno-
cent" employees and the employer,275 and pointed out that the
minority firefighters could have sought the participation of the
union in negotiating the consent decree.276 In her view, "innocent"
employees whose status may be affected by the final consent decree
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C.	 2000e-2(h) (1988). In this paper we do not discuss the other seniority system
cases following Teamsters, such as American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63 (1982).
255 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 354; accord Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 239 (1982)
(employer can toll accrual of back pay liability to successful plaintiffs by offering jobs pre-
viously denied, without retroactive seniority; requiring employer to offer seniority would
place "particularly onerous burden" on innocent employees who had accrued seniority while
the case was litigated).
275 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356.
271 467 U.S. 561 (1984).
272 See id. at 576, 583.
275 Id. at 565.
v4 Id. at 575.
275 Id. at 588 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
275 Id.
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must be represented and must participate fully in the negotiation
process. 277 This concern with third party, or non-party, rights sug-
gests that if non-minority employees are not made parties to a title
VII suit they must be allowed to attack the judgment later. Stotts
thus foreshadowed the holding of Martin v. Wilks that non-parties
affected by court-approved consent decrees containing race-con-
scious relief could challenge those decrees in a collateral lawsuit. 278
Wilks invalidated the "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine
that had been followed by most federal courts. 279 The Court held
that joinder pursuant to Federal Rule 19,280 rather than knowledge
277
	 at 588 n.3 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, concurring separately,
considered the consent decree a final judgment binding upon the petitioners. Id. at 590-91
(Stevens, J., concurring). Nevertheless, he found the injunction invalid because it could not
reasonably be based on the consent decree, and the changed circumstances necessary to
support modification were not present. Id. at 592 (Stevens, J., concurring).
278 See Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63. (1989). Wilks required joinder regardless of whether
the non-party had knowledge of the suit and an opportunity to intervene. Id. at 765.
279 Id. at 2185. Indeed, the Court acknowledged that its position contradicted the
majority of the courts of appeals. Id. at 765 n.3. The Court listed the following "sampling"
of circuit cases that support the "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine: Striff v. Mason,
849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1986),
aff'd, 484 U.S. 301 (1988); Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68-69 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied sub nom. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Stotts v. Memphis Fire
Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local
Union 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984); Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dept of Water
& Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981); Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62,
64 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 940 (1982); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632
F.2d 1045, 1052 (3d Cir. 1980). Id. It is telling that the majority could only come up with one
circuit court decision other than Wilks itself that would generally allow collateral attacks on
consent decrees by non-parties. See Dunn v. Carey, 808 F.2d 555, 559-60 (7th Cir. 1986).
2" Rule 19(a), "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication," states that:
(a) A person who is subject to service of process and whose joinder will not
deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall be
joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition
of the action in the person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or
impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the perions
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person
has not been so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party
FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a). If the person or persons cannot be joined because of jurisdictional or
venue reasons, Rule 19(b) lists factors to be balanced in determining whether the case should
proceed in those persons' absence. Of course, if necessary parties cannot be added, and the
court proceeds without them, the necessary parties will not be bound.
Section (c) of Rule 19 requires a party to state in its pleadings the names, if known, of
any persons as described in (a)(1)—(2) who are not joined and the reasons for not joining
them. FED. R. Cy/. P. 19(c). Applying this subsection in title VII cases would be a gargantuan
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of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene under Rule 24, 281 was
the proper method by which potential parties are subjected to the
jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree. 282
The Court contrasted the mandatory nature of joinder with the
permissive terms governing intervention. 288
The implications of Wilks were thoroughly explored by the
parties and amici in their briefs. The minority employee petitioners
made cogent arguments about the chilling effect on title VII, point-
ing out that mandatory joinder would be unworkable and would
impose unnecessary burdens on both plaintiffs and joined parties.
Furthermore, they demonstrated the risk that non-parties would
contest joinder, effectively defeating the purpose of Rule 19. 284 But
the Court denied that these difficulties resulted from the choice
task for plaintiffs. Section (d) makes this Rule subject to the provisions of Rule 23 governing
class actions. For a discussion of class actions under the Wilks ruling, see infra notes 297-310
and accompanying text.
2" For purposes of Wilks, the relevant portion of Rule 24, "Intervention," is the follow-
ing:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action: . (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to
the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant
is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. Dv. P. 24(a).
Section (b)(2) of Rule 24 allows permissive intervention upon timely application when
an applicant's claim, or defense, and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. This section does not seem to apply to the Wilks scenario. The non-minority
workers' claim of discrimination arose only after the settlement of the prior litigation and
thus did not involve any question of law or fact regarding discriminatory practices existing
at the time the original suit was brought by minority plaintiffs.
222 Sec 490 U.S. at 765. Although Willis involved a consent decree, the Court's decision,
by its terms, applied equally to litigated judgments. The Pacific Legal Foundation, as atnicus
curiae on behalf of respondents, stressed the difference between a consent decree and a
litigated judgment, arguing that a consent decree should be given limited preclusive effect
because it is not an adjudication on the merits. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal
Foundation in Support of Respondents at 11-.1'2, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos.
87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1688). The Court's ruling, making joinder of third parties mandatory
where their rights may be affected, affects the parties' behavior at the outset of the litigation,
regardless of whether the suit ultimately results in a consent decree or in a judgment.
Moreover, the Rule 19(b) possibility that the trial court could proceed without the absent
"innocent" employees does not solve the problem, because according to Wilks, they would
not be bound.
Wilks, 490 U.S. at 763-64.
2" See Brief for petitioners John W. Martin et al, at 31, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755
(1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668). The briefs also showed that defendant class actions
under Federal Rule 23 would not solve the problems created by mandatory joinder, but
instead would further complicate matters.
274	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 (Vol. 33:211
between mandatory intervention and mandatory joinder, and
claimed that the problem arose from the nature of title VII reme-
dies.285
In holding that joinder under Rule 19 was mandatory to bind
non-parties, Wilks found compulsory intervention incompatible with
the Federal Rules. This was the interpretation suggested by the
United States in its amicus brief for the white firefighters. 286 The
United States had argued that the drafters of the Federal Rules
drew intervention in permissive terms, as distinguished from man-
datory joinder under Rule 19. Citing the advisory committee notes
to the 1966 amendments of the Federal Rules, minority petitioners
responded that the drafters intended that there be no preference
for joinder over intervention. 287 In particular, petitioners noted
comments to revised Rule 19 that suggest intervention by an af-
fected non-party as an alternative to joinder.288 Petitioners also re-
ferred to comments to revised Rule 24 that indicate the drafters'
intention to make the position of an intervenor of right under
section (a)(2) comparable to that of a party under Rule 19(a)(2)(i). 289
The comments depict intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2) as
a kind of counterpart to Rule 19(a)(2)(i) in that a party susceptible
to involuntary joinder under the latter rule should have a right to
intervene on its own motion under the former. 2" Thus, the advisory
committee notes establish a clear equation between the two rules
rather than .the hierarchy adopted by the Wilks majority. 291
288 Wilks, 490 U.S. at 767.
288 See Brief for the United States at 18, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87—
1614, 87-1639, 87-1668).
287 See Reply Brief for Petitioners John W. Martin et al. at 6-7, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668).
288 Id.
289 Id.
288 See FED. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory committee's note to 1966 Amendments.
291 See id. Significantly, the majority in Waits omitted any mention of the advisory
committee's notes. The majority focused only on the language of Rules 19 and 24 to support
its conclusion that joinder is mandatory and intervention is permissive. See 490 U.S. at 763-
64. It is true that Rule 24(a)(2) states that applicants who show prejudice to their ability to
protect their interests "shall be permitted to intervene," while Rule 19 states plainly that persons
whose absence will either prejudice their own or the parties' interests "shall be joined." FED.
R. Civ. P. 19, 24. Statutory language, however, cannot properly be interpreted without
reference to the drafters' intent, and the petitioners' arguments make clear that the drafters'
intent, as expressed in the advisory committee's notes, substantially weakens the Court's
conclusion. See Reply Brief of Petitioners John W. Martin et al. at 6-7, Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668). Section 108 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 reaffirms the Rule 24 standards that prevailed in most circuits before Wilks. See Civil
Rights Act of 1991, sec. 108, 703, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1076-77 (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(n)(1)(A)).
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The central concern of the Wilks petitioners was that compul-
sory joinder would make title VII actions unworkable, ultimately
chilling the filing of employment discrimination claims. These fears
were justified. 292 The threshold question of whom to sue had be-
come exceedingly complex. Wilks effectively required plaintiffs to
join at the outset every person whose interest might be impaired by
the outcome of the litigation. This was so even though the plaintiffs
could not reasonably discern which members of this potentially
enormous group had a sufficient interest to mandate their being
joined.295 Since title VII plaintiffs do not know in advance whether
the case can be settled through a consent decree, they would have
had to try to join all employees or potential employees whose rights
could have been impaired.294
In effect, Wilks used Rule 19 to create a no-win situation for
title VII plaintiffs. It is likely that the non-parties whom plaintiffs
seek to join would oppose joinder. These non-parties, generally
white workers, had an incentive to contest being joined, as they
would have been free to attack any decree or judgment issued,
apparently whenever and for as long as they wished to do so. The
non-minority workers also have viable legal arguments against join-
der. They cannot be joined as defendants because they do not meet
the statutory definition of proper title VII respondents. 295 Alter-
natively, they cannot be joined as plaintiffs because they have not
filed title VII charges, as required by the statute. 296 Finally, in a
class action under Rule 23(a)(2), non-minority workers can argue—
quite successfully after Falcon—that their claims are legally and
factually distinct from those of the existing plaintiff class and hence
cannot properly be included in the certified class.297
222 For examples of litigation filed after Wilks, see LAWYERS' CommirrEE, supra note 259;
Robert Pear, 1989 Ruling Spurs New Tack in Civil Rights Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1990, at
AI.
29' See, e.g., Brief of the National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 24-25, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-
1668).
224 Mandatory joinder also imposes significant financial burdens on the involuntarily
joined parties. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 41,
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668). Even if the plaintiffs
know the case will not settle, it appears they will still have to try to join the same people
because otherwise they will not be bound. For instance, post-trial injunctive relief giving a
promotion might later be attacked by those not named.
292 Title VII specifies as proper respondents employers, labor unions, agencies and joint
apprenticeships. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1988).
299
	 § 2000e-5(f) (1988).
297 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 46, Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668).
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It is ironic that, while essentially eliminating the plaintiff class
action in Falcon, the Court mandated unattainable defendant classes
in Wilks. The "spectre" of defendant classes is likely to remain just
that because of the procedural difficulties of certifying defendant
classes. Even assuming that Rule 23(b)(2) permits defendant classes,
a point still in question,298 there are significant obstacles to certifi-
cation.
These obstacles largely parallel the obstacles to certification of
plaintiff classes discussed earlier; 299 nothing in Falcon indicates that
it does not apply equally to defendant class actions. 3" There will
undoubtedly be problems in defining the scope of a defendant class
under Rule 23, in identifying a class representative, and in ensuring
a representative's ability to fairly and adequately represent the
class. 3" The number of non-minority employees potentially "im-
paired or impeded" by the outcome of a given title VII suit could
be enormous. Such a large group would present a wide range of
claims, many of which might not have a sufficiently close nexus to
satisfy Falcon. For example, the claim of a non-minority applicant
who complains of a hiring practice pursuant to a consent decree
might not sufficiently typify a claim about promotion practices un-
der the same decree. These problems could well arise where, as in
Wilks, non-minority employees claim reverse discrimination arising
from a consent decree that covers a variety of employment prac-
tices. 302
299 See Brief Amici Curiae of NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. at 21, Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668). In 1987, the Court granted
certiorari in Henson v. East Lincoln Township, to decide this very question. See 484 U,S. 923
(1987). However, the case is still pending, the court having granted a motion to defer further
proceedings. 484 U.S. 1057 (1988). The Court has not yet heard arguments in the case.
299 See supra notes 201-53 and accompanying text.
999
 Furthermore, the language of Rule 23(a) itself ("one or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all ..." (emphasis added)) indicates
that the drafters intended defendant classes to be encompassed by judicial interpretations of
the Rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
99
 These problems were set forth and thoroughly explored in several amines briefs
submitted in support of petitioners. The brief of the states' attorneys general was especially
thorough. See Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 57-59,
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668).
992
 The United States downplayed the difficulties of defendant class actions under Rule
23. Brief for the United States at 18, Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614,
87-1639, 87-1668). First, the United States asserted that non-minority employees likely to
be affected by title VII litigation would be joined under Rule 23(b)(1)(A), not under 23(b)(2),
as petitioners suggested. Id. at 21-22. The United States further contended that the "opt
out" provision under Rule 23(c) would be unavailable to Rule 23(b)(1) defendant class
members, thus ensuring binding judgments. Id. at 22. In addition, the United States empha-
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Narrowing the scope of a defendant class under Rule 23 would
be critical to making mandatory joinder workable. Yet Wilks, by its
terms, compelled the original parties to join all potentially affected
non-parties, however remote their interest in the litigation."' Thus,
narrowing the scope of the defendant class would run the risk of
inviting later collateral attacks on the judgment.
The named representative must fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class. The adequacy of the representation is
particularly critical, as it would determine the binding effect of any
judgment on the unnamed class members. Fair and adequate rep-
resentation would be difficult to ensure in defendant class actions
because of the probable divergence of interests within the class, as
well as the existence of an incentive for later collateral attacks.
Class members' interests likely will vary depending on such
differences as seniority, rank, department and whether the mem-
bers are employees or applicants. Some will favor settlement, while
others will want to pursue a litigated judgment. Unless proper
subclasses are designated, representation is likely to be inadequate,
making later attack probable."4
Wilks gave the named representative of an involuntary defen-
dant class an incentive to provide inadequate representation. Wilks
held that collateral attack on title VII consent decrees is permissible
where affected non-parties have not been adequately represented
in the litigation leading to the decree."' To be adequately repre-
sented, these persons must first be joined as parties."6 However,
Wilks did not preclude the possibility that the actual representation
of such joined parties may be inadequate, thus allowing them col-
laterally to attack the decree. Hence, the unwilling representative
of a defendant class might have provided weak representation in
order to open the door for later collateral attacks by class members,
sized the availability of transfer and consolidation under the Federal Rules to prevent un-
manageable litigation and ensure a single binding judgment. Id. at 23. Finally, the United
States stressed reliance on principles of stare decisis and comity to minimize inconsistent
judgments where joinder, transfer and consolidation devices fail. Id. at 24. This effort to
minimize the unmanageability of defendant class actions fails, however, as it does not address
many of petitioners' central arguments and relies too heavily on the smooth workings of the
overburdened federal judiciary.
3° 3 See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 767-68.
3" However, the defendant class members will have little incentive to sort themselves
into adequately representative subclasses, as failing to do so will allow them later to attack
the judgment or settlement.
3°5 See 490 U.S. at 762-63.
31)6 Id. at 2187.
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who would argue that they were not bound by the earlier litigation
due to inadequate representation. 307
Nor would joinder of unions solve these problems. The ade-
quacy of representation of class members by the union is a real
concern, as the facts of Wilks demonstrated. 303 Moreover, the inter-
ests of the union and its members might have diverged. In some
cases, this divergence might have caused the union to favor settle-
ment to avoid certain litigation costs, while the union members
might have favored litigation to avoid any prospective relief.
Post-Wilks defendant class actions illustrate the Court's Catch-
22: Falcon made it nearly impossible to maintain a plaintiff class
action; Wilks appeared to mandate defendant class actions by requir-
ing joinder. The Falcon requirements, however, as well as the prac-
tical difficulties of managing such massive joinder and the potential
conflict of interests of the class representative, made defendant class
actions virtually impossible to maintain.
Respondents in Wilks argued, and the Court apparently agreed,
that prohibiting collateral attacks on title VII consent decrees would
alter non-minority workers' substantive rights. 309 As the Wilks dis-
senters contended, however, giving preclusive effect to the consent
decree did not deprive non-minority workers of any legal rights.310
The consent decree did not and could not deprive these workers
of their independent right to intervene or bring title VII claims. 3"
Thus, it is only to the extent that their claims concern the legality
of the affirmative action plan embodied in the consent decree that
non-minority workers should be estopped from relitigating the va-
lidity of that plan. 312 The non-minority challengers should have to
907 See Brief of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 60, Martin
v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668). Despite the Civil Rights
Act of 1991's attempt to address this issue, such a strategy may remain viable. Section 108
of the Act bars attacks on consent decrees by parties whose interests were "adequately
represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment." See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, sec. 108, § 703, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1076-77 (to be codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n)(1)(A)).
"8 The Birmingham Firefighters' Association ("BFA"), the firefighters' union, appeared
at the fairness hearing and entered objections to the consent decree, supposedly on behalf
of white firefighters. Wilk, 490 U.S. at 759. Nevertheless, the Wilk respondents maintain
that the BFA did not and could not adequately represent their interests and thus, that they
should be allowed to attack the consent decree collaterally. Brief of Respondents Robert K.
Wilks el al., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (Nos. 87-1614, 87-1639, 87-1668).
'°9 See 490 U.S. at 763.
5 ' 0 See id. at 770 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"' Id.
317 This raises another example of the Court's pro-defendant bias in title VII cases. On
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establish the same prima fade case of discrimination under title VII
as the original minority plaintiffs. 3 " To allow them to skip this step
by directly challenging the decree is to award them substantive
rights not given to the minority plaintiffs.
The majority in Wilks wrote as if it were merely following the
dictates of due process and Federal Rule 19 in holding that joinder
is mandatory, and in invalidating the "impermissible collateral at-
tack" doctrine. 3 " But the issue is considerably more complex, and
there is a good deal more flexibility in the doctrine than the Court
acknowledged. Once again, procedure and substance are inextric-
able. By saying that the white firefighters must be notified and made
parties before they are bound, the Court created substantive rights
through procedure. 3 "
As the dissenters in Wilks explained, one can be impacted by a
decision and still not have a right or protectable legal interest that
requires mandatory joinder. 3 " Think about the polluting facility
that must be shut down until the abatement of the nuisance; if the
defendant cannot abate or chooses not to expend the funds neces-
sary to do so, the facility may be closed forever. Employees will lose
one hand, time limits are now very strict for initiating suit, and the statute of limitations
commences as soon as the initial decision is made which later results in the individual instance
of discrimination. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989). Yet Wilks
held that for non-minorities claiming to be adversely affected by the original Litigation, the
statute of limitations does not begin until the individual claimant is passed up for a promotion,
not at the time the decree or judgment is entered. And this rule applies even where, as in
Wilks, the non-minority claimant had notice of the decree and an opportunity to enter
objections at a fairness hearing prior to its entry.
3,3 Clearly, this prima facie case should include proving purposeful discrimination as is
now required of minority plaintiffs. The affirmative action cases, however, teach that although
minority plaintiffs must prove discriminatory intent, white plaintiffs need not do so. See, e.g.,
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1979).
314 As the dissent pointed out, a third party could collaterally attack "a judgment if the
original judgment was obtained through fraud or collusion." Wilks, 490 U.S. at 771 n.5
(Stevens, J., dissenting). But this consent decree was entered in a "genuine adversary pro-
ceeding," and there was no contention of fraudulent or collusive settlement. Id. at 774-75
(Stevens, J„ dissenting). Thus, according to the dissenters, this was an impermissible collateral
attack. Id.
"3 When a court says there is something to be lost if someone is not first notified and
given the right to be heard, the court is creating a new right. This is how welfare benefits
evolved into an entitlement. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Our legal system
signals the creation of a new right by announcing that procedural due process prohibits
deprivation without notice and the right to be heard. See Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard
Dykstra, Notice and the Right to Be Heard; The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C. L. L.
REV. 449,467-68 (1974).
" 6 Wilk, 490 U.S. at 769-70 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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their jobs. The truck that comes each morning to sell doughnuts
and coffee will lose substantial business. Customers of the plant may
have to seek a more distant source. If the offending defendant is a
disposal site, adjoining towns may have to create a new site or ship
their trash great distances at increased expense. All these people
have interests that will be impaired by the decision, but it is highly
unlikely that courts would dismiss the suit if they were not joined
as Rule 19 necessary parties.317 To put it another way, nuisance law
itself takes into account the interests of affected people, while not
making them parties. 318 Indeed, virtually all litigation affects many
others who are not necessary parties." 9
Consider the numerous alternatives the Court could have
adopted had it wished to emphasize title VII's policy of eliminating
discrimination. It could have concluded that Congress did not in-
tend to make bringing and settling title VII actions impossible;
therefore, absent white employees either had to intervene or be
bound by the decree. The Court also could have required title VII
plaintiffs to notify any absent employee they wished to bind so that
such person could intervene. 320 Last, the Court could have followed
317 There are numerous cases in which non-parties have an interest that will be affected
by the decision in a lawsuit, but the courts do not treat them as indispensable or Rule 19
parties. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 927-29 (11th Cir.
1982) (tenants not indispensable to suit against Georgia Residential Finance Authority to
disallow an expedited eviction process for low income housing that would affect the interest
of the private owners); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d
420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975) (in a civil rights class action by minority applicants complaining of
the disproportionately large number of blacks and Hispanics who failed the exam, white
guards who passed were not indispensable); Sansom Comm. v. Lynn, 366 F. Supp. 1271,
1280-81 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (University of Pennsylvania not indispensable in suit brought by
neighbors to enjoin HUD from putting up new buildings, even though the new buildings
would be used by the university and an injunction would prohibit the university from
demolishing buildings it owned). Such cases frequently cite Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (described in note 292
infra), which illustrates the similarity between discrimination, environmental and other Rule
19 cases. Moreover, creditors of parties are also not normally held to be Rule 19 parties.
JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 67, at 430. Other relevant cases are cited infra note 325.
3113 Affected parties may be able to intervene if they choose, but if they do not, they
cannot later attack a decree or settlement.
319
 For some of the constitutional problems this may raise, see City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
329 This is not dissimilar from the historic vouching in when a secondarily responsible
guarantor wished to bind the primarily responsible debtor, although in that case the guar-
antor and debtor normally may have a greater identity of interest than the African-American
and white employees. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. City Nat'l Bank, 65 N.E. 24 (Mass. 1902);
Ronan E. Degnan & Alan J. Barton, Vouching to Quality Warranty: Case Law and Commercial
Code, 51 CAL. L. REv. 471 (1963); see also Developments in the Law—Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 907 (1958).
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the circuit courts and applied the "impermissible collateral attack
doctrine."52 '
Rule 19 itself provides additional ways to comply with its clear
meaning, without the draconian result of mandatory joinder. The
Court could have concluded that whatever interests white employ-
ees had with respect to promotion were not "related to the subject
of the action" as required by Rule 19. 922 The "subject of the action"
is, after all, alleged discrimination by the employer, not the em-
ployment rights of current white employees.'" Or the Court could
have reasoned that it was not the "disposition of the action" that
would deprive the white employees of rights, but rather the previ-
ous discrimination of the employer that permitted white employees
to get jobs and seniority in disproportionate and distorted numbers.
The Court could have found that, in enacting title VII, Congress
had already decided that victims of discrimination have rights that
trump the interests of those white employees who benefitted from
that discrimination; that is, that those white employees' positions
would have been different but for the distortion caused by the
employer's discrimination. 324 By using Rule 19 to develop legal
rights of white employees that transcend the rights of discrimina-
tees, the Court rewrote title VII through joinder doctrine. Its new
version of title VII was contrary to Congress's intent to create new
rights for the minority victims of discrimination.
Finally, the Court could have relied on the "public rights" ex-
ception to Rule 19. In some cases, the courts have not insisted on
Rule 19 joinder of those whose interests will be "impaired or
impeded" by a litigation if their position is already advanced by
another party (in Wilks, by the city, personnel board and firefighters
321 See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762. The doctrine and its exceptions are explained in Justice
Stevens's dissent. See id. at 771-72 & n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
322 See FED. R. Civ. P. 19.
323 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 340 F.
Supp. 400, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). In this case, the court held that coal producers who had
contracts with the T. V.A. did not have to be joined in a case brought to enjoin the T.V.A.
from purchasing and using strip-mined coal because, among other reasons, their participation
would not "help much to elucidate the issue in the case: whether TVA followed the dictates
of NEPA." Id. at 408. Although this statement was made as part of an application of Rule
19(b), it applies equally to the question under 19(a)(2) as to whether a non-party "claims an
interest relating to the subject of the action." Id.; FED. R. Civ.•P. 19(a); see•also Jeffries v.
Georgia Residential Fin. Auth., 678 F.2d 919, 928-29 (11th Cir. 1982) (court treats the rights
and conduct of private owners as a distinct matter from the tenants' attack on an expedited
eviction process for low-income housing).
3" Absent the discrimination, perhaps the white employees might not have been as
successful in their careers. See Brown & Baumann, Nostalgia, supra note 3, at 54.
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union), if mandatory joinder would be unwieldy or impossible, and
if there was a strong public interest that the case proceed. In an
environmental suit brought by the Sierra Club, for example, the
District Court for the Eastern District of California held that al-
though miners' property rights would be affected, the miners were
not necessary parties: "where what is at stake are essentially issues
of public concern and the nature of the case would require joinder
of a large number of persons, Rule 19's joinder requirements need
not be satisfied." 325 Also citing Federal Rule 1, the district court
reasoned that "[s]urely justice cannot be done if public interest
litigation is precluded by virtue of the requirements of joinder." 326
The Supreme Court might have deemed eliminating the pollution
to our country from employment discrimination as being as much
in the public interest as protecting the physical environment.
None of this is to say that the white firefighters of Birmingham,
who might otherwise have been promoted faster, would not lose
something from a decree to cure previous discrimination. 327 The
majority of federal courts, however, had protected Wilks-like con-
sent decrees from collateral attacks by white employees. Thus, there
is good reason to question the Supreme Court's political neutrality
in using joinder principles to erect yet another barrier to title VII
litigation.328 After Wilks, title VII consent decrees were attacked
throughout the country, and dormant cases were reopened, making
323 Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 321-24 (E.D. Cal. 1985). The "public rights"
or "public interest" exception to necessary joinder was articulated in National Licorice Co. v.
NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940); see also Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S.
515, 552 (1937). For application of the concept in suits filed by private parties, see Kirkland
v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 424 (2d Cir. 1975) (white
applicants who had passed a civil service examination held not indispensable parties to suit
brought by plaintiffs alleging discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983); Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 458 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D.D.C. 1978) (applicants
for leases held not indispensable in suit brought under the National Environmental Protection
Act to enjoin federal officials from issuing "preference right coal leases"); see also National
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 326 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
326 Sierra Club, 608 F. Supp. at 325.
327 See, e.g., Stuart Taylor, Second-Class Citizens, Ant. LAW., Sept. 1989, at 42 (describing
the situations and feelings of white firefighters, members of the same fire department whose
policies were contested in Wilk, who had higher test scores than the African-Americans who
had been hired pursuant to the consent decree). But the dissent in Watts pointed out that
the district court found that no black officers had been promoted who were "not qualified
or who were demonstrably less qualified than whites who were not promoted." 490 U.S. at
781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
326 See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.3 (listing six cases in five circuits as a "sampling of cases
from the Circuits applying the 'impermissible collateral attack' rule or its functional equiva-
lent," and one circuit court decision deciding the opposite). See supra note 279 for more
discussion of this footnote.
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a mockery of the concept of finality. 529 In Wilks, as in so many recent
title VII cases, the Court downplayed the serious repercussions of
its jurisprudence for minority plaintiffs,'" and used "neutral" pro-
cedure in a far from simple or transsubstantive manner to advance
its ideological agenda.
VI. How FEE ALLOCATIONS PENALIZE PLAINTIFFS
Civil rights plaintiffs are typically unable to pursue their claims
without legal representation. Much of the civil rights plaintiffs' bar,
including pro bono organizations, depends on the fee shifting pro-
visions of civil rights statutes."' Thus, the rules about fees signifi-
cantly impact plaintiffs' access to the courts, and the cases imparting
a pro-defendant slant to these rules have discouraged the filing of
title VII suits.
We have just seen how the Supreme Court used Rule 19 to
create substantive rights for white employees at the expense of title
VII plaintiffs. Having done so, the Court then found a way, in
Independent Federation of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, to insulate the white
employees from liability for legal fees."' We also saw how the Court
undermined the feasibility of title VII class actions. At the same
time, the Court has jeopardized the fees of the attorneys who rep-
3" LAWYERS' CommirrEE, supra note 259, at I, 14-28. It is unclear whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 applies to cases like these that were pending at the time of its enactment.
See, e.g., The Civil Eights Act of 1991, RES 1PsA (Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law,
Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1991. The case law is in disarray. See, e.g., Mojica v. Gannett Co.,
779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (Act is retroactive); Hansel v. Public Serv. Co. of Colorado,
778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991) (Act is not retroactive to pending cases).
'3° See 490 U.S. at 767.
"' Title VII provides for the award of attorney's fees in section 706(k):
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States,
a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the Commission and the
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
42 U.S.C. fi 2000e-5(k) (1982). The standards for awarding fees arc generally the same
under both title VII and section 1988 of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976. This
latter statute provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of 42 U.S.C.
Sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title . . . the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part
of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). See generally S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908. Section 113 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
makes expert witness fees available to prevailing parties in title VII cases, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k), and in section 1981 cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c). Attorney's fees are also available under
the Equal Access to Justice Act, which provides attorney's fees to plaintiffs who prevail against
the United States. See 28 U.S.C. 11 2412 (1982).
3" 491 U.S. 754 (1989).
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resent plaintiffs in class actions. The holding of Evans v. Jeff D. 3"
invites an adversarial relationship between title VII plaintiffs and
their lawyers in class actions. In Marek v. Chesny, 334 the Court's
interpretation of a procedural rule jeopardizes fee awards to plain-
tiffs' lawyers. Zipes, Jeff D. and Marek have undermined the congres-
sional policy of awarding attorneys fees to victorious title VII plain-
tiffs,"6 thus making it far less likely that attorneys will take title VII
cases
A. Intervenors Get a Free Ride
In Zipes, the Court refused to allow prevailing plaintiffs to
collect legal fees from unsuccessful intervenors."7 It held that a
plaintiff will only be entitled to fees against an intervenor when the
intervenor's action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without foun-
dation.""8 Reasoning that intervenors are not wrongdoers but
3" 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
3" 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
333
 In an early civil rights case, Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968),
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress intended to encourage plaintiffs to act as
"private attorney[sj general" and to promote private enforcement of civil rights through the
fee shifting provisions of title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Id. at 402. Piggie Park established
that prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases are entitled to an award of attorney's fees unless
"special circumstances" would render an award unjust. The Court saw the fee shifting
provision as furthering a congressional intent to encourage private attorneys general to
"vindicat[e) a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority." Id. (footnote omitted).
The Court recognized that if plaintiffs were routinely forced to pay their attorney's fees, few
plaintiffs would be able to vindicate their rights. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975), the Court held that the Piggie Park standard for awarding attorney's fees to a
successful plaintiff was applicable to title VII actions. See id. at 415. But three years later, in
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court held that "prevailing
party" included a prevailing defendant. See id. at 417. In Christianburg Garment, the Court
created a different standard for prevailing defendants that permits the award of attorney's
fees when the plaintiff's action is frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though
not motivated by subjective bad faith, Id. The Court rejected the EEOC's argument that
prevailing defendants should be awarded attorney's fees only when plaintiff's suit was
brought in bad faith, concluding that "in enacting § 706(k) Congress did not intend to permit
the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only in a situation where the plaintiff
was motivated by bad faith in bringing the action." Id. at 418-22.
3" Although corporate defendants often have in-house counsel whom they routinely
consult on personnel questions, plaintiffs do not have regular counsel available for consul-
tation on recurring discrimination claims.
337
 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754,766 (1989).
333 Id. In Zipes, female flight attendants brought an action against TWA alleging that
the airline's policy of discharging employees who became mothers violated title VII. Id. at
755. In the original action, the plaintiffs were represented by the Airline Stewards and
Stewardesses Association ("ALSSA"), a union that preceded the Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants ("IFFA"). Id. at 755-56. After the suit was filed, the defendant changed
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merely innocent parties protecting their interests, the Court char-
acterized intervenors as "particularly welcome, since we have
stressed the necessity of protecting, in Title VII litigation, 'the le-
gitimate expectations of . . . employees innocent of any wrongdo-
ing."'"
As Justice Marshall pointed out in dissent, the majority "breaks
the congressional promise that prevailing plaintiffs will be made
whole for efforts to vindicate their civil rights" and elevates inter-
venors to the same plane as title VII plaintiffs.'" The majority
explicitly refused to respect the substantive goals of title VII, stating
that these objectives do not have "hegemony over all the other rights
and equities."'" Zipes effectively nullifies the congressional policy
that title VII plaintiffs act as private attorneys general. 342 Abandon-
ing the focus of earlier cases that encouraged plaintiffs to enforce
title VII, Zipes is concerned with the possibility that an award of
fees against an intervenor would provide a disincentive to those
with interest in the litigation from raising their claims. And litigating
intervenors' claims is expensive; the plaintiffs in Zipes spent three
years and $200,000 successfully defending the settlement against
the intervenor's claims in the district court, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court."'
Zipes creates yet another hazard for title VII plaintiffs, who
may succeed in their claims against intervenors yet be forced to
bear the cost of litigating the intervenors' suits, even after the de-
fendant has been found liable for violating title VII. 344 Zipes en-
courages a title VII defendant to shield itself from liability for legal
fees by encouraging its arguments to be made by the intervenor. 345
its policy and settled with the ALSSA. Id. at 756. After the settlement, the IFFA sought
permission to intervene in the lawsuit on behalf of incumbent Right attendants not affected
by the challenged policy. Id. at 757. The IFFA objected to the settlement on two grounds:
first, the district court lacked jurisdiction, and second, the relief the court had approved
would violate the collective bargaining agreement between the IFFA and TWA. Id. The
Supreme Court rejected both claims. Id.
559 Id, at 764.
34° Id. at 774-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
5" Id. at 763 n.4. The majority also reasoned that those who collaterally attack title VII
settlements as permitted by Marlin v. Willis are not liable for attorney's fees, and thus
concluded that plaintiffs still face the prospect of attorney's fees in defending their victories.
Id. at 762.
Al5 See supra note 335.
545 Id, at 779 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A" See id.
In dissent, Justice Marshall suggested that many defendants will minimize fee ex-
posure by relying on intervenors to raise many of the defenses. Id. at 779-80 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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On the other hand, making a defendant liable for the plaintiff's
fees in an intervenor's case would be in keeping with the philosophy
of title VII. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his concurring
opinion:
Such a rule would safeguard the plaintiff's incentive to
enforce Title VII by assuring that the costs of defending
against an unsuccessful intervention will be recouped, and
would give a plaintiff added incentive to invite interven-
tion by interested third parties, whose concerns can be
addressed most fairly and efficiently in the original Title
VII proceedings.346
This observation was particularly cogent given the perpetual right
to intervene created by Martin v. Wilks.347
B. Plaintiffs at War with Their Own Lawyers
The defendant-oriented title VII doctrine created by the Su-
preme Court seems to make settlement a particularly attractive
option for a plaintiff. Read together, however, Marek v. Chesny348
and Evans v. Jeff D. 349 force a plaintiff's attorney to choose between
settling the case and receiving a fee, 35° thus creating an adversary
relationship between plaintiff and lawyer.
In Marek v. Chesny, the Court held that prevailing civil rights
litigants who were entitled to fees may be barred from recovering
any fees for work performed after rejecting a settlement offer made
under Rule 68 351 when the ultimate recovery is less than the amount
"6 Zipes, 491 U.S. at 768 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The chilling
effect of Zipes was at issue in the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, which provided that
"parties who prevail in employment discrimination cases may recover fees expended in
defending their court decrees against subsequent challenges." S. Res. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. 1019 (1990). Similar language addressing Zipes was included in earlier
drafts of the 1991 Act but does not appear in the final draft of the legislation. See H.R. REP.
No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 79-81 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 617-
19; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
397 Justice Marshall's Zipes dissent is illustrative; in his view, Zipes and Wilk combine to
force many victims of discrimination "to forego remedial litigation for lack of financial
resources. As a result, injuries will go unredressed and the national policy against discrimi-
nation will go unredeemed." 491 U.S. at 780 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"8
 473 U.S. I (1985).
349
 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
"° See generally, Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 270 (1989).
" 1 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides in relevant part:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against
a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be
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offered at settlement. 352 The Court construed the word "costs" in
Rule 68 to include attorney's fees, and ruled that any time a damage
award at trial is less than the settlement offered by the defendant,
the plaintiff may not recover fees."'
Justice Brennan demonstrated in dissent that, because Marek
forces pretrial settlement, the Court's holding is inconsistent with
the congressional policy behind the post-trial fee shifting provisions
of civil rights statutes. 354 Marek works against plaintiffs by forcing
attorneys to choose between seeking more favorable judgments and
risking their fees if they fail to win those judgments. 955 This is a
perfect example of a court using a procedural rule to destroy a
statutorily created right. 356
taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effects
specified in the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service
of the offer the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted,
either party may then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof
of service thereof and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not
accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible
except in a proceeding to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by
the offered is not more favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs
incurred after the making of the offer.
352 473 U.S. at 10-11. In Marek, the plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against
three police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Before trial, defendants made an offer of
settlement under Rule 68 of $10,000, a sum specifically including costs and attorney's fees.
Plaintiff rejected the offer. At trial, the plaintiff was awarded damages, not including costs,
of $60,000. The plaintiff then tiled for attorney's fees under section 1988. See 473 U.S. at 4.
355 Id. Rule 68 has been construed to apply only when the plaintiff obtains a judgment,
and not when plaintiff loses. See Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346 (1981).
354 Marek, 473 U.S. at 31 (Brennan, J., dissenting). As Justice Brennan points out, Rule
68 is a "one way street," available to defendants and not to plaintiffs. Id. (citation omitted).
Apparently, a substantial portion of Congress agrees. A provision to preclude Marek from
application to title VII cases was included in a final House version of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 but did not survive the final draft of the legislation. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), 102
Cong., 1st Sess. 82-83 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 620-21; see also Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
555 See generally, Emily M. Calhoun, Attorney Client Conflicts of Interest and the Concept of
Non-Negotiable Fee Awards in 42 U.S.C. § 1988, 55 U. CoLo. L. REV. 341 (1984); James Kraus,
Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver of Attorney's Fees by Civil Rights Litigants in
Exchange for Favorable Settlement of Cases Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 29
Via.. L. REV. 597 (1984).
556 As Professor Burbank has repeatedly and eloquently explained, the Enabling Act of
1934, and subsequent versions, should be interpreted as written so that the command that
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should "not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right" is taken seriously and given meaning. See Burbank, Enabling Act, supra note 10, at
1025-26; Steven B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington's "Substance" and
"Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012, 1016-20, 1033, 1046; Stephen B.
Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68—Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. Mimi. J.L. REF. 425, 428,
430-33 (1986).
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While Marek creates an enormous incentive for the plaintiff to
settle, 357 the title VII attorneys who do settle risk their fees. In Evans
v. Jeff D., plaintiff's counsel was instructed by his client to waive his
fee as part of the settlement.358 The Supreme Court held that under
Rule 23(e), a district court has discretion to approve a settlement
conditioned on such a forced fee waiver. 859 Jeff D. intensifies lawyers'
dilemmas in class actions, that of choosing between favorable settle-
ments and their own fees. 36° Marek and Jeff D. place attorneys in an
excruciating ethical dilemma; attorneys may agree to premature
settlements and avoid risk to their fees, or they may follow their
clients' wishes in favor of settlement, thus foregoing their fees. 361
Marek and Jeff have created enormous barriers for civil rights
plaintiffs, as well as significant financial quandaries. Perhaps most
seriously, they have divorced the interests of plaintiffs from their
lawyers, thus subverting the attorney-client relationship.
555 See generally, Roy D. Simon, The New Meaning of Rule 68: Marek v. Chesny and Beyond,
14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 475 (1986); Roger Platt, Note, Settle or Else: Federal Rule
68 Makes Civil Rights Litigation a Risky Business: Marek v. Chesny, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 535 (1987).
553 475 U.S. 717 (1986). In J eff D., the plaintiffs were a class of emotionally handicapped
children who sought damages for alleged deficiencies in state-provided education and health
services. The plaintiffs' counsel was a legal aid attorney who agreed to settlement one week
before trial.
359 Id. at 742-43.
369 Since Rule 23(e) and Jeff D. apply to class actions, there is a potential conflict between
the named plaintiffs and other class members if they refuse the waiver of the fee. The
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 included a requirement that courts entering consent
decrees settling discrimination cases first obtain an attestation that a waiver of attorney's fees
was not compelled as a condition of settlement. See S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
This provision was also included in earlier drafts of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, but it does
not appear in the final version. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 83-85
(1991) (seeking to overturn Jeff D.), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 621-23; see also Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
361 Since Jeff D., the lower courts have been unwilling to interfere with settlement waivers
in individual civil rights cases which, unlike settlements in class actions under Rule 23(e), do
not require approval of the court. See, e.g., Panola Land Buying Ass'n v. Clark, 844 F.2d
1506, 1508 ( I 1 th Cir. 1988) (courts "need not and should not get involved" in fee waivers in
settlements); Willard v. City of Los Angeles, 803 F.2d 526, 527 (4th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's
attorney has no right to intervene to object to settlement waiving his fees). Commentators
have criticized these cases. See Margaret A. de Lisser, Giving Substance to the Bad Faith Exception
of Evans v. Jeff D.: A Reconciliation of Evans with the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 553, 581-82 (1987). See generally, Steven M. Goldstein, Settlement
Offers Contingent Upon Waiver of Attorney's Fees: A Continuing Dilemma After Evans, 20 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 693, 694 (1986); Note, Fees as the Wind Blows: Waivers of Attorney's Fees in
Individual Civil Rights Actions Since Evans v. Jeff D., 102 HARV. L. REV. 1278, 1292 (1989);
Peter H. Woodin, Note, Fee Waivers and Civil Rights Settlement Offers: State Ethics Prohibitions
After Evans v. Jeff D., 87 Comm. L. REV. 1214, 1230-37 (1987).
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VII. How RULE 11 INTERSECTS WITH TITLE VII: THE LAST
STRAW
The complexities of pleading a title VII case and the stringent
requirements for establishing a prima facie case present a Rule 11
dilemma for plaintiff's counsel: certifying a complaint containing
specific allegations where all or most of the information is unveri-
fiable because it is within defendant's control. 562 Rule 11 was
amended in 1983 as a result of a widespread feeling that the old
rule was a rarely invoked, ineffective tool for preventing abuses in
the pleading process. 363 The new rule sought to address a perceived
"litigation explosion" of rneritless claims filed and pursued with near
impunity. 364 While the goal of preventing litigation abuse is certainly
valid, 365 strict application of Rule 11 to the new formulations of the
title VII prima facie case is difficult to justify.566 Title VII plaintiffs'
lawyers usually practice alone or in small firms, and title VII plain-
tiffs typically are economically insecure. As we have seen, title VII
567 Rule 11 requires a party or attorney to sign all pleadings, motions or other papers.
This signature constitutes certification that the signer has read the document and that:
[T]o the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation ... .
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable
expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. l
385
	
a history of the enforcement problems inherent in the old Rule 11, see D.
Michael Risinger, Honesty in Pleadings and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure I I , 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976). The advisory committee notes to the
amended Rule I I speak directly and repeatedly to the problem of judicial discretion in the
imposition of sanctions. The advisory committee reaches the unmistakable conclusion that if
a court is forced to impose sanctions when the rule is violated, attorneys will be forced to
meet their responsibilities under the rule. FED. R. Cr/. P. 11 advisory committee's note; see
also STEPHEN B. BURBANK, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOC'Y, STUDIES OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM,
RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at xix (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
364
 Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REv. 485, 485 (1989).
385 Among the most outspoken supporters of the amended Rule 11 is J udge Schwarzer,
who has written in support of its continued vigorous application. William W. Schwarzer,
Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11—A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985); William W.
Schwarzer, Commentary, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HA RV. L. REv. 1013 (1988).
38B See supra text accompanying notes 71-111.
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doctrine is in flux, and the facts are largely inferential and in
defendants' hands, Sanctions for the failure sufficiently to investi-
gate facts and law chill valid claims while encouraging a prolifera-
tion of sanction-oriented litigation. 367
 Indeed, commentators and
judges have become increasingly concerned with Rule 11's potential
to wreak havoc with civil rights cases. 368
Envision the classic employment discrimination case: a person
on the job notices, overhears or suspects that she is being discrim-
inated against—perhaps passed over for promotion—on the basis
of her race. With only this information, plaintiff's lawyer must draft
pleadings to meet Rule 11's strictures that all pleadings be "well
grounded in fact" and "warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law."369
 In our hypothetical about African-American doctors chal-
lenging a hospital hiring policy requiring the personal recommen-
dation of physicians already on the staff, plaintiff's counsel will not
have much of the information critical to the plaintiff's prima facie
case: the subjective discriminatory intent of the hospita1, 3" the jus-
tifications for the hospital's policy, the cost of the existing policy
and of alternatives, and/or the effectiveness of those alternatives to
the hospital's performance of its functions."' Plaintiff's counsel
probably will not know the number and qualifications of African-
American physicians rejected; certainly, she will not know about
367 See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 364, at 486-88, expressing concern that]udge Schwarzer's
suggestions do not address the unique problems Rule 11 created for civil rights plaintiffs
and their attorneys.
' 63 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 363, at 68-72; Burbank, Transformation, supra
note 14, at 1938, 1961; Carter, supra note 186, at 2191-95; Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L.
Rim 1901, 1913-14 n.52 (1989).
'69 FED. R. City. P. 11. Lawyers and individual plaintiffs alike are subject to the Rule's
commands upon the signing of a "pleading, motion, or other paper." Id. See Business Guides,
Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991), in which even a
represented party whose officer signed a court document was sanctioned for violating Rule
11. Id. at 935.
37°
 The 1991 Civil Rights Act does not affect disparate treatment subjective motivation
cases. See Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
"' Section 105 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 purports to overrule Wards Cove by
restoring the Griggs allocation of proof in disparate impact cases. See sec. 105, § 703, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1074-75 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k)(1); see also
§ 3(2) ("The purposes of this Act are . . . to codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and
job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . and in the
other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.") (citations
omitted). However, the data about the hospital remains critical to plaintiff. See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, sec. 105.
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those who did not apply because of the policy. She will not know
the qualifications of white doctors accepted on the staff. She may
not even be certain of the elements of her prima facie case. More-
over, plaintiff's attorney will inevitably have far fewer resources,
financial and otherwise, than attorneys representing the hospital. 372
Defendants now reflexively use Rule 11 motions in response to
the filing of civil rights claims. 373 This means that even those plain-
tiffs and their lawyers who have brought title VII cases in good
faith may have to squander precious resources defending against
Rule 11 motions. The threat of Rule 11 may compel plaintiff and
counsel to refrain from initiating a meritorious title VII claim. As
Judge Cudahy recently observed, in dissent from a decision to
remand a case for further fact finding, his colleagues were "almost
at the point of saying the main question before the court is not—
`Are you right?' but 'Are you sanctionable?'" 374 In his view, Rule 11
tends to encourage satellite litigation and to chill both the most and
least legitimate civil rights lawsuits, turning "a protection against
frivolous litigation" into "a fomenter of derivative litigation, a mire
for unwary parties and overzealous courts." 373 In short, the "Rule
11 tail [is] wagging the substantive law dog." 376
Much title VII litigation gives the appearance of a Rule 11
violation. For example, Rule 11 requires that all pleadings and
papers be "well grounded in fact."977 Strict construction of this
language is a serious hurdle to title VII plaintiffs, who often must
372 Moreover, defendant may well have experienced and expert in-house counsel.
373 The very nature of civil rights claims tends to invite Rule II motions from defendants.
See, e.g., Arthur B. LaFrance, Federal Rule 11 and Public Interest Litigation, 22 V. U. L. REV.
331 (1988); Tobias, supra note 550; Tobias, supra note 364; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A
Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988).
374 Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085.-86 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 901 (1988).
"5 Id. at 1085. While some Rule 11 cases do get reported, hundreds more do not.
Professor Tobias warns that "relying on reported decisions warrants considerable caution
[,as) . . . much judicial activity involving Rule 11, even orders imposing sanctions, has not
been reported." Tobias, supra note 350, at 302. He suggests that a published opinion in and
of itself can serve as a deterrent. Id. at 302. Moreover, the lack of reported cases hides
another aspect of the Rule I 1 problem; many cases are not brought because of the imminent
threat of sanctions. As the Task Farce Report notes, "no statistics on reported decisions can
reflect private resolution of Rule 1 I motions" and 'reported decisions are unlikely to give a
clear picture of the role that warnings about the requirements of Rule 11 play." TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 363, at 57, 58.
376 Yancey v. Carroll County, 674 F. Supp. 572, 575 (E.D. Ky. 1987). Some commentators
have suggested that Rule 11 has helped to resurrect the antiquated notion of the "disfavored
claim" despite Congress's clear intent to the contrary. See Tobias, supra note 364, at 502.
377 FED. R. Ctv. P. 1I.
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rely heavily on the discovery process to obtain information. 378
 Recall
our hypothetical doctors and the information they lacked, all of
which is in the hands, files or minds of the defendants. Although
discovery might elicit some of the information, a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion might be allowed prior to the completion of discovery. The
motion for Rule I I sanctions will inevitably follow.
In one recent and particularly troubling case, a plaintiff's coun-
sel was subject to Rule 11 sanctions where the good faith of the
discovery requests was challenged in light of the plaintiff's failure
to retain an expert.379
 Plaintiff's lawyer had made a discovery re-
quest for statistical data in the defendant's possession. The court
held that the party seeking the data must make its intentions clear
with regard to subsequent professional analysis of that data "so the
adversary can select the most economical means of compliance." 380
Besides protecting the defendant's files, and complicating the pro-
duction of the evidence needed by plaintiff to form a well-grounded
factual background, such a rule completely ignores plaintiff's lack
of resources. Should plaintiff be required to hire an expert statis-
tician to evaluate data that may or may not lead to support of the
claim? Should a defendant be excused from full compliance with
discovery requests on the basis of the plaintiff's attorney's lack of
demonstrated ability to interpret the documents without expert
assistance? Is a plaintiff's ability to hire an expert relevant to de-
fendant's duty to respond to discovery? The use of Rule 11 sanctions
to penalize the wrong answer to these questions subverts the dis-
covery process.
Rule 1 l's requirement that a pleading be "warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law" is similarly fraught with problems for the
title VII plaintiff, particularly in its deleterious effect on the ad-
vancement of novel legal theories."' Shrock v. Altru Nurses Registry 382
is illustrative. Shrock, a male nurse, filed charges with the EEOC in
378
 An objective standard is used in evaluating the factual inquiry. In the employment
discrimination context, see Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873 (5th
Cir. 1988) (and cases cited therein).
378 See Greenberg v. Hilton Intl Co., 875 F.2d 39, 41 (2d Cir. 1989).
18° Id. at 40 n.1.
381
 Professor Tobias notes that "ft]hese concepts are at the cutting edge of legal devel-
opment, which means that they are difficult to conceptualize and substantiate ... [and] once
formulated, look non-traditional and even implausible." Tobias, supra note 364, at 497. He
suggests consideration of the implications of Rule 11's rigorous enforcement in a case like
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Tobias, supra note 364, at 497.
981 810 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1987).
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1979 alleging that his employer refused to refer male nurses to
female patients."' He later filed a pro se title VII action that was
dismissed in 1983 pursuant to a settlement that put him back on
Altru's registry of nurses.'" Two weeks after the settlement, Shrock
filed new charges with the EEOC and another suit in which he
alleged that Altru had discriminated against him again. 985 Shrock's
case was dismissed on Altru's motion for summary judgment and
Altru's motion for attorney's fees was denied. 386 Both parties ap-
pealed. On appeal, Judge Posner held that the suit was "not frivo-
lous in the traditional sense of making an utterly groundless claim.
Maybe Altru did discriminate against Shrock . . . . "387 Still, Judge
Posner was "puzzled" at the district court's refusal to grant Altru's
attorney's fees, and despite the fact that Altru's request for fees was
not made pursuant' to Rule 11, the case was remanded for consid-
eration of that issue. 388
If ever there was a case that argued for a modification or
extension of existing legal theories, it is Altru. Altru Nurses Registry
was a nurse referral agency, and as such was in a gray area of
employer status under title VII. Shrock did not technically work
for the agency; he worked for the patients to whom Altru referred
him. 389 On appeal, Judge Posner found Shrock to be an indepen-
dent contractor, thus removing Altru from the coverage of title
VII. 390 Although the court did not "need [to] decide when, if ever,
an employer covered by the statute can be held liable for conduct
toward someone who is not its employee," Judge Posner cited two
cases supporting that proposition and further noted that "[those
cases] gave [Shrock] a shot at bringing Altru within the jurisdiction
of the statute as an employer if Altru turned out to have enough
employees." 39 ' Because there was support for plaintiff's position, it
is peculiar that Altru was remanded for further determination of
3°3 Id. at 660.
3°4 Id.
3°3 Id.
3" Id.
367 Id. at 661.
atm Id. Judge Posner noted that "[Wie are given pause ... that Altru's motion for attorney's
fees did not mention Rule II; it relied solely on 42 U.S.C. section 1988 (that was wrong, too,
as we said) . • Olt is true that a request for sanctions under Rule 11 is not a prerequisite to
their imposition . . . Therefore we do not treat Altru's failure to mention Rule 11 in the
district court ... as a waiver of Rule II sanctions." Id. at 662.
"9 See id. at 660-61.
39° Id. at 660.
39' Id. at 661.
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Rule 11 sanctions. The remand was nominally based on Shrock's
poor investigation of the factual basis of the suit. Judge Posner
implied, however, that Rule 11 sanctions are awarded only where
the plaintiff's suit is "frivolous, unreasonable, or without founda-
tion," which Shrock's case admittedly was not. 392 This use of Rule
11, especially in a case that does not show even a hint of bad faith,
confirms many of the worst fears about the rule's application against
title VII plaintiffs. Regardless of the outcome on the merits of the
Rule 11 issue, such unwarranted and expensive satellite litigation
exacts a heavy price in terms of plaintiff's time, money and anxiety.
Altru also implicates Rule 11's requirement that the pleadings
be factually well-grounded. The court's choice of words—whether
Altru "turned out" to have enough employees—and its reference
to other facts the panel found lacking393
 is disturbing because it
presumes the availability of information to the plaintiff. This would
hardly be the case in instances where the employee had not previ-
ously filed suit against his employer. For a plaintiff in Shrock's
position, such information, absent discovery, would not likely be
forthconaing."4
Rule 11 is particularly harsh in an area like title VII, where the
Supreme Court has regularly reformulated the prima facie case.
Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which purports to restore
some of the provisions of title VII to their original meaning, 395
although meant to assist plaintiffs, may well exacerbate the Rule 11
problems, at least until the Court has definitively interpreted the
new statute. The point is clear: Rule 11 sanctions are especially
inappropriate in times of doctrinal upheaval.
"2 Altru, 810 F.2d at 661 (citing Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,
421 (1978)).
ig' Id. For instance, the court alluded to issues surrounding how Altru referred nurses
to its clients, whether hospitals as well as doctors and patients were part of Altru's client base,
and how many inquiries from female patients Altru had in a given period of time. Id. It is
significant that Shrock attempted to provide such additional evidence on appeal when he
apparently had engaged an attorney, but the court held that evidence had come too late, as
it had not been raised in district court. See Altru, 810 F.2d at 661-62. The court was apparently
applying a "product" test in judging lawyer-activity under Rule 11 rather than the "conduct"
test suggested by the very language of the Rule. See Burbank, Transformation, supra note 14,
at 1933-34.
3" The Altru case does not directly address other troubling aspects of Rule 11, such as
its mandatory imposition of sanctions upon a finding of a violation, its seemingly automatic
use by defense counsel or its potential for resurrecting the archaic notion of "disfavored
claims" in the civil rights context. See Tobias, supra note 364.
3" We shall explore the separation of powers implications of such "restoration" acts in
a subsequent article. Once again, we appreciate the generosity of the Fund for Labor Relations
Studies which has partially supported this research.
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As Professor Burbank has pointed out, "no group of lawyers
... [is] more concerned about the impact of amended Rule 11 on
their clients and their practice than lawyers who specialize in plain-
tiff's civil rights (including employment discrimination) law." 396 The
data supports many of the fears of the civil rights bar. 397 Although
the statistics vary, the commentators agree that a greater proportion
of Rule 11 sanctions has been brought in civil rights cases than in
other categories of federal civil litigation. Moreover, many more
sanctions have been granted against plaintiffs than defendants.
While varying in degree, the three major studies of the effect
of Rule 11 on the legal system all point to the rule's disproportionate
burden on civil rights cases in general, and civil rights plaintiffs,
including employment discrimination plaintiffs, in particular. Pro-
fessor Nelken wrote that while civil rights claims in 1983-1985
represented only 7.6% of all civil actions, Rule 11 motions appeared
in over 22% of those cases. 398 Professor Burbank reported that in
the Third Circuit, civil rights plaintiffs. were sanctioned over five
and a half times more frequently than all other plaintiffs com-
bined.399 Professor Vairo's results told much the same story, but on
a larger scale: civil rights and employment discrimination cases were
the subject of 28.1% of all Rule 11 cases, plaintiffs were targeted
86.4% of the time, and sanctions were granted in 71.5% of those
cases in which plaintiffs were the targets. 400 Other plaintiffs were
sanctioned in only 54.2% of all other cases, perhaps suggesting that
civil rights plaintiffs are subject to a more stringent Rule 11 standard
than other plaintiffs. 40 ' Defendants, targeted in a mere 13.6% of
all cases, were sanctioned only 50% of the time. 402 The title VII
plaintiff has ultimately borne a disproportionate share of the Rule
596 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 363, at 68 (parentheses in original). Some courts
view Rule 1 I as a fee shifting statute rather than a deterrent statute. This interpretation is
not only counter to the Rule's intent, see id. at 10-13, but also particularly harmful to
plaintiffs.
397 See also Vairo, supra note 373, at 200-201. Compare TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note
363, at 68-69 with Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions under Amended Federal Rule 1 1—Sonie"Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1327, 1338-
53 (1986).
398 Nelken, supra note 397, at 1327.
S99 Civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned 47.1% of the time while all others were sanc-
tioned 8.45% of the time. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 363, at 69.
Vairo, supra note 373, at 200-01. The Task Force Report generally questioned Professor
Vairo's methodology, raising concerns of underinclusiveness and double counting. See TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 363, at 56.
401 Vairo, supra note 373, at 200-01.
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11 burden and the threat of Rule 11 sanctions has been predictably
chilling to plaintiffs.40
 The use of Rule 11 in title VII cases is a
good example of a facially transsubstantive rule that has a starkly
non-transsubstantive effect.
VIII. EPILOGUE: SUBSTANCE IN THE SHADOW OF PROCEDURE
We set out in this article to explore the relationship between
substance and procedure in the context of a discrete statute. It is
profitable to look back upon our enterprise in three different ways.
Most obviously, the web of interrelationships between substantive
and procedural law determines the behavior of lawyers: what cases
they accept, what settlements can be achieved and what cases will
be lost and won.
Second, we have shown that the four suppositions underlying
modern procedure are suspect in title VII cases. We argue that the
division between substance and procedure makes little sense if one
wants to understand how laws actually operate. Procedural rules
are not flexible and simple. In operation, lawyers and judges define
the general substantive law and general procedural rules. Our ex-
amination of title VII also erodes the myth of transsubstantive
procedure. The courts have crafted unique procedural rules for
title VII. Even if the procedure has not been specifically designed
for title VII, across the board procedural rules have a distinct,
unique impact in any given field. Finally, the application of proce-
dural rules to title VII has not been, and indeed cannot be, value-
neutral. The process of defining general law, be it procedural or
substantive, is inherently political, for the definitions normally favor
one side or the other.
Third, our analysis has implications for considering classic sep-
aration of powers issues and for legal reasoning generally. If pro-
cedure and substance are as intertwined as this article suggests, laws
passed to achieve given ends must frequently provide specific pro-
cedural and evidentiary rules. Furthermore, the legal culture needs
to reconsider the tendency to examine substantive law, civil proce-
dure and evidence as discrete fields of learning.
A. On Losing Causes: A Fable for Lawyers
Recall the hospital whose practice is to hire only doctors who
have been recommended by staff members. As no African-Ameri-
40
 Commentators and courts have noted that only a small percentage of Rule I I cases
are reported. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 363, at 59 (and citations therein).
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can doctors have ever been recommended, the staff remains all
white. Assume that the hospital originally adopted this rule in the
nineteenth century because of racial hatred, which continues to this
day. The hospital has always explained its rule in terms of good
patient care and staff collegiality.
You, an experienced civil rights lawyer, are consulted by an
African-American surgeon, who, lacking an appropriate recom-
mendation, will not be considered by the hospital. You think first
about the theory of your claim. You have two choices, disparate
treatment or disparate impact. If the former, the burden is on the
doctor to meet pleading, production and persuasion burdens with
respect to the hospital's racial animus. For disparate impact, you
will have easily accessible statistical evidence: the all-white staff. But
the doctor may still have the burden of pleading, production and
persuasion regarding the availability of alternative non-discrimina-
tory staffing methods. After the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the doctor's
burdens with respect to hospital practices remain unclear. 404
How will you plead your case? Remember that you must plead
it with some specificity, and that Rule 11 sanctions threaten if you'
begin a case with what later proves to be insufficient facts. Remem-
ber, too, that your case is still at the pre-discovery stage. You have
no direct or even inferential evidence about defendant's state of
mind; after all, how can you ever know the state of mind of the
defendant, absent a "smoking gun?" You are not safe inferring
racial animus from the statistic of the all-white medical staff. So
much for disparate treatment. As for disparate impact, you can
plead the racially disparate effect, but you have no way of knowing
if there is a way for the hospital to hire doctors, that will have a less
discriminatory impact. In short, even though we have posited a
violation that title VII clearly was passed to rectify, you cannot even
plead your case in a way that would permit discovery, without
subjecting yourself to Rule 11 sanctions.
Have you considered the massive, and expensive, discovery you
will have to conduct in order to try to get evidence of the hospital's
real motive? What administrator will admit racial prejudice? Think
about the discovery you will need in order to develop alternative
hiring practices that will be equally effective in serving the hospital's
goals? If courts are "less competent than employers to restructure
business practices," 405 how will you be able to attempt that task?
404 See supra note 109.
"5 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 661 (1989) (citation omitted). The
1991 Civil Rights Act does not affect this institutional competence issue. See Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
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And if you are foolhardy enough to go forward nonetheless,
how will you ever get paid? Your client doesn't want to pay you to
tilt at windmills, particularly if a "victory" will put him in a job
where he rightfully suspects he will be despised. Moreover, he fears
that if he is known as a troublemaker he will be unable to work at
any hospital in the community." You ponder the possibility of a
class action for all African-Americans who have lacked a white
sponsor. But the hospital has no written policy against interviewing
minorities, and, indeed, its informal, non-written policy is neutral
on its face. Falcon teaches that racial discrimination is no longer by
definition class discrimination, and instead, essentially forces each
plaintiff to bring his or her own case. 407
 You do not have enough
information to satisfy Falcon's nexus requirement, and you may be
subject to Rule 11 sanctions before you can attempt to get that data
through discovery.
Must you now bring a defendant's class action? After all, if your
doctor gets hired, some white surgeon may not get hired, or some
white doctor currently on staff may have reduced use of the oper-
ating rooms. The rights of these white "innocent victims" might
take precedence over your client. White non-parties whose interests
may be impacted by a decree in a title VII case would not have
been bound after Martin v. Wilks. You may find yourself with an
unenforceable decree unless you provide the current and future
white doctors, whoever they might be, a reasonable opportunity to
object"
Your client is a single plaintiff who probably cannot plead, yet
alone prove or afford the discovery costs of, a prima facie title VII
case against an all-white hospital that has discriminated against
minorities for a century. You are compelled to think about settle-
ment. What if the hospital offers to settle, you refuse, and five years
later you win one dollar less than the offer?" Or what if your client
wants to settle, but the hospital is unwilling to pay your fee? 41° How
comfortable will you be telling your own client not to settle, even
408 See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
VICTIMS 26 (1988).
40' In our hypothetical, there is no "racially biased testing procedure" applied to both
employees and applicants that might trigger the footnote 15 exception to the close nexus
rule. See General Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.I5 (1982). See also supra note 211
and accompanying text for a discussion of footnote 15.
4°H
 The 1991 Civil Rights Act appears to require this opportunity. See sec. 108, fi 703,
1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071, 1076-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 4 2000e-2(n)(1)).
4011 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
410
 See Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
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though he is better off with the settlement? Will your client want
to go forward when you explain that he may have to pay the
hospital's fee if he loses or your fee if others intervene and prolong
the litigation? And never forget that throughout this process, you
and your client may be sanctioned under Rule 11. Will you ever
consider representing another title VII plaintiff ? 4 "
B. On Procedural Myths
It is our job as lawyers, teachers and scholars to consider how
laws actually work. After this exercise, we can no longer support
the artificial bifurcation of procedure and substance that has in-
formed our legal education and our jurisprudence. The interplay
of elements of the prima facie case, burdens of proof, pleading
requirements, discovery, rules of party-joinder, Rule 11 sanctions
and fees dictate the effectiveness of title VII. Laws, after all, are
not self-applying; what lawyers predict about this mixture deter-
mines what cases they take. Over time, one would expect the same
mixture to influence the behavior of those subject to the law. If
lawyers cannot readily bring title VII cases, potential title VII de-
fendants can act with impunity.
Lawyers would know very little if they limited their reading to
title VII and the Federal Rules. They would have to learn how the
courts have interwoven procedure and substance into a complex,
frustrating fabric. In other words, procedure is not transsubstantive.
There are special rules for title VII cases. Nor is procedure simple;
as we have seen, the procedure for tide VII cases is often complex.
We are not criticizing the idea of integrating substance and
procedure. Indeed, it is probably inevitable. For a law to be applied,
it must be broken down into elements, and decisions have to be
made with respect to pleading, parties and sanctions. But this in-
tegration is necessarily value-laden. It can expand plaintiffs' rights
or contract them, it can implement or thwart the purpose of the
statute. In our view, the restrictive interpretation of title VII is
regrettable, but that is not our point. All statutes take on meaning
through the unique mixture of their words and their procedure,
and the impact of this mixture on the legal profession.
This conclusion explodes the final myth: the political neutrality
of procedure. Procedure will help or hinder certain parties and
411 See Steven A. Holmes, Workers Find h Tough Going Filing Lawsuits Over Job Bias, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1991, at A 1.
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classes of cases in different ways. Procedure has deep political over-
tones. It is not a neutral procedure separate from substantive law.
C. Looking Forward by Looking Backwards
Since the mid-nineteenth century, procedural reformers in the
United States have been fond of deprecating common law proce-
dures that utilized discrete writs, each of which had its own proce-
dures. As legal historians have explained, the substance was secreted
within procedure.4 t 2 Both the Field Code and the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure consciously departed from this model; for the most
part, the procedural rules were drafted as an independent body of
law to be available for all cases in like manner. Legal thinking and
teaching kept apace. For a brief period, around 1880, courses were
given and treatises were written that joined substance and process
in given fields such as insurance, bailments and common carriers.
But this was a short-lived development. Who of us learned tort law
or contract law or constitutional law simultaneously with the rele-
vant procedural attributes?
This article questions the appropriateness of thinking about
law in a compartmentalized way. We must examine substantive doc-
trine, procedural rules, sanctions and fees in an integrated manner,
along with the social, economic and professional milieu of the com-
bined substantive-procedural regime. Otherwise, the inquiry is
empty and stylized.
We are not advocating a return to the hypertechnical procedure
of the common law.413
 Rather, our point is the need to recognize
4L2 "So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions in the infancy of Courts of Justice,
that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of
procedure; and the early lawyer can only see the law through the envelope of its technical
forms." HENRY S. MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1883); see also
S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 30-32 (1969); cf. Alan
Watson, The Law of Actions and the Development of Substantive Law in the Early Roman Republic,
89 LAW Q. REV. 387 (1973) (on the evolution from a pleading system to rational substantive
law).
4L5 For many, if not most matters, the general, flexible Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
may work fine. Our point is that Congress would be well-advised to consider when deviations
are needed to increase the likelihood that the rights meant to be granted by a specific statute
will in fact be vindicated by the courts. See Burbank, Preclusion, supra note 5, at 831, 832 and
831, n.462; Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: the Supreme Court, Federal Rules and
Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716-17(1988); Burbank, Transformation, supra
note 14, at 1940; Subrin, Equity, supra note 6, at 985; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 7, at
2041-43, 2048-51.
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that courts, without legislative guidance, have begun to read pro-
cedural specificity into title VII. It is clear that this jurisprudence
involves a good deal more than "mere" procedure. The decision
that white "victims" must be heard before minority plaintiffs can
prevail, although disguised in rulings on intervention in consent
decrees, is perforce a transformation of the substantive law. More
subtly, the decisions to require stricter pleading for title VII cases,
or to apply Rule 11 to these cases in the same manner as in other
cases, have redefined plaintiffs' title VII rights. Obviously, alloca-
tions of burdens of proof have an even more direct impact.
That judges have political views that influence their decisions,
particularly when they are not constrained by precise statutory lan-
guage, is as inevitable as the interplay of substance and procedure.
The critical questions are who will hone the procedures for partic-
ular statutes, and whether the substance/process integration will
hinder or further the statutory goals. Almost all of the title VII
integration has been defendant-oriented, fulfilling the ideology of
a majority of the Supreme Court, and implemented by the predom-
inantly conservative federal judiciary. 414
Because, at least theoretically, legislatures create new rights so
that citizens will have those rights vindicated, legislators must pay
close attention to how the substantive law will in fact interact with
procedure. At a minimum, this requires more precision in the stat-
utes themselves. Indeed, the legislature is aware of this necessity.
The concept of "restoration acts," attempting more precisely to
define the elements of causes of action and burdens of proof, has
become increasingly common. 415 The recent controversy over the
4 " In his two terms in office, President Reagan appointed "more than half" or the
federal judiciary, including three members of the Supreme Court. LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 17, 167 (1990) (citing H. ScHwAwrz, PACKING THE
COURTS (1988)). President Bush has made two Supreme Court appointments. The Washington
Post has predicted that by 1994, three quarters of the 752 federal trial and appeals court
judges will have been appointed by Reagan and Bush. Al Karmen & Ruth Marcus, A Chance
to Deepen Stamp on Courts, WASHINGTON POST, lan. 29, 1989, at Al.
415
	
e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28
(1988) (overruling Grove City College v. Bell, 965 U.S. 555 (1984)); Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982) (overruling City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980)); Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 94-555, 92 Stat.
2076 (1976) (overruling General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976)); Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(overturning Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, (1975)); Handi-
capped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415(e)(4)(B)—(G) (1982 Supp. V) (overturning Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, (1984)).
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proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
demonstrates both presidential and congressional consciousness
that procedure defines substance. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
appears to have restored much of title VII law to where it was
before the Supreme Court used procedural mechanisms to redefine
discrimination and equality. 416
 The controversy over legislation that
reads so technically reveals a growing awareness of the integral
nature of procedure and substance. 417
The trend toward legislative integration is not a bad one. It
requires legislative oversight, hearings and debate to craft statutes
that will combine substance and process to make rights more readily
vindicated. 418
 But more legislative specificity is not a panacea. Spec-
ificity can lead to underinclusiveness just as vagueness can invite.
too much judicial discretion. 419
One thing is clear from our study: synthesis will take place.
Those who favor the goal of eliminating discrimination in our so-
ciety had best attempt the integration on their own terms. Procedure
cannot be a junior partner; as much as the substance, it will fre-
Some states have already passed statutes to rebut Supreme Court employment discrimination
cases. William E. Schmidt, Minnesota Widens Rights to Counter High Court Move, N.Y. TIMES,
May 12, 1990, at 1, 10; see also Massachusetts Equal Rights Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 93, 1 102
(Supp. 1991).
416
 After vetoing the Civil Rights Act of 1990, President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 on November 21, 1991. That Act purports to overrule key aspects of Wards Cove
and Martin v. Wilks. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, secs. 105, 108, / 703, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(105 Stat.) 1071, 1074-77 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e-2(n)(1)(A), (k)(1)).
417
 President Bush recognized that a change in burden of proof is not just lawyer's talk.
He vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 because, in his view, the changes sought by Congress
would upset business practices by imposing heavier burdens on employers. In one respect,
the President was right. The corrections enacted by Congress would have changed results.
Despite the specific language in the Act to the contrary, the President's veto message claimed
that the bill would require quotas and restrict legitimate employment practices by making it
too difficult for employers to defend them. Civil Rights Act of 1990-Veto, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., 136 CONG. REC. S16562 (1990).
4U/
 This is not always an easy task. Title VII has concrete statute of limitations require-
ments that have thwarted plaintiffs not because of their specificity but because of their
extreme complexity, and because of the questions Congress left unanswered. Title VII
mentions no less than fifteen discrete time periods, and the Supreme Court has added a
sixteenth in Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807 (1980). See 42 U.S.C. .1 2000e-5. In this
instance, the attempt at integration worked poorly. Congress addressed one of these situa-
tions, the applicable limitations period for challenges to seniority systems, in section 112 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See sec. 112, § 706(e), 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071,
1078-79.(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 1 2000e—(5)(e)).
419 Statutes are not regulations, nor should they be. See Parmet, Discrimination and
Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 331 (1990) (criticizing the
new statute for including too many overly specific code-like provisions).
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quently require definition. This means that some procedural inci-
dents will have to accompany the substantive law in a more precise
and integrated fashion. In law, as in other disciplines, form and
substance are integrally related. In our democratic regime, it is
particularly appropriate that the legislature actively participate in
the synthesis.
